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“What men, what monsters, what inhuman race,  
What laws, what barb'rous customs of the place,  
Shut up a desart shore to drowning men,  
And drive us to the cruel seas again?” 
 
(Virgil, Aenid I, 539-540)1 
 
                                                 
1 KEENER, Frederick M. (Ed.), Virgil’s Aenid – Translated by John Dryden (London: Penguin Classics, 1997). 
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 Purpose of the research and methodology 
 
The phenomenon of people taking to the seas in search of safety, refuge or better economic 
conditions is certainly not new. The mass exodus of Vietnamese boat people throughout the 
1980s was followed in the 1990s by large-scale departures from Albania, Cuba and Haiti. 
Recently, international attention has focused on the movement of Somalis and Ethiopians 
across the Gulf of Aden, increasing numbers of sea arrivals in Australia as well as the 
outflow of people from North Africa to Europe in the aftermath of the Libya crisis. Beyond 
these situations, irregular maritime movements are a reality in all regions of the world. 2 A 
uniform legal definition of the terms ‘migrant’ or ‘migration’ does not exist at the 
international level.3 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) – the leading 
international organization for migration established in 19514 – stressed the variety of terms 
used to describe the same or similar phenomenon. For example, the terms ‘illegal migration’, 
‘clandestine migration’, ‘undocumented migration’ and ‘irregular migration’ are to a large 
extent used loosely and often interchangeably.5 In this dissertation, the terms ‘irregular 
migration’ and ‘illegal migration’ will be used. 
 
There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. On the 
definition of irregular migration, KOSER states: “Irregular is itself a complex and diverse concept 
that requires careful clarification ... [I]t is important to recognize that there are lots of ways that a 
migrant can become irregular.”6 Irregularities in migration can arise at various points – 
departure, transit, entry and return – and they may be committed either against the migrant 
or by the migrant’.7 IOM defined irregular migration as a movement that takes place outside 
                                                 
2 UNHCR, “Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Distress at Sea – How Best to Respond?”, Background paper (8-
10 November 2011), para. 1, available online: <http://www.unhcr.org/4ec1436c9.html>. 
3 TÜRK, Volker, “Freedom from Fear: Refugees, the Broader Forced Displacement Context and the Underlying 
International Protection Regime”, in CHETAIL, Vincent (Ed.), Globalization, Migration and Human Rights: 
International Law under Review (Brussels: Bruylant, 2007), Vol. II, 483, fn. 16. 
4 Constitution of the International Organization for Migration (adopted 19 October 1953, entered into force 30 
November 1954), 207 UNTS 189. In 1996, IOM concluded a cooperation agreement with the United Nations: 
Cooperation Agreement between the United Nations and the International Organization for Migration (adopted  
25 June 1996), 1928 UNTS 315. 
5 PERRUCHOUD, Richard (Ed.), Glossary on Migration (Geneva: IOM, 2004), 4, available online: 
<http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/IML_1_EN.pdf>. 
6 KOSER, Khalid, International Migration: a Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
55. 
7 ILO, “Towards a Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in the Global Economy”, Report VI presented at the 
International Labour Conference, 92nd sess, Report VI, Agenda Item 6, Geneva, 1-17 June 2004, 11. 
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the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries. From the perspective of 
destination countries it is illegal entry, stay or work in a country, meaning that the migrant 
does not have the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration 
regulations to enter, reside or work in a given country. From the perspective of the sending 
country, the irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an 
international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfil the 
administrative requirements for leaving the country.8 Thus, irregular migrants are people 
that cross international borders outside of formal, regularized migration channels.9 Although 
there is a tendency to restrict the use of the term ‘illegal migration’ to cases of smuggling of 
migrants and trafficking in persons,10 in this thesis the term is being used in its broader 
sense, namely migration to a destination country in violation of the immigration laws and 
sovereignty of that country.11 Migration can be categorized as either voluntary or forced, 
with the latter category usually describing refugees. Nevertheless, as the term refugee has a 
very specific meaning, it does not include all forced migrants.12  
 
Nowadays, most maritime movements are so-called ‘mixed’ movements, involving 
individuals or groups travelling in an irregular manner along similar routes and using 
similar means of travel, but for different reasons. This means that the people on board have 
various profiles and needs, as opposed to being primarily refugee outflows.13 However, all of 
these movements include at least some refugees, asylum-seekers or other people of concern 
to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The 1951 Convention 
                                                 
8 PERRUCHOUD, Richard (Ed.), Glossary on Migration (Geneva: IOM, 2004), 34, available online: 
<http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/IML_1_EN.pdf>. 
9 BETTS, Alexander, “Soft Law and the Protection of Vulnerable Migrants”, 24 Georgetown Immigration Law 
Journal 533 (2010), 536. 
10 PERRUCHOUD, Richard (Ed.), Glossary on MSigration (Geneva: IOM, 2004), 34, available online: 
<http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/IML_1_EN.pdf>. 
11 Some authors consider the term ‘illegal’ as being quite controversial since it names a person not only as an 
outsider to a particular nation, but as an outsider to any nation. As such, the other is outside the law itself, and, in 
a word, ‘illegal’. They suggest not to use this term as it is imperative to avoid labels that suggest a lack of legal 
existence which is both discriminatory and counterfactual. See for example: DAUVERGNE, Catherine, “Making 
People Illegal”, in FITZPATRICK, Peter & TUITT, Patricia (Eds.), Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global 
Subject (London: Ashgate Press, 2003), 84; BERG, Laurie, “At the Border and between the Cracks: The 
Precarious Position of Irregular Migrant Workers under International Human Rights Law”, 8 Melbourne Journal 
of International Law 1 (2007), 6. 
12 KOSER, Khalid, International Migration: a Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
16-17. 
13 UNHCR, “All in the Same Boat: The Challenges of Mixed Migration”, available online: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a1d406060.html>. 
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relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as someone who is unable or unwilling to 
return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.14 
An asylum seeker is a person seeking to be admitted into a country as refugees, but whose 
claim for refugee status – under relevant international and national instruments – has not yet 
been definitively evaluated. 15 However, among seaborne migrants, there are also people 
who are economic migrants looking for a better life in a developed country. Therefore, States 
are quite reluctant in permitting these persons onto their territory.  
 
These mixed movements frequently take place without proper travel documentation and 
are often facilitated by smugglers. The vessels used for the journey are generally 
overcrowded, unseaworthy and not commanded by professional seamen. Therefore, distress 
at sea situations are common, raising grave humanitarian concerns for those involved. 
Search and rescue operations, disembarkation, processing and the identification of solutions 
for those rescued are re-occurring challenges for States, international organizations as well as 
the shipping industry.16 Next to this, illegal migration by sea is often treated by States as a 
security threat. In order to cope with this problem, States are taking interception measures to 
prevent people from arriving at their territory by sea. The problem of migrants at sea 
therefore poses both maritime safety issues (search and rescue) as well as maritime security 
issues (interception). The problem of stowaways is also a maritime security problem. A 
stowaway is “[a] person who is secreted on a ship, or in cargo which is subsequently loaded on the 
ship, without the consent of the ship owner or the master or any other responsible person and who is 
detected on board the ship after it has departed from a port, or in the cargo while unloading it in the 
port of arrival, and is reported as a stowaway by the master to the appropriate authorities.”17 
                                                 
14 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 
UNTS 137 [Refugee Convention],  Art. 1. The 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees removed 
geographical and temporal restrictions from the Refugee Convention. Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 
(adopted 31 January 1967, entered into force 4 October 1967) 606 UNTS 267. 
15 PERRUCHOUD, Richard (Ed.), Glossary on Migration (Geneva: IOM, 2004), 8, available online: 
<http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/IML_1_EN.pdf>. 
16 UNHCR, “Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Distress at Sea – How Best to Respond?”, Background paper (8-
10 November 2011), para. 2, available online: <http://www.unhcr.org/4ec1436c9.html>. 
17 Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic (adopted 9 April 1965, entered into force 5 March 
1967), 591 UNTS 265, as amended [FAL Convention], Annex: Section 1 – Definitions and general provisions. 
See also: FAL, “Revised Guidelines on the Prevention of Access by Stowaways and the Allocation of 
Responsibilities to Seek the Successful Solution of Stowaway Cases”, FAL Resolution 11(37) (9 September 
2011). 
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However, in this dissertation we will only deal with migrants who travel with their own 
means. 
 
The central research question is whether the law of the sea provides enough tools to deal 
with migrants at sea both as a safety and as a security problem and if not, how we can 
improve the law in order to meet the current needs. Although this research does not focus on 
human rights or humanitarian law, these are mentioned where appropriate or deemed 
necessary in the light of an evaluation of the law of the sea. Regional legal instruments, 
initiatives and developments will be used to illustrate how certain areas deal with the 
problem of migrants at sea. Therefore, not every region will be covered in every part, nor 
will there be a comparative approach between regions. As we will focus on the law of the 
sea, we will merely deal with the actual sea journey of migrants. Therefore, the following 
elements will only be important when they influence the rights and obligations of the parties 
involved at sea: (1) the question why persons migrate: whether they have economic or 
political reasons is often not as important as the fact that they are at sea – being therein either 
voluntarily or not – with the aim of migrating; (2) what happens to the migrants after 
disembarkation (asylum procedure, reception condition etc.). 
 
With the aim of answering the central research question, the following methodology will 
be used: 
 
1. describe and analyze the current legal framework and highlight the legal gaps – 
based on the practical needs and problems – in law of the sea instruments relating to  
the maritime safety aspects of migrants at sea, namely search and rescue 
2. describe and analyze the current legal framework and highlight the legal gaps – 
based on the practical needs and problems – in law of the sea instruments relating to  
the maritime security aspects of migrants at sea, namely interception 
3. consider the common concerns of both maritime safety and maritime security aspects 
of migrants at sea as well as the confusion between the two legal regimes 
 16
4. explore a mechanism for re-interpreting and/or adapting the existing law of the sea 
instruments in order to provide for a workable and realistic solution for States and 
seafarers as well as for a stronger protection of migrants at sea 
 
In order to reach the above-mentioned objectives, three major parts have to be discerned: 
maritime safety (search and rescue), maritime security (interception) and common concerns 
and abuses. The results of these three parts will provide the necessary basis on which the 
conclusions will be founded. This dissertation applies a unique approach as it does not only 
deal with safety and security as two different legal regimes, but also takes a look at the 
problems that may arise when combining them with each other or when confronting them 
with other fields of law, such as human rights. 
 17
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Introduction 
 
The Arab Spring recently highlighted the problem of migrants at sea and the 
shortcomings of the international legal framework. Due to the social uprisings in Tunisia and 
Libya, thousands of people tried to reach Europe by sea. This is a dangerous journey, as 
these asylum seekers often travel in unseaworthy vessels. As a result of the Arab Spring, it is 
estimated that more than 1.500 people drowned or went missing while attempting to cross 
the Mediterranean to reach Europe in 2011.18 In 2012, UNHCR also expressed its concerns on 
the loss of life in maritime incidents in the Caribbean among people trying to escape – often 
in unseaworthy vessels – difficult conditions in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake.19 For 
example, in summer 2012, several persons lost their lives in Bahamian and US waters while 
trying to reach the shores of Florida. US Coast Guard data show that as of December 2011 
over 900 people have been found on boats in rescue operations including some 652 Haitians, 
146 Cubans and 111 people from the Dominican Republic.20  
 
These events are a reminder of the extremes that people in difficult situations sometimes 
resort to. Although no firm statistics exist, it is estimated that hundreds of deaths occur 
yearly as a result.21 The international community is aware that this problem has to be tackled 
as soon as possible in order to prevent further loss of life. This chapter will first deal with the 
search and rescue obligations of flag States and their shipmasters as well as those of coastal 
States. Secondly, we will take a look at the problem of disembarkation. As most rescued 
persons are asylum seekers, States are reluctant to let them disembark onto their own 
territory. Recently, there is a regional initiative for the Mediterranean Basin to solve the 
disembarkation problem. This will be discussed in a next part. Finally, we will discuss State 
responsibility as well as criminal sanctions for shipmasters in case international obligations 
are not being met. 
                                                 
18 UNHCR, “Mediterranean Takes Record as Most Deadly Stretch of Water for Refugees and Migrants in 2011”, 
Briefing Note (31 January 2012), available online: <http://www.unhcr.org/4f27e01f9.html>. 
19 UNHCR, “More People are Risking Lives in the Caribbean to Reach Safety”, Statement (13 July 2012), 
available online: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/50001c5a2.html>. 
20 US Coast Guard, “US Coast Guard Maritime Migrant Interdictions”, available online: 
<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/FlowStats/currentstats.asp>. 
21 UNHCR, “More People are Risking Lives in the Caribbean to Reach Safety”, Statement (13 July 2012), 
available online: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/50001c5a2.html>. 
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1. Search and rescue 
 
1.1. The duty to render assistance 
 
The moral obligation to render assistance to persons in peril or lost at sea is one of the 
oldest and most deep-rooted maritime traditions. The early maritime law was concerned 
with the preservation of maritime property, rather than with the protection of seafarers.22 
However, by the mid-19th century, one in five British mariners died at sea. Among sailors, 
mortality was higher than in any other occupation. Between 1861 and 1870, as much as 5,826 
ships were wrecked off the British coast with the loss of 8,105 lives.23 In 1880, the legal 
obligation of rendering assistance at sea was recognized in the Scaramanga v. Stamp Case, 
where it was decided: “To all who have trust themselves to the sea it is of the utmost importance 
that the promptings of humanity in this respect should not be checked or interfered with by prudential 
considerations which may result to a ship or cargo from the rendering of needed aid.”24  
 
In 1897, the Comité Maritime International (CMI) held its first international conference in 
Brussels to advance issues regarding collisions and salvage, as well as the duty to render 
assistance at sea. As a result, the Brussels Convention on Salvage was signed on 23 
September 1910.25 In 1989, the Brussels Convention was replaced by the International 
Convention on Salvage.26 The provisions in these conventions expressly articulate an 
unqualified duty to render assistance to ‘persons’ or to ‘any person’ ‘in distress’ or ‘in danger 
of being lost at sea’.27  Article 10 of the 1989 Salvage Convention stipulates: “(1) Every master 
is bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his vessel and persons thereon, to render 
assistance to any person in danger of being lost at sea. (2) The States Parties shall adopt the measures 
necessary to enforce the duty set out in paragraph 1. (3) The owner of the vessel shall incur no liability 
for a breach of the duty of the master under paragraph 1.” Also, Article 98 of the 1982 Law of the 
                                                 
22 GOLD, Edgar, CHIRCOP, Aldo E. & KINDRED, Hugh M., Maritime Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003), 193-195. 
23 See JONES, Nicolette, The Plimsoll Sensation: The Great Campaign to save Lives at Sea (London: Little 
Brown, 2006). 
24 Scaramanga v. Stamp, 5 C.P.D. 295 (1880), 304. 
25 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law related to Assistance and Salvage at Sea 
and Protocol of Signature (adopted 23 September 1910, entered into force 1 March 1913), 4 UKTS 6677. 
26 International Convention on Salvage (adopted 28 April 1989, entered into force 14 July 1996), 1953 UNTS 
194 [1989 Salvage Convention]. 
27 CACCIAGUIDI-FAHY, Sophie, “The Law of the Sea and Human Rights”, 9 Panoptica 1 (2007), 6. 
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Sea Convention (LOSC)28 contains a similar provision. However, the 1989 Salvage 
Convention and the LOSC have a different purpose. While the 1989 Salvage Convention 
aims to develop uniform international rules regarding salvage operations,29 the LOSC creates 
a legal order for the seas and oceans.30 Nevertheless, both conventions place the obligation to 
give effect to the duty to render assistance on States, rather than on masters.31 
 
Nowadays, it is a legal obligation for shipmasters and States under customary 
international law, as well as under Articles 58(2) and 98(1) LOSC to render assistance to 
persons in danger of being lost and to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of 
persons in distress. Article 98(1) LOSC states: “Every State shall require the master of a ship 
flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: 
(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) to proceed with all 
possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as 
such action may reasonably be expected of him; (c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other 
ship, its crew and its passengers and, where possible, to inform the other ship of the name of his own 
ship, its port of registry and the nearest port at which it will call.”  
 
Although the LOSC only mentions this duty in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and 
on the high seas, a State cannot rely on its sovereign powers to disregard this obligation in its 
territorial sea.32 Article 18(2) LOSC stipulates that – for the purpose of rendering assistance to 
persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress – passage may include stopping and 
anchoring. Furthermore, the provision in Article 98(1) LOSC mentions ‘any person found at 
sea’ and not ‘any person found on the high seas’. As assistance must be given to ‘any’ 
                                                 
28 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 
November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 [LOSC]. 
29 1989 Salvage Convention, Preamble. 
30 LOSC, Preamble. 
31 SEVERANCE, Arthur Alan, “The Duty to Render Assistance in the Satellite Age”, 36 California Western 
International Law Journal 377 (2006), 382. 
32 MSC, “Review of Safety Measures and Procedures for the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, IMO Doc. 
MSC 76/22/8 (31 July 2002), Annex “Report-Record of Decisions on the United Nations Inter-Agency Meeting 
on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, para. 6; BARNES, Richard A., “Refugee Law at Sea”, 53 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 47 (2004), 50-52. 
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person33, the obligation applies regardless of the persons’ nationality or status or the 
circumstances in which they are found.34 Therefore, migrants cannot be excluded from this. 
 
First of all, there is a duty to render assistance to persons in danger of being lost. There is 
a variety of acts that may constitute assistance, for example to tow the vessel to safety, 
extricate a grounded vessel, fight a fire aboard a ship, provide food and supplies, embark 
crewmen aboard to replace the tired or the missing, secure aid or assistance from other 
nearby ships, or simply stand-by to provide navigational advice.35 Secondly, there is an 
obligation to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress. However, 
the LOSC does not mention what ‘distress’ is. In the case of The Eleanor, it was submitted that 
distress must entail urgency, but that ‘there need not be immediate physical necessity’.36 The 
decision in the Kate A. Hoff case established that it is not required for the vessel to be ‘dashed 
against the rocks’ before a claim of distress can be invoked.37 In the Rainbow Warrior case, the 
tribunal took a broader view of the circumstances justifying a plea of distress, accepting that 
a serious health risk would suffice.38 Finally, the International Law Commission (ILC)  
confirmed that a situation of distress ‘may at most include a situation of serious danger, but 
not necessarily one that jeopardizes the very existence of the person concerned’.39 
 
The actual distress phase is defined by the 1979 International Convention on Maritime 
Search and Rescue (SAR Convention)40 – a treaty monitored by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) that imputes multi-State coordination of search and rescue systems – as: 
                                                 
33 LOSC, Art. 98(1). 
34 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (adopted 1 November 1974, entered into force 25 May 
1980) 1184 UNTS 278 [SOLAS Convention], Chapter V Regulation 33 para. 1. 
35 NORRIS, Martin J., The Law of Salvage (Mount Kisco NY: Baker/Voorhis, 1958), 15-31; WILDEBOER, Ina H., 
The Brussels Salvage Convention: Its Unifying Effect in England, Germany, Belgium, and The Netherlands 
(Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1965), 95; KENNEY, Frederick J. & TASIKAS, Vasilios, “The Tampa Incident: IMO 
Perspectives and Responses on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, 12 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 
143 (2003), 151-152. 
36 The Eleanor Case, Edw. 135 (1809), 135. 
37 General Claims Commission United States and Mexico, Kate A. Hoff v. The United Mexican States, 2 April 
1929, 4 UNRIAA 444 (1929), reprinted in 23 American Journal of International Law 860 (1929). 
38 Arbitral Award, Case concerning the difference between New Zealand and France concerning the 
interpretation or application of two agreements concluded on 9 July 1986 between the two States and which 
related to the problems arising from the Rainbow Warrior affair, New Zealand v. France, 30 April 1990, 10 
UNRIAA 215 (1990), para. 79. 
39 ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (New York: ILC, 1973),  Vol. II, 134, para. 4, available 
online: <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes%28e%29/ILC_1973_v2_e.pdf>. 
40 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (adopted 27 April 1979, entered into force 22 June 
1985) 405 UNTS 97 [SAR Convention]. 
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“A situation wherein there is reasonable certainty that a person, a vessel or other craft is threatened by 
grave and imminent danger and requires immediate assistance.”41 When exactly a situation is 
identified as requiring immediate assistance, can be different according to which State is 
handling the situation. For some States the vessel must really be on the point of sinking.42 
However, the ILC stated that – although a situation of distress may at most include a 
situation of serious danger – it is not necessarily one that jeopardizes the life of the persons 
concerned.43 In contrast, for other States it is sufficient for the vessel to be unseaworthy.44 
MORENO-LAX even suggests that unseaworthiness per se entails distress.45  
 
Council Decision 2010/25246 adopted additional guidelines that must be respected by 
European Member States during search and rescue situations at sea when operating within a 
Frontex – European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union47 – joint operation at sea. When 
deciding whether a vessel is in distress or not, search and rescue units should take all 
relevant elements into account, in particular: “(a) the existence of a request for assistance; (b) the 
seaworthiness of the ship and the likelihood that the ship will not reach its final destination; (c) the 
number of passengers in relation to the type of ship (overloading); (d) the availability of necessary 
supplies (fuel, water, food, etc.) to reach a shore; (e) the presence of qualified crew and command of the 
                                                 
41 SAR Convention, Annex Chapter 1 para. 1.3.13. 
42 European Commission Proposal for a Council Decision of 27 November 2007 supplementing the Schengen 
Borders Code as regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation 
coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, 
COM (2009) 658 final, Explanatory Memorandum, para. 2. 
43 ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (New York: ILC, 1979), Vol. II, Part II, 135, para. 10, 
available online: 
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describe the situation of distress of persons at sea. See for example: BARNES, Richard A., “Refugee Law at Sea”, 
53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 47 (2004), 60. 
44 European Commission Proposal for a Council Decision of 27 November 2007 supplementing the Schengen 
Borders Code as regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation 
coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, 
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45 MORENO-LAX, Violeta, “Seeking Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a Fragmentary Reading of EU 
Member States’ Obligations Accruing at Sea”, 23 International Journal of Refugee Law 174 (2011), 195. 
46 Council Decision (EU) No. 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, OJ L 111/20 of 4 
May 2010. 
47 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border of the Member States of the European Union, 
OJ L 349/1 of 25 November 2004. 
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ship; (f) the availability of safety, navigation and communication equipment; (g) the presence of 
passengers in urgent need of medical assistance; (h) the presence of deceased passengers; (i) the 
presence of pregnant women or children; and (j) the weather and sea conditions.”48  
 
Thus – according to these guidelines – although unseaworthiness is certainly an element 
to take into consideration when assessing the situation, it does not automatically imply a 
distress situation. As every situation is different, the fact whether persons at sea are in 
distress or not will dependent on the specific circumstances. Therefore, an assessment can 
only be made on a case-by-case basis. Although the definition of distress is quite vague, this 
allows shipmasters and States to take all relevant elements into account. Their margin of 
appreciation to decide whether persons are in distress or not is regarded as being essential. 
However, one element that is indisputable, is that the existence of an emergency should not 
be exclusively dependent on or determined by an actual request for assistance.49 
 
1.2. The obligation to cooperate 
 
Coastal States shall establish adequate and effective search-and-rescue (SAR) services (for 
example, through the creation of a Rescue Co-ordination Centre (RCC) and, where 
circumstances so require, cooperate with neighbouring States for this purpose.50 The basic 
elements for a search and rescue service are a legal framework, the assignment of a 
responsible authority, the organization of available resources, communication facilities, 
coordination and operational functions and processes to improve the service including 
planning, domestic and international cooperative relationships and training.51 In the SAR 
Convention, rescue is described as “an operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their 
initial medical or other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety.”52  
                                                 
48 Council Decision (EU) No. 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, OJ L 111/20 of 4 
May 2010, Annex Part II para. 1.3. 
49 Council Decision (EU) No. 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, OJ L 111/20 of 4 
May 2010, Annex Part II para. 1.4. 
50 LOSC, Art. 98(2); SAR Convention, Annex Chapter 2 para. 2.1.1. 
51 SAR Convention, Annex Chapter 2 para. 2.1.2. 
52 SAR Convention, Annex Chapter 1 para. 1.3.2. 
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Until the adoption of the SAR Convention, there was actually no international system 
covering search and rescue operations. Consequently, in some areas there was a well-
established organization able to provide assistance promptly and efficiently, in others there 
was nothing at all. The SAR Convention thus aims at developing an international search and 
rescue plan. As a result, no matter where an accident occurs, the rescue of persons in distress 
at sea will be co-ordinated by a search and rescue organization and – when necessary – by 
co-operation between neighbouring search and rescue organizations.53 Basically, the world’s 
oceans are divided into 13 search and rescue areas, in each of which the countries concerned 
have delimited search and rescue regions for which they are responsible.54 The 13 maritime 
SAR areas are: Area 1 - North Atlantic; Area 2 - North Sea; Area 3 - Baltic Sea; Area 4 - 
Eastern South Atlantic; Area 5 - Western South Atlantic; Area 6 - Eastern North Pacific; Area 
7 - Western North Pacific; Area 8 - Eastern South Pacific; Area 9 - Western South Pacific; Area 
10A - North West Indian Ocean; Area 10B - South West Indian Ocean; Area 10C - East Indian 
Ocean; Area 11 - Caribbean Sea; Area 12A - Mediterranean Sea; Area 12B - Black Sea; Area 13 
- Arctic Ocean.55 
 
States must ensure that sufficient Search and Rescue Regions (SRR) are established 
within each sea area. These regions should be contiguous and – as far as practicable – not 
overlap.56 Each SRR shall be established by agreement among parties concerned.57 The 
delimitation of SRR’s is not related to and shall not prejudice the delimitation of any 
boundary between States.58 Parties are required to ensure the closest practicable coordination 
between maritime and aeronautical services.59 The International Aeronautical and Maritime 
Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR Manual) – which was jointly published by IMO and 
                                                 
53 IMO, “Search and Rescue”, available online: 
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54 IMO, “SAR Convention”, available online: 
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the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) – provides guidelines for a common 
aviation and maritime approach to organizing and providing search and rescue services.60 
 
According to Article 98(2) LOSC, where circumstances so require, coastal States have to 
cooperate with neighbouring States. What exactly is ‘cooperation’? The concept of 
‘cooperation’ can be seen as the active and practical expression from the notion of 
‘interdependence’.61 Already in 1625, Hugo GROTIUS stated: “There is no State so powerful that 
it may not some time need the help of others outside itself, either for purposes of trade, or even to ward 
off the forces of many foreign nations united against it. In consequence we see that even the most 
powerful peoples and sovereigns seek alliances […].”62 In its individual opinion in the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries case (1951), Judge ALVAREZ suggested that the traditional individualistic 
regime – on which social life was founded – was being substituted by a new regime, namely 
the regime of interdependence. As a result, the law of social interdependence was more and 
more taking the place of the individualistic law.63 Although his opinion was not followed by 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the term ‘interdependence’ began to be heard with 
increasing frequency in political forums in the early 1970’s.64 
 
This 1970’s trend inspired many countries represented at the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III, 1973-1982). Consequently, the LOSC 
contains many undertakings to cooperate in a great variety of contexts. As a result of the 
principle pacta sunt servanda, a duty of cooperation created by the LOSC would actually 
require a Party to act cooperatively in respect of all Parties or a prescribed category of such 
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Parties, as directed by the particular provision.65 ‘Cooperation’ derives from the Latin verb 
co-operari, which means working or acting together or jointly, or uniting to produce and 
effect. Therefore, the duty to cooperate implies action. This action could for example exist of 
entering into negotiations in good faith at the request of any interested party, the creation at 
national level of institutions designed  to foster  international cooperation or the conclusion 
of bilateral, regional or global agreements. As a result, the refusal to respond to a request to 
negotiate for example could amount to a breach of the obligation and as a result justify 
appropriate remedial action.66 However, taking countermeasures for instance would prove to 
be difficult.  In the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, the ICJ accepted that countermeasures 
may justify otherwise unlawful conduct “taken in response to a previous international wrongful 
act of another State and […] directed against that State”.67 Yet, certain conditions have to be met. 
It is for example not very likely that there will be an actual injured State.68 While discussing 
the obligation to cooperate in suppressing piracy, GUILFOYLE notes: “While a duty to cooperate 
to the fullest possible extent may seem a strong obligation, the international community has not 
agreed that it has any specific minimum content. Identifying a breach of a duty to cooperate is 
notoriously difficult.”69 
 
It is thus clear that a number of loopholes seriously impair the effectiveness of the duty 
to cooperate.70 First of all, in public international law there is no general customary law-
based obligation for States to cooperate. Therefore, duties to cooperate are treaty-based and 
as such the cooperative relationship is being artificially created. Secondly, provisions on 
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cooperative conduct are often not manifestly demonstrably based on reciprocity or mutuality 
of benefit. Thirdly, the wordings of the obligation leaves it unclear as to the specific conduct 
required in fulfilment of that obligation. Therefore, the proof of such a breach would be very 
difficult. Fourthly, treaties that include an obligation to cooperate, often include a margin of 
appreciation. For example, Article 98(2) LOSC asks coastal States to cooperate “where 
circumstances so require”. Lastly, the effectiveness of a cooperation duty can also be impaired 
by non-cooperation. A particular problem is unilateral actions by States. For example, 
powerful States may turn to unilateralism when they decide that they may achieve their 
foreign policy goals by unilateral action rather than cooperation. As the international system 
is based upon sovereign equality of States, the system is in fact characterized by gross 
inequalities in power that are a structural obstacle to cooperation and thus encourages 
powerful States “to go it alone”.71 On the one hand, there are a growing number of obligations 
to cooperate in international law, for example to suppress drug trafficking by sea72 or to 
prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their transport by sea.73 On the 
other hand, there exists an unsatisfactory degree of implementation of these duties because 
of non-compliance.74 
 
In April 2009, the Turkish owned and Panamanian flagged ship M/V Pinar E rescued 142 
African migrants off the coast of Lampedusa. The ship and the rescued migrants were the 
subject of an ensuing stand-off between Italy and Malta regarding who would receive the 
migrants. While Malta insisted that the M/V Pinar E would take the migrants to Lampedusa 
because it was the nearest port to where the stricken boats were found, Italy maintained that 
the persons were rescued in the Maltase SRR and thus fell under Malta’s responsibility. 
Although Italy finally agreed to allow disembarkation in Sicily, the decision was made 
                                                 
71 SCHREUER, Christoph H., “State Sovereignty and the Duty of States to Cooperate – Two Incompatible 
Notions?”, in DELBRÜCK, Jost (Ed.), International Law of Cooperation and State Sovereignty: Proceedings of an 
International Symposium of the Kiel Walther Schücking Institute of International Law (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 2002), 177. 
72 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (adopted 20 
December 1988, entered into force 11 November 1990), 95 UNTS 1582 [Drugs Convention], Art. 17(1). 
73 Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation of Security Initiative (adopted 4 September 2003), available online: 
<http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm>. 
74 DELBRÜCK, Jost, “The International Obligation to Cooperate – An Empty Shell or a Hard Law Principle of 
International Law? – A Critical Look at a Much Debated Paradigm of Modern International Law”, in 
HESTERMEYER, Holger P. et al. (Eds.) Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity – Liber Amicorum Rüdiger 
Wolfrum (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), 15. 
 28
exclusively in consideration of the painful humanitarian emergency aboard the cargo ship. 
Italy made clear that its acceptance of the migrants must not in any way be understood as a 
precedent nor as a recognition of Malta’s reasons for refusing them.75 This is one of the many 
incidents that highlight the lack of cooperation and coordination between SAR services of 
these two States. 
 
As already mentioned, the SAR Convention aims to create an international system for 
coordinating rescue operations and therefore State parties are invited to conclude SAR 
agreements with neighbouring States to regulate and coordinate SAR operations and 
services in the agreed maritime zone.76 Such agreement do not only technically and 
operatively implement the obligation laid down in Article 98(2) LOSC, they also diminish the 
risk of non-rescue incidents. Next to this, they can offer an economic advantage to the extent 
that the contracting parties can share costs arising from organizing and carrying out SAR 
operations.77 For the moment, several States in the Mediterranean have for example 
unilaterally declared a SRR. However, there is no regional agreement yet on the coordination 
among them.78 
 
In 2004, Australia and Indonesia did conclude such an agreement. These countries 
designated their RCC’s for the agreed SAR region and defined the modalities by which the 
RCC’s should interact, exchange information and execute cross-border SAR operations. 
During these operations, the rescue unit of one State can enter the territorial sea of the other 
State after a notification. In order to determine the RCC that will be responsible for carrying 
out a certain operation, the area where the vessel is located will be decisive. The RCC 
responsible for this area organizes the operation. In case the exact location is unknown, the 
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RCC that received the distress call is responsible.79 Although Australia and Indonesia 
disagree on several other points of their maritime policies, this agreement has definitely 
become an important tool for operational cooperation between the two States, thus 
enhancing the efficiency of SAR services and the safety of life at sea.80 Nevertheless, there 
may be negative consequences resulting from such an agreement. When a SAR operation 
occurs in the zone under Indonesian competence, people will be disembarked in this 
country. However, asylum seekers often prefer Australia instead of Indonesia. For example, 
in October 2009, the Ocean Viking wanted to bring some rescued Sri Lankan Tamil asylum 
seekers to Indonesia.81 However, these people refused to disembark in this country.82 
 
On 13 August 2012, the Australian Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers – a panel lead by 
former Australian Defence Force chief Angus HOUSTON – issued a report stating that 
Australia and Indonesia should cooperate even more closely.83 The report was drafted after 
an invitation of the Prime Minister and the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to 
provide a document on the best way forward for Australia to prevent asylum seekers risking 
their lives on dangerous boat journeys to Australia. On 14 August 2012, a day after the report 
was made available, Home Affairs Minister Jason CLARE declared to fear that 67 people – 
presumed to be asylum seekers – on board a boat that was missing since it left Indonesia in 
July, probably had sunk.84 That same month, only six persons were rescued after a boat – 
believed to be carrying 150 asylum seekers attempting to reach Australia – sank in the Sunda 
Strait between Java and Christmas Island.  At the time of rescue by a merchant ship, the 
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survivors had already been in the water for about 24 hours. The boat’s passengers included 
women and children and were believed to have been Afghan asylum seekers.85 
 
1.3. Conclusion 
 
It is a legal obligation for shipmasters and States under customary international law, as 
well as under Articles 58(2) and 98(1) LOSC to render assistance to persons in danger of 
being lost and to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress. 
Although the definition of distress is quite vague, this allows shipmasters and States to take 
all relevant elements into account. Their margin of appreciation to decide whether persons 
are in distress or not is regarded as being essential. As every situation is different, the fact 
whether persons at sea are in distress or not will dependent on the specific circumstances. 
Therefore, an assessment can only be made on a case-by-case basis. However, one element 
that is indisputable, is that the existence of an emergency should not be exclusively 
dependent on or determined by an actual request for assistance.86 
 
Coastal States shall establish adequate and effective SAR services (for example, through 
the creation of an RCC and, where circumstances so require, cooperate with neighbouring 
States for this purpose.87 However, there is no specific minimum content of this duty to 
cooperate. Identifying a breach is therefore notoriously difficult.88 However, the SAR 
Convention aims to create an international system for coordinating rescue operations and 
therefore State parties are invited to conclude SAR agreements with neighboring States to 
regulate and coordinate SAR operations and services in the agreed maritime zone.89 For the 
moment, several States in the Mediterranean have for example unilaterally declared a SRR. 
                                                 
85 Migrants at Sea, “140+ Feared Dead After Migrant Boat Sinks Off Indonesia” (30 August 2012), available 
online: <http://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/2012/08/30/140-feared-dead-after-migrant-boat-sinks-off-
indonesia/>. 
86 Council Decision (EU) No. 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, OJ L 111/20 of 4 
May 2010, Annex Part II para. 1.4. 
87 LOSC, Art. 98(2); SAR Convention, Annex Chapter 2 para. 2.1.1. 
88 GUILFOYLE, Douglas, “The Challenges in Fighting Piracy”, in VAN GINKEL, Bibi & VAN DER PUTTEN, Frans-
Paul (Eds.), The International Response to Somali Piracy (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), 130. 
89 SAR Convention, Chapter 3. 
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However, there is no regional agreement yet on the coordination among them.90 
Nevertheless, such agreements are an important tool for operational cooperation between 
States, thus enhancing the efficiency of SAR services and the safety of life at sea. 
                                                 
90 See TREVISANUT, Seline, “Search and Rescue Operations in the Mediterranean: Factor of Cooperation or 
Conflict?”, 25 International Journal of Marine & Coastal Law 523 (2010), 523-542. 
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2. Disembarkation 
 
2.1. No disembarkation duty for States 
 
Neither treaty law nor customary international law requires States to let rescued persons 
disembark onto their territory. Both the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS Convention)91 – a treaty seeking to ensure protection of passengers aboard ships in 
distress through the prevention of situations of distress – and the SAR Convention92 only 
provide that States must arrange for the disembarkation of persons rescued at sea as soon as 
reasonably practicable.93 Accepting an obligation to disembark would thus mean that States 
voluntarily surrender part of their sovereignty. Coastal ports are in the internal waters of a 
State and therefore they are subject to domestic law.94 Nevertheless, treaty rules make it 
possible to restrict this sovereignty. The judgement in the Aramco Case (1958), which deals 
with a dispute between Saudi Arabia and the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), 
stated: “According to a great principle of public international law the ports of every State must be 
open to foreign merchant vessels and can only be closed when the vital interests of the State so 
require”.95   
 
This would also imply the existence of a right to access for merchant vessels carrying 
persons rescued at sea, even when these are migrants. Nevertheless, as there is no proof of 
such a principle of international customary law, this statement is not correct.96 It is true that 
most States have permitted merchant ships to enter their ports on economic grounds. 
However, first of all, bilateral agreements between States do not possess a 'norm-creating 
character'.97 Second, such an agreement does not imply that coastal States could not refuse the 
                                                 
91 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (adopted 1 November 1974, entered into force 25 May 
1980) 1184 UNTS 278 [SOLAS Convention]. 
92 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (adopted 27 April 1979, entered into force 22 June 
1985) 405 UNTS 97 [SAR Convention]. 
93 SOLAS Convention, Chapter V Regulation 33; SAR Convention, Chapter 3 para. 3.1.9. 
94 ICJ, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, Nicaragua v. United 
States of America, 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 14 (1986), paras. 212-213. 
95 Arbitral Award, Aramco v. Saudi Arabia, 23 August 1958, 27 International Law Reports 117 (1958), para. 27. 
96 SOMERS, Eduard, Inleiding tot het Internationaal Zeerecht (Mechelen: Kluwer, 4th ed. 2004), 36. 
97 BARNES, Richard A., “Refugee Law at Sea”, 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 47 (2004), 58. 
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right to access.98 Third, when no international agreement deals with the matter, the coastal 
State can freely regulate this access. The Statute on the International Regime of Maritime 
Ports of 1923 provides for a non-discrimination principle concerning access to coastal ports, 
but the latter depends on the reciprocity rule, hence no absolute right of access exists.99 
 
The only exception to this rule could be for ships in distress.100 The situation of distress 
must result from a bona fide emergency or force majeure and not, for example, from 
insufficient precaution at the beginning of the journey. Thus, can a ship that carries persons 
rescued at sea be seen as a ship in distress? This could perhaps be the case if, for example, an 
epidemic disease breaks out or the ship becomes unseaworthy due to the large number of 
people on board. The SOLAS Convention states that it is possible for a ship to become 
unseaworthy as a result of a rescue operation. Nevertheless, this can never be a reason to 
apply the SOLAS Convention rules on ships in distress.101 On the other side, according to the 
ILC, when human life is at stake or when the physical integrity of a person is being 
threatened, the ship is in distress.102 This is not the case when only a few persons are ill, but 
when an epidemic disease spreads among the persons rescued and the crew, the ship itself 
can be regarded as being in distress. 
 
But even if this were the case, does a ship in distress have an absolute right to enter 
foreign ports in order to attain safety? The Statute on the International Regime of Maritime 
Ports of 1923 is silent on this matter. Most academics rely on the Rebecca Case to conclude that 
a right of access for ships in distress does exist.103 However, according to SOMERS, no right of 
                                                 
98 CHURCHILL, Robin & LOWE, Alan V., The Law of the Sea (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 3rd ed. 
1999), 62; DE LA FAYETTE, Louise, “Access into Ports in International Law”, 11 International Journal of Marine 
& Coastal Law 1 (1996), 1. 
99 Convention and Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports (adopted 9 December 1923, entered 
into force 26 July 1926), 515 UNTS 350. 
100 COLOMBOS, Constantine J., Higgins and Colombos on the International Law of the Sea (Longmans, London, 
1951), 329. 
101 SOLAS Convention, Art. IV(b). 
102 ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (New York: ILC, 1973), Vol. II, 134, para. 4, available 
online: <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes%28e%29/ILC_1973_v2_e.pdf>. 
103 General Claims Commission United States and Mexico, Kate A. Hoff v. The United Mexican States, 2 April 
1929, 4 UNRIAA 444 (1929); See, for example, CHURCHILL, Robin & LOWE, Alan V., The Law of the Sea 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 3rd ed. 1999), 63. 
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entry for ships in distress exists in customary law.104 This is a logical deduction from the 
existence of coastal sovereignty over internal waters, and appears to be the position 
generally adopted in State practice.105  Article 11 of the Salvage Convention106 confirms this 
by providing the right for a coastal State to refuse the vessel in distress entry into its port 
when there is a risk to that port (e.g., pollution).  Article V(b) of the SOLAS Convention also 
states that a State has the right to decide who enters its own ports, even in case of emergency. 
State practice is in line with these provisions.  
 
It is important to note that the 2003 IMO Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in 
Need of Assistance detach the rescue of persons from the issue of refuge to the ship itself. 
The Guidelines identify two situations that can occur: (1) the ship, according to the master’s 
assessment, is in need of assistance but not in a distress situation (about to sink, fire 
developing, etc.) that requires the evacuation of those on board and (2) those on board have 
already been rescued, with the possible exception of those who have stayed on board or have 
been placed on board in an attempt to deal with the situation of the ship.107 Historically, the 
two issues – a ship in distress and the persons aboard in distress – were indeed 
intertwined.108  However, with today’s modern technology, persons in distress can for 
example be removed from a vessel by helicopter. Access to a port is not per se necessary to 
save lives. 
 
As a result, persons rescued at sea can spend weeks on a ship at sea before a State allows 
them to go ashore. The case of the Marine I provides an example. On 30 January 2007, the 
                                                 
104 SOMERS, Eduard, Inleiding tot het Internationaal Zeerecht (Mechelen: Kluwer, 4th ed. 2004), 38-40. Contra: 
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(2005), 1-64). 
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193 [1989 Salvage Convention]. 
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Spanish Coast Guard received a distress call from the vessel Marine I. It was alleged that over 
300 migrants from Guinea were on board. Although the Marine I was within the Senegalese 
SRR, Senegal requested Spain to proceed with a rescue operation, claiming that Senegal did 
not have the proper means to assist. Because the Mauritanian port of Nouadhibou was 
closest to the emergency, Senegal also informed Mauritania of the situation. On 4 February, a 
Spanish maritime rescue tug reached the Marine I and provided immediate relief by handing 
out supplies of water and food. The Spanish government also commenced negotiations with 
Senegal and Mauritania on the fate of the migrants. On 12 February (two weeks after the 
distress call), Spain, Senegal and Mauritania finally reached an agreement regarding the 
passengers. It was reportedly agreed that Spain would pay €650,000, in return for Mauritania 
allowing the passengers to disembark. Repatriation commenced the day after the migrants 
had disembarked. Guinea agreed to readmit thirty-five passengers, all of African origin.109 In 
total, Spain reported 18,000 irregular arrivals by sea from West Africa that year.110 The fact 
that Spain was prepared to pay as much as €650,000 to prevent the disembarkation of 300 
migrants shows that some States are reluctant to allow disembarkation of rescued persons 
onto their territory. 
 
The main reason for this reluctance is that almost all of these persons are migrants 
requesting asylum. According to the UNHCR, it is very difficult to know the exact 
percentage of asylum-seekers that arrive by sea, because official statistics in most countries 
do not state how an asylum-seeker arrived, i.e., by sea, land or air. On average, roughly 70 % 
of those arriving by sea in Malta are asylum-seekers. In the case of Italy, one-third of those 
arriving on Lampedusa Island apply for asylum. This amounts to roughly 60 % of all 
applications for asylum in Italy. 111 Moreover, this migration is often mixed. Not only political 
migrants or refugees try to reach a safe shore. Most of these people are economic migrants 
looking for a better life in a developed country. States are therefore reluctant to permit 
disembarkation unless they receive financial or readmission guarantees. Negotiations on 
these conditions can last for days or even weeks.  
                                                 
109 WOUTERS, Kees & DEN HEIJER, Maarten, “The Marine I Case: A Comment”, 22 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 1 (2010), 2-3. 
110 UNHCR, “All in the Same Boat: The Challenges of Mixed Migration”, available online: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a1d406060.html>. 
111 UNHCR, “Irregular Migration by Sea” (28 May 2009), available online: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/4a1e48f66.html>.  
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Unfortunately this means that the migrants – often requiring medical care – do not receive 
this aid immediately. The shipmaster and his crew are not trained to assist these migrants in 
their special needs. Furthermore, the financial pressure on the master and owner of the ship, 
due to the delay of the ship, can be enormous. In some cases, compensation for expenses, 
delay, and diversion – together with consequential losses – can be provided through 
Protection and Indemnity Clubs (P&I Clubs). However, with today’s ever-increasing 
emphasis on swift deliveries and fast turn-arounds, the economic pressures on seafarers 
sometimes override humanitarian principles.112 In May 2007, a group of 27 boat people were 
rescued by the Italian Navy after they had spent three days and nights clinging to tuna pens 
being towed by a Maltese fishing vessel, the Budafel. The captain of this vessel told the media 
that he refused to divert his ship to disembark the men because he was afraid of losing his 
valuable catch of tuna.113 By failing to institute co-ordinated, well-organized systems for 
receiving and processing asylum-seekers and migrants, States are putting seafarers in an 
intolerable position: damned if they do, and damned if they don’t.114  
 
Consequently, in practice some shipmasters will ignore migrants at sea because they 
know that their entrance into ports will be refused. Human Rights Watch (HRW), one of the 
world’s leading independent organizations dedicated to defending and protecting human 
rights, recorded several testimonies of migrants at sea. In August 2008, Abassi – a 21-year-
old Nigerian – drifted on an inflatable boat in international waters for five days: “One side of 
the boat had sunk and the other was still floating. There were 85 of us clinging to it. There was 
nothing to eat and by the second day we had no water. People were drinking sea water and got sick. 
Three people died. On the fourth day we saw a helicopter. The helicopter saw us and waved. The 
helicopter did not drop food or water, and no boat came to rescue us. Five hours later we saw a ship. It 
did not come to help. It stopped and spent a few hours standing there. The boat just watched.”115 
 
                                                 
112 International Transport Workers’ Federation, “Damned If They Do…” (2006), available online:  
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Already in the mid-1970s, disembarkation was a problem as many boat people fled from 
the communist regime in Vietnam. On the initiative of UNHCR and in cooperation with 
many States, the Disembarkation Resettlement Offers Scheme (DISERO) was completed in 
1979,116 followed by the Rescue-at-Sea Resettlement Offers Scheme (RASRO) in 1985.117 The 
coastal States of Indochina were prepared to allow disembarkation and to grant temporary 
protection in exchange for guarantees that other – often developed – States would grant 
permanent protection to the refugees.118 By the end of the 1980s the number of people fleeing 
Vietnam was increasing, and the willingness of host States in the region to offer protection 
and of third countries outside the region to offer resettlement was declining. As a result the 
pool of ‘long-stayers’ in first asylum camps grew and the countries in the region began to 
identify resettlement as a ‘pull factor’ attracting increasing numbers of economic migrants 
instead of political refugees.119 In 1989 the Steering Committee of the International 
Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees therefore drafted the Comprehensive Plan of Action 
1989-1997 (CPA).120 One of the goals of this CPA was to identify the status of the migrants 
and to resettle only persons who were granted the status of refugee according to the 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951.121 Those found not to be refugees were 
repatriated and reintegrated in their home countries. The big difference with the DISERO 
programme was that the countries of origin were also involved. The CPA ended in 1996, 
because it was considered to have met its objectives.122 
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Although a mechanism like the CPA – linking the disembarkation duty to financial 
arrangements and/or burden-sharing agreements123 – could be used to face the 
disembarkation problem today, several circumstances have changed in the last couple of 
years. Two big differences can be identified. First of all, the problem of migrants at sea has 
geographically spread and their objective has changed. Where in the past the Vietnamese 
boat people arrived in neighbouring developing countries, current migrants often have 
developed States as their destination. A second difference is the fact that States have changed 
their opinion on migrants at sea. In the 1980s, the division between communists and non-
communists still existed. As a result, the Vietnamese received a lot of support from 
developed countries. After big disasters like 9/11, States began to consider migrants as a 
possible threat to their security.124 Although the CPA focused on controlling migration, its 
overall effect was not so much to halt movement, as to redirect the outflow.125 However, 
because the current interception measures have the opposite aim and thus do want to halt 
movement, States will be reluctant to accept an identical plan of action for the situation as it 
is now. Furthermore, the late Mr. Sergio VIEIRA DE MELLO – then UNHCR Bureau Chief for 
Asia and Oceania – noted in 1996 that “UNHCR cannot continue indefinitely to spend for one 
Vietnamese non-refugee nearly eight times as much as we spend for a Rwandan refugee. UNHCR 
cannot justify continuing its care and maintenance expenditure…for a caseload not in need of 
international protection.”126 Nevertheless, the burden-sharing principles found in the CPA can 
be used again to set up a new plan of action. 
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2.2. 2004 SOLAS and SAR Amendments 
 
2.2.1. 2001 Tampa incident 
 
In August 2001 the Tampa incident highlighted the problem of disembarkation of 
migrants at sea. The master of the Norwegian container ship M/V Tampa rescued some 438 
asylum seekers from drowning in international waters between Christmas Island (Australia) 
and Indonesia. The master first headed towards Indonesia, as he was technically in the 
Indonesian SRR. This reportedly elicited threats from some of the migrants, who insisted on 
being taken to Christmas Island. As the captain prepared to enter Australian territorial 
waters, the Australian Special Air Services intercepted and boarded the ship. The incident 
gave rise to a very complex international political situation. The Australian government 
claimed that the port facilities on Christmas Island could not accommodate a vessel of the 
Tampa’s size. The UNHCR called upon the States to share the burden. Although the 
Norwegian government's reaction was positive, the Australian government rejected this 
arrangement and contacted New Zealand, Nauru, and later Papua New Guinea, all of which 
agreed to receive a number of migrants.127 
 
It took weeks for all the countries involved to solve the disembarkation problem, thereby 
painfully demonstrating the insufficiency of the international legal framework.128 In 
Resolution A.920(22) of November 2001, the IMO General Assembly asked the Maritime 
Safety Committee (MSC), the Legal Committee (LEG) and the Facilitation Committee (FAL) 
to review the existing legal instruments to identify and eventually eliminate all legal 
inconsistencies, ambiguities and gaps concerning persons rescued at sea.129 Mr. William 
O’NEIL – the IMO Secretary-General in 2001 – stated that the implementation of new 
measures for safety at sea would not suffice, because the problem of migrants at sea is not 
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only a maritime issue. In a situation involving asylum-seekers instead of “ordinary” persons 
in need at sea (an example of the latter is, e.g., the passengers of a cruise ship that is sinking), 
certain principles of refugee law and human rights must be respected.130 
 
Therefore an Interagency Group was set up in July 2002 to deal with the problem of 
migrants at sea.131 The IMO, the UNHCR, the United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and 
the Law of the Sea (UNDOALOS), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 
the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and IOM 
are all participating in this Interagency Group. The competences of the IMO and of 
UNDOALOS extend to the search-and-rescue part at sea, as well as to the provision of a 
place of safety afterwards.132 In addition, UNDOALOS deals with the coordination and 
cooperation in the field of the law of the sea within the framework of the UN General 
Assembly.133 The competences of the UNHCR,134 UNODC,135 OHCHR,136 en IOM137 with 
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respect to migrants at sea are considered to be multi-disciplinary and worldwide, as these 
relate to asylum, transnationally organized crime such as human trafficking, human rights 
and migrants.138 The UN General Assembly highly welcomed this initiative to cooperate139 
and in 2004140, 2007141 and 2008142 three other interagency meetings were organized.  
 
2.2.2. 2004 SAR and SOLAS Amendments and Associated Guidelines 
 
2.2.2.1. Content 
 
The conclusions of the Interagency Group meetings were the basis for the 2004 SOLAS 
and SAR Amendments,143 the IMO Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea144 
and the IMO/UNHCR practical guide on rescue at sea.145 These instruments try to safeguard 
the rights and interests of all the parties involved, e.g., the persons rescued, the flag States, 
the coastal States, the shipmaster, etc. Although the amendments – when ratified – are 
binding, the guidelines aim to help States and shipmasters in the execution of their duties. 
The objective of the practical guide is to form a kind of useful manual for shipmasters, 
insurance companies, ship owners, government authorities, etc., during the post-rescue 
phase. It contains the procedures that must be followed, the applicable international law 
                                                                                                                                                        
“Review of Safety Measures and Procedures for the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, IMO Doc. MSC 
76/22/8 (31 July 2002), Annex “Report-Record of Decisions on the United Nations Inter-Agency Meeting on the 
Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, para. 18; IOM, “Contribution of the International Organization for 
Migration to the Report of the Secretary General on Oceans and the Law of the Sea” (30 January 2003), 
available online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/general_assembly/contributions58.htm>. 
138 MSC, “Report-Record of decisions on the second United Nations Inter-Agency Meeting on the Treatment of 
Persons Rescued at Sea”, IMO Doc. MSC 79/22/6 (15 September 2004), para. 22. 
139 UNGA, “Oceans and the law of the sea”, UN Doc. A/RES/57/141 (12 December 2002), para. 34, available 
online: <http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm>. 
140 Second Interagency Group Meeting ‘The Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea’, London (12 July 2004). 
141 Third Interagency Group Meeting ‘The Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea’, Geneva (11 December 2007). 
142 Fourth Interagency Group Meeting ‘The Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea’, New York (23-27 June 2008). 
143 2004 Amendments Relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (adopted 20 
May 2004, entered into force 1 July 2006), MSC Resolution 153(78) (20 May 2004) and 2004 Amendments 
Relating to the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979 (adopted 20 May 2004, entered 
into force 1 July 2006), MSC Resolution 155(78) (20 May 2004). 
144 MSC, “Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, MSC Resolution 167(78) (20 May 2004). 
145 IMO/UNHCR, “Rescue at Sea. A Guide to Principles and Practice as Applied to Migrants and Refugees” 
(2006), available online: 
<http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id=15282/UNHCRIMOleafletpersonsrescuedatsea.pdf>. 
 42
principles (not only rules under the law of the sea, but also principles of refugee law), contact 
information and other relevant advice. 146 
 
The 2004 SOLAS Amendments stipulate that the owner, the charterer, the company 
operating the ship or any other person may not influence (for example, because of financial 
motives) the shipmaster’s decision which – in his professional judgement – is necessary for 
the safety of life at sea.147 The inconvenience of and the financial burden for the assisting ship 
will be reduced due to the obligation on the Contracting Parties to cooperate in a way that 
minimizes further deviation from the ship’s intended voyage. In addition, disembarkation 
will be arranged as soon as reasonably practicable.148 With regard to rescued persons, the 
2004 SOLAS Amendments stipulate that the obligation of assistance applies, regardless of the 
rescued persons’ nationality or status or the circumstances in which they are found.149 
Furthermore, within the capabilities and limitations of the ship, all embarked persons must 
be treated with humanity.150 
 
Although the SAR Convention states that rescue implies that persons in distress have to 
be delivered to a place of safety,151 it does not define what a place of safety is. The 2004 IMO 
Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea state that a place of safety can be 
defined as a location where rescue operations are considered to terminate, where the 
survivors’ safety or life is no longer threatened, basic human needs (such as food, shelter and 
medical needs) can be met and transportation arrangements can be made for the survivors’ 
next or final destination.152 Disembarkation of asylum-seekers recovered at sea, in territories 
where their lives and freedom would be threatened, must be avoided153 in order to prevent 
the violation of the non-refoulement principle.154 The government in charge of the SRR in 
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which the survivors were recovered is held responsible for providing a place of safety on its 
own territory or ensuring that such a place of safety is granted in another country.155 
Although an assisting ship may only serve as a temporary place of safety,156 there is still no 
actual duty for States to disembark the persons rescued.157 This means that States can refuse 
disembarkation or make it dependent on certain conditions, such as the division of the 
financial burden (for example, for medical care), resettlement, readmission or immediate 
return to a safe third country.158 The positive side of these agreements is that they share the 
burden between several States and that disembarkation will be advanced. Except for the 
immediate return to safe third countries – because this could violate the non-refoulement 
principle159 – the UNHCR supports this burden-sharing approach.160 Unfortunately not all 
countries have concluded such agreements. Most of the time burden-sharing decisions must 
be made ad hoc. Therefore in some cases it can still take weeks before arrangements for 
disembarkation have been made.161 
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On 11 July 2011, the Almirante Juan de Borbón – a Spanish frigate participating in NATO 
Operation Unified Protector – rescued 114 migrants from drowning in the Mediterranean. 
After the vessel had left Libya, the engine broke down and the persons on board drifted 
around for two days without food or water. When the warship was informed about their 
condition, they provided immediate assistance. On 13 July 2011, a man and his pregnant wife 
were brought to Malta for medical treatment. Spain agreed to receive a 10-month-old baby. 
However, neither Spain, Italy nor Malta wanted to accept disembarkation onto their 
territory. Malta stated that NATO was responsible for the problem. Eventually, the migrants 
were transferred to Tunisia on 16 July 2011.162 As some of the asylum-seekers were of 
Tunisian origin and due to the political situation in the country at that time, this might have 
been a violation of the non-refoulementprinciple. 
 
Next to this, by making the Government of the SRR in which survivors were recovered 
responsible for providing a place of safety or ensuring that such a place of safety is provided, 
migrants in distress at sea are sometimes being ignored or brought to the SRR of another 
State. As a result, States know that they will not only be responsible for providing assistance, 
but also for the place of safety. In March 2011, a boat carrying 72 migrants spent 16 days 
drifting in the Mediterranean after it had left Tripoli to reach Italy. Migrants stated that 
several ships and even a NATO aircraft carrier ignored pleas for help. The out-of-fuel ship 
eventually washed up on western Libyan beach. Only 11 people survived while the others 
had died of thirst and starvation at sea.163 There are even testimonies of asylum-seekers that 
the Greek coast guard tows seaborne migrants into the Turkish SRR.164  
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Moreover, implementing the 2004 SOLAS and SAR Amendments proved to be more 
difficult than expected. Developed countries like Finland and Malta have not even signed the 
amendments yet. Even for countries that did implement the amendments, together with the 
other legal obligations, it is in practice not always easy to enforce them. Several reports by 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) indicate that some shipmasters and even State 
authorities ignore people in need of assistance at sea or simply tow their boats into the SRR 
of another country.165 The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) is a pan-
European network of NGOs concerned with the needs of all individuals seeking refuge and 
protection within Europe. It has collected migrant stories through its member agencies across 
Europe. For example, Mitra, an asylum-seeker from Afghanistan, was 16 years old when he 
tried to reach Greece with other people in a small inflatable dinghy. The Greek coast guard 
discovered them when they were 300 meters away from the Island of Lesbos. The coast 
guard threw them a rope and Mitra and the others were taken on board the coast guard’s 
vessel. The coast guard threw the bread, water, and everything else that was left in the 
dinghy into the water. A few kilometres from the Turkish coast they threw the dinghy back 
out and Mitra and the others were violently forced back into it. The coast guard had made a 
small hole in the rubber dinghy and only gave them one oar.166 Because of the isolated nature 
of the problem, chances are small that these kinds of practices will be revealed. Finally, many 
of the rules are soft law, such as the IMO Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at 
Sea. 
 
Finally, no clear guidance is given as to the extent of the responsibility of Contracting 
Parties who are not responsible for the SRR in which the rescue occurs, even when these SRR 
are geographically located very close to where a vessel has rescued persons in distress. It is, 
for example, possible that SRRs stretch to areas near the coasts of other Contracting States. 
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Moreover, in areas with overlapping SRRs, it is unclear which State is the Contracting Party 
that is primarily responsible for finding a suitable place of safety.167 
 
2.2.2.2. Relationship with Article 98 LOSC 
 
What exactly is the relationship between Article 98 LOSC and the relevant articles in the 
SAR and SOLAS Conventions? Several provisions of the LOSC reflect principles compatible 
with those already included in IMO treaties and recommendations adopted prior to the 
LOSC; such indeed is the case with certain provisions in the 1979 SAR and 1974 SOLAS 
Conventions. The active participation of the IMO Secretariat at the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea has ensured that no overlapping, inconsistency or 
incompatibility exist between the LOSC and IMO treaties. What about the 2004 SAR and 
SOLAS Amendments? The IMO is explicitly mentioned in only one of the articles of the 
LOSC, namely Article 2 of Annex VIII. Several other provisions refer to the ‘competent 
international organization’ in connection with the adoption of international shipping rules 
and standards in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and the 
prevention and control of marine pollution from vessels and by dumping. The expression 
‘competent international organization’ – when used in the singular of the LOSC – applies 
exclusively to IMO, bearing in mind the global mandate of the organization as a specialized 
agency within the United Nations system.  
 
The wide acceptance and uncontested legitimacy of IMO’s mandate is indicated by the 
universality of the organization as the 170 sovereign States that are member of IMO 
represent all regions of the world. They may participate in the meetings of the IMO bodies 
responsible for drafting and adopting safety and anti-pollution rules and standards. New 
IMO conventions are normally adopted by consensus. Numerous provisions in the LOSC 
refer to the mandate of several organizations in connection with the same subject matter. 
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Sometimes, activities set forth in these provisions may involve IMO working in co-operation 
with other organizations.168 
 
As the LOSC is regarded as an ‘umbrella convention’, most of its provisions – being of a 
general kind – can be implemented only through specific operative regulations in other 
international agreements.169  This is reflected in several provisions of the LOSC which require 
States to ‘take account of’, ‘conform to’, ‘give effect to’ or ‘implement’ the relevant 
international rules and standards developed by or through the ‘competent international 
organization’ (i.e. IMO). The latter are variously referred to as ‘applicable international rules 
and standards’, ‘internationally agreed rules, standards, and recommended practices and 
procedures’, ‘generally accepted international rules and standards’, ‘generally accepted 
international regulations’, ‘applicable international instruments’ or ‘generally accepted 
international regulations, procedures and practices’.170 Despite the fact that in many cases the 
LOSC contains general obligations to apply rules and standards contained in IMO 
Conventions, IMO rules and standards which are very precise technical provisions cannot be 
considered as binding among States unless they are parties to the treaties where they are 
contained. The LOSC provisions concerning maritime safety aim at the effective 
implementation of substantive safety rules, but in the end they remain basically provisions 
which regulate the features and extent of State jurisdiction and not the enforcement of 
measures regulated in IMO conventions.171 
 
However, in Article 98 LOSC there is no reference to rules established by the ‘competent 
international organization’. As a result, the obligations under the LOSC concerning search 
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and rescue at sea are exhausted by the provisions in Article 98 LOSC. Relevant IMO 
conventions – such as the SAR and SOLAS Conventions – can therefore only be used as an 
interpretative tool pursuant to Article 31(3) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT). Concerning the interpretation of treaties, the VCLT provides in Article 31(3) 
that (a) subsequent agreements, (b) practice and (c) relevant rules of international law 
between the Parties to a treaty are relevant to its interpretation.172  
 
Nevertheless, the use of such interpretative methods has to remain faithful to the 
ordinary meaning and context of the treaty in light of its object and purpose.173 Although the 
ICJ has acknowledged that treaties have to be interpreted and applied within the framework 
of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation, it also accepted that 
there is a primary necessity of interpreting an instrument in accordance with the intentions 
of the parties at the time of its conclusion.174 In combining both the evolutionary and the 
inter-temporal element, the ICJ reflects the opinion of the International Law Commission 
when commenting on the draft text of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT.175 
 
However, this approach is based on the view that the concepts, terms and provisions in 
question were by definition evolutionary. Therefore, it cannot be applied with regard to a 
general revision or re-interpretation of a treaty. As a result, evolutionary interpretation does 
not entitle a court or a tribunal to engage in a process of constant revision or updating of a 
treaty – such as the LOSC – every time a newer treaty is concluded that relates to similar 
matters.176 Many of the terms in the LOSC are likely to be inherently evolutionary, such as 
the definition of pollution of the marine environment.177 The effectiveness of any such 
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development is dependent upon a general acceptance by the States Parties to the LOSC, 
either through widespread participation in treaty-making processes or acquiescence.178 
 
Although the 1979 SAR and 1974 SOLAS Conventions have respectively 101 and 161 
State parties,179 the implementation of the 2004 Amendments – containing several 
humanitarian considerations – proved to be more difficult than expected. States like Finland 
and Malta have not even signed the amendments yet. As there is no general acceptance of 
the provisions contained in the 2004 Amendments, the latter cannot be used to re-interpret 
Article 98 LOSC. States that did not sign the amendments will thus not be bound by them. 
Italy however is a party to the LOSC, the 1979 SAR and 1974 SOLAS Conventions and the 
2004 SAR and SOLAS Amendments. 
 
The 2004 IMO Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea were especially 
developed to provide guidance to Governments and to shipmasters with regard to 
humanitarian obligations and obligations under the relevant international law relating to 
treatment of persons rescued at sea. These guidelines are considered to be associated with 
the 2004 SAR and SOLAS Amendments, as they were adopted at the same time. The term 
‘Government’ that is used in these Guidelines, should be read to mean Contracting 
Government to the SOLAS Convention of 1974, as amended in 2004, or Party to the SAR 
Convention of 1979, as amended in 2004. 180 Although these provisions are not binding, a soft 
law instrument can also contain an agreed interpretation of a treaty provision (Article 
31(3)(a) VCLT). Soft law instruments can help to meet the practical obstacles of 
implementation and assist States in meeting their existing commitments. They contain 
certain elements which are unlikely to find their way into a treaty because of the opposition 
of some States to binding agreements, but also because of their aim. Subtle evolutionary 
changes in existing treaties may come about through the process of interpretation under the 
influence of soft law. Therefore, sometimes there is not even the need for attempting to turn 
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a soft law provision into a ‘rule’ of international customary law or to enshrine it in a binding 
treaty.181 
 
It is submitted that States that have adopted the 2004 SAR and SOLAS Amendments 
have also agreed upon the associated 2004 IMO Guidelines as a tool of interpretation. Malta 
for example did not sign the 2004 Amendments, because they do not agree with the 
provisions in the 2004 Guidelines. On 22 December 2005, the IMO received a communication 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malta declaring that Malta “is not yet in a position to 
accept these amendments”.182 According to Malta there is a safe place in terms of search and 
rescue and there is a safe place in terms of humanitarian law.183 The 2004 Guidelines, 
however, do state that a place of safety has to fulfil humanitarian requirements too. 
 
2.3. 2009 FAL Principles 
 
2.3.1. Content 
 
In the beginning of 2009 the IMO FAL Committee approved a circular on ‘Principles 
relating to administrative procedures for disembarking persons rescued at sea’.184 This 
circular could lead to more harmonized, efficient and predictable procedures. Initially, the 
ultimate objective was to amend the SOLAS and SAR Conventions, taking into account these 
principles, as appropriate. Spain, Italy and Malta submitted proposals for amendment, which 
were rejected in 2010. In January 2009 the FAL Committee identified five essential – but only 
recommendatory – principles that governments should incorporate into their administrative 
procedures for disembarking persons rescued at sea: 
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“1.  The coastal States should ensure that the search and rescue (SAR) service or other competent 
national authority coordinates its efforts with all other entities responsible for matters relating to the 
disembarkation of persons rescued at sea; 
2. It should also be ensured that any operations and procedures such as screening and status 
assessment of rescued persons that go beyond rendering assistance to persons in distress are to be 
carried out after disembarkation to a place of safety. The master should normally only be asked to aid 
such processes by obtaining information about the name, age, gender, apparent health and medical 
condition and any special medical needs of any person rescued. If a person rescued expresses a wish to 
apply for asylum, great consideration must be given to the security of the asylum seeker. When 
communicating this information, it should therefore not be shared with his or her country of origin or 
any other country in which he or she may face threat; 
3. All parties involved (for example, the Government responsible for the SAR area where the persons 
are rescued, other coastal States in the planned route of the rescuing ship, the flag State, the 
shipowners and their representatives, States of nationality or residence of the persons rescued, the 
State from which the persons rescued departed, if known, and the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR)) should cooperate in order to ensure that disembarkation of the persons 
rescued is carried out swiftly, taking into account the master’s preferred arrangements for 
disembarkation and the immediate basic needs of the rescued persons. The Government responsible for 
the SAR area where the persons were rescued should exercise primary responsibility for ensuring such 
cooperation occurs. If disembarkation from the rescuing ship cannot be arranged swiftly elsewhere, the 
Government responsible for the SAR area should accept the disembarkation of the persons rescued in 
accordance with immigration laws and regulations of each Member State into a place of safety under 
its control in which the persons rescued can have timely access to post rescue support; 
4. All parties involved should cooperate with the Government of the area where the persons rescued 
have been disembarked to facilitate the return or repatriation of the persons rescued. Rescued asylum 
seekers should be referred to the responsible asylum authority for an examination of their asylum 
request; and 
5. International protection principles as set out in international instruments should be followed.” 185 
 
                                                 
185 FAL, “Principles Relating to Administrative Procedures for Disembarking Persons Rescued at Sea”, IMO 
Doc. FAL 35/Circ.194 (22 January 2009), para. 2. 
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The United States stated that, although it supports the aims and objectives of the circular, 
it disagreed with certain aspects, because some of the provisions are inconsistent with its 
domestic law.186 The third Principle especially is quite far-reaching. When disembarkation 
cannot be arranged swiftly elsewhere, the Government of the SRR should accept – in 
accordance with national immigration laws and regulations – to disembark the persons 
rescued. This means that coastal States have the ultimate responsibility. Malta and Japan 
reserved their position with respect to this sentence.187 The other FAL Principles were already 
incorporated in non-binding instruments – in particular the IMO Guidelines on The 
Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea188 and the IMO/UNHCR Practical Guide on Rescue at 
Sea189 –  but they can become binding when they are used as a basis for amendments to the 
SOLAS and SAR Conventions. 
 
The FAL Circular was forwarded to the UNHCR for its information. The Working Group 
that drafted these Principles stated that if the MSC decides to amend the provisions of the 
SOLAS and SAR Conventions on persons rescued at sea, the FAL Principles could serve as 
interim guidelines to Member Governments until the revised provisions of the two 
Conventions enter into force.190 The MSC – at its eighty-fourth session in May 2008 (MSC 84) 
– already agreed to include a high-priority item on “Measures to protect the safety of persons 
rescued at sea” in the work programme of its Sub-Committee on Radiocommunications and 
Search and Rescue (COMSAR) and of its Sub-Committee on Flag State Implementation (FSI). 
On practical grounds, the MSC decided that the COMSAR should consider the matter first 
and then – at a later date – to progress it in cooperation with the FSI. The MSC further 
instructed the two Sub-Committees to take into consideration the work being carried out by 
FAL, as appropriate.191 
                                                 
186 FAL, “Draft Report of the Facilitation Committee on its Thirty-Fifth Session”, IMO Doc. FAL 35/WP.6 (16 
January 2009), para. 6.39. 
187 FAL, “Formalities connected with the Arrival, Stay and Departure of Persons”, IMO Doc. FAL 35/WP.5 (14 
January 2009), para. 6. 
188 MSC, “Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, MSC Resolution 167(78) (20 May 2004).  
189 IMO/UNHCR, “Rescue at Sea. A Guide to Principles and Practice as Applied to Migrants and Refugees” 
(2006), available online: 
<http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id=15282/UNHCRIMOleafletpersonsrescuedatsea.pdf>.  
190 FAL, “Formalities connected with the Arrival, Stay and Departure of Persons”, IMO Doc. FAL 35/WP.5 (14 
January 2009), para. 4. 
191 MSC, “Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its 84th Session”, IMO Doc. MSC/84/24 (16 May 2008), 
paras. 22.25 and 22.36. 
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2.3.2. Appraisal 
 
The FAL is responsible for IMO's activities and functions relating to the facilitation of 
international maritime traffic.192 These are aimed at reducing the formalities and simplifying 
the documentation required of ships when entering or leaving ports or other terminals. Its 
involvement on issues concerning persons rescued at sea should be limited to those matters 
which fall either within the areas of its competence already mentioned or within the scope of 
the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic (FAL Convention). These can 
be broadly summarized as issues relating to the arrival and disembarkation of persons 
rescued.193 For example, in 2005 the 1965 FAL Convention was amended to include under 
Section 2, ‘Arrival, stay and departure of the ship’, special measures of facilitation for ships 
calling at ports in order to put ashore sick or injured persons rescued at sea.194 The purpose 
of these measures is purely facilitative. Their application implies that the State already 
permitted disembarkation. 
 
The 2009 FAL Circular on Principles Relating to Administrative Procedures for 
Disembarking Persons Rescued at Sea actually go further than the 2005 FAL Amendments 
because they deal with the problem of disembarkation itself, which is regarded as falling 
within the FAL’s competence. The FAL is clear: the purpose of the Principles set out in the 
Circular is to harmonize the administrative procedures and make them both efficient and 
predictable.195 The hoped-for result is rapid disembarkation and legal certainty, which will 
lead to facilitated maritime traffic. As mentioned before, four out of the five 2009 FAL 
Principles are not new. They were already included in non-binding instruments. The FAL 
Circular containing the Principles is not a binding instrument but can only be regarded as 
soft law. Nevertheless, because the MSC instructed the COMSAR and the FSI to take these 
                                                 
192 IMO Convention, Art 1.  
193 COMSAR, “Draft Report to the Maritime Safety Committee”, IMO Doc. COMSAR 13/WP.5 (22 January 
2009), para 10.7. 
194 FAL Convention, Section 2H. 
195 FAL, “Principles Relating to Administrative Procedures for Disembarking Persons Rescued at Sea”, IMO 
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principles into consideration – as appropriate – when drafting the SOLAS and SAR 
amendments, these could become binding law.196 
 
The most controversial Principle is the one containing a new far-reaching duty for the 
Government of the SRR where the persons are rescued: “If disembarkation from the rescuing 
ship cannot be arranged swiftly elsewhere, the Government responsible for the SAR area should accept 
the disembarkation of the persons rescued in accordance with immigration laws and regulations of 
each Member State into a place of safety under its control in which the persons rescued can have 
timely access to post rescue support”.197 A number of observations can be made with regard to 
this text. First of all, this paragraph uses some vague terms. The word ‘swiftly’ can mean 
hours, days or even weeks, so that it is not very clear what is exactly meant. On the other 
hand, when disembarkation can be defined as being swift, is dependent on the specific 
circumstances. When the public order on the ship is totally disrupted, when the great 
amount of rescued people endangers the seaworthiness of the ship, or when people are 
dangerously ill, even one day can be too long. An identical problem arises with regard to the 
word ‘timely’, in relation to access to post-rescue support. Another ambiguous expression is 
that the Government should accept disembarkation at a place of safety ‘under its control’. It 
is not clear what is meant by this. For example, such a place could well be an isolated island. 
After all, the conditions for a place of safety incorporated in the IMO Guidelines are not 
mentioned in the FAL Principles. The last issue is that overlapping of SRR sometimes makes 
it difficult to determine the ‘Government responsible for the SAR area’. 
 
Second, the SAR Government has a clear duty to permit disembarking, even when this 
cannot be arranged swiftly. The biggest advantage is the legal certainty for the ship and the 
rescued people. Moreover, as the SAR Government has the ultimate responsibility to permit 
disembarking, it will be stimulated to find a swift solution. In most cases, the State that takes 
care of the SAR operation will also have the closest port, which is positive from a 
humanitarian perspective and from the seafarers’ perspective. The counterpoint is that if this 
duty to disembark were laid down in binding amendments, it would never be accepted. 
                                                 
196 MSC, “Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its 84th Session”, IMO Doc. MSC/84/24 (16 May 2008), 
paras. 22.25 and 22.36. 
197 FAL, “Principles Relating to Administrative Procedures for Disembarking Persons Rescued at Sea”, IMO 
Doc. FAL 35/Circ.194 (22 January 2009), para 2.3. 
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Malta and Japan entered reservations concerning this paragraph of the Circular. During the 
MSC’s drafting of the 2004 SOLAS and SAR Amendments, most States had already indicated 
that they would not agree to such an obligation. As a matter of fact, this is the reason why 
the International Convention relating to Stowaways of 1957198 remains unable to obtain the 
required number of ratifications. Its Article 2(1) stipulates:  “If on any voyage of a ship registered 
in or bearing the flag of a Contracting State a stowaway is found in a port or at sea, the Master of the 
ship may, subject to the provisions of paragraph (3), deliver the stowaway to the appropriate authority 
at the first port in a Contracting State at which the ship calls after the stowaway is found, and at 
which he considers that the stowaway will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention.”  
 
It is clear that imposing such a duty on States will be difficult to realize,199 even more so 
because the 2004 SOLAS and SAR amendments cope with implementation problems. 
Furthermore, if the SAR Government bears the ultimate responsibility, it could be inclined to 
deny demands for assistance or to tow the migrant boats into the SRR of a neighbouring 
country. On the other hand, the willingness of other countries involved – such as the flag 
State – to make arrangements for disembarkation can diminish because they know that the 
SAR Government will eventually bear the responsibility. As a last point, the disembarkation 
is related to the immigration laws and regulations of each Member State. In practice this 
often leads to the refusal of the sea-borne migrants. Only persons rescued at sea who are not 
asylum-seekers will be disembarked rapidly, but this has never posed a problem. However, 
when migrants are involved, States can use this provision to refuse disembarkation onto 
their territory. 
 
                                                 
198 International Convention relating to Stowaways (adopted 10 October 1957, not yet entered into force), 
reprinted in Comité Maritime International, Handbook of Maritime Conventions (2001) as Doc. 14-1. 
199 BARNES, Richard A., “Refugee Law at Sea”, 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 47 (2004), 71-
72. 
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2.4. SAR and SOLAS Amendment proposals 
 
2.4.1. Content 
 
Only one week after the completion of the January 2009 FAL meeting, the thirteenth 
session of COMSAR (COMSAR 13) started and the FAL Principles were formulated. Spain 
and Italy stated that they had intended to submit an information document, but that the 
period between the conclusion of MSC 84 and the date for submission of documents to 
COMSAR 13 had not left them enough time to do so. Instead they both intended to submit 
the documents to the seventeenth session of FSI (FSI 17) in April 2009. As a result, COMSAR 
agreed that it was premature to refer the issue to the SAR Working Group due to the lack of 
substantive submissions and invited interested parties to submit proposals for consideration 
by FSI 17 and COMSAR 14 (March 2010).200 
 
At FSI 17, Spain and Italy submitted a proposal to amend the SOLAS and SAR 
Conventions. The existing paragraph 3.1.9 of Chapter 3 “Co-operation between States” in the 
SAR Convention and paragraph 1-1 of Regulation 33 “Distress situations: obligations and 
procedure” in Chapter V of the SOLAS Convention would be replaced by the 
following:201“All parties involved (for instance, the Contracting Government responsible for the 
search and rescue area where persons are rescued, other States along the route of the vessels rescuing 
persons at sea, the flag State, the ship owners and their representatives, the States of nationality or 
residence of the persons rescued, the State where the persons rescued at sea are coming, if it is known) 
shall co-operate and collaborate to guarantee the rapid disembarkation of persons rescued at sea and to 
ensure that masters of ships, when involved in search and rescue operations by embarking persons in 
distress at sea, are released from their obligations with minimum further deviation from the ships’ 
intended voyage, provided that releasing the master of the ship from their obligations under the 
current regulation does not further endanger the safety of life at sea. The Contracting Government 
responsible for the search and rescue region, where the rescue operation takes place, shall exercise 
                                                 
200 COMSAR, “Report to the Maritime Safety Committee”, IMO Doc. COMSAR 13/14 (6 February 2009), para. 
10. 
201 FSI, “Measures to protect the safety of Persons Rescued at Sea. Compulsory guidelines for the treatment of 
persons rescued at sea. Submitted by Spain and Italy.”, IMO Doc. FSI 17/15/1 (13 February 2009), Annexes 1 
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primary responsibility for ensuring that such coordination and co-operation occurs, so that the 
persons rescued at sea are disembarked from the vessel involved in the rescued operation and delivered 
to a place of safety under its control, where persons rescued at sea can have timely access to post rescue 
support.” 
 
Both proposals go beyond the 2004 amendments of SOLAS and SAR Conventions. Four 
major changes can be identified: 
 
- In the first paragraph the words ‘Parties’ (used in the 2004 SAR Amendments) and 
‘Contracting Governments’ (used in the 2004 SOLAS Amendments) are replaced by 
‘all parties involved’. These parties are specified between brackets, but because they 
are just given as an example, this list is not exhaustive. Not only States are included; 
ship owners and their representatives are also mentioned. We must however keep in 
mind that the ship owner, according to Regulation 34-1 of the SOLAS Convention, 
must not prevent or restrict the master of the ship from taking or executing any 
decision which, in the master’s professional judgement, is necessary for the safety of 
life at sea. 
 
- Disembarkation must be executed rapidly instead of ‘as soon as reasonably 
practicable’. These are both quite vague formulations, so that in practice there will 
probably be hardly any difference between the two. However, there is a slight 
difference in connotation for the parties involved. From a flag State point of view, it 
is deemed of critical interest that its merchant ships are relieved rapidly as 
commercial vessels are not suited to host rescued persons for extended periods. 
Moreover, the financial impact for the ship due to delay can become enormous after a 
few weeks.  The well-being of the rescued persons and of the crew of the rescuing 
vessel itself is also taken into account. As a result, when disembarkation is not 
rapidly achieved, shipmasters could be dissuaded from fulfilling the international 
principle of helping in a rescue situation at sea. On the other hand, it is important for 
the coastal State that accepts the rescued persons, that certain arrangements have 
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been made before disembarkation is allowed and that the latter is thus reasonably 
practicable. 
 
 
- The place of safety must be ‘under the control’ of the Contracting Government 
responsible for the SRR. This does not mean that disembarkation must be allowed at 
a place under the jurisdiction of the State. 
 
- Timely access to post-rescue support must be provided at the place of safety. The 
IMO Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea  and the IMO/UNHCR 
Practical Guide on Rescue at Sea are already aimed at promoting post-rescue 
support, not only focussing on the period after the rescue and before disembarkation 
but also after disembarkation. By laying down certain conditions for the place of 
safety, post-rescue support was guaranteed. Paragraph 6.12 of the IMO Guidelines 
stipulates that a place of safety is a location where the survivors’ safety or life is no 
longer threatened, basic human needs such as food, shelter and medical needs can be 
met, and transportation arrangements can be made for the survivors’ next or final 
destination.  
 
These proposals are clearly based on the 2009 FAL Principles. According to Spain and 
Italy, the 2009 FAL Principles address all the main aspects relating to procedures for 
disembarkation, fully balancing the requirement of protection of human lives at sea with the 
need of minimizing disruptions to those who assist persons in distress.202 Nevertheless, one 
main difference can be recognized. The obligation on the Government responsible for the 
SRR to accept the disembarkation in accordance with its immigration laws and regulations 
when it cannot be swiftly executed elsewhere, has disappeared. This was the most 
controversial part of the 2009 FAL Principles and did not make it into the amendment 
proposals. Therefore, no duty to disembark is imposed upon States. 
 
                                                 
202 COMSAR, “Draft Report to the Maritime Safety Committee”, IMO Doc. COMSAR 13/WP.5 (22 January 
2009), para. 10.9. 
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Malta argued strongly that disembarkation is a very delicate issue on which a lengthy 
debate had taken place in 2004, as a result of the negotiations for the SOLAS and SAR 
Amendments. It maintained that disembarkation is a multi-disciplinary matter that needs to 
be undertaken with an inter-agency approach.203 But because FSI 17 considered the proposal 
by Spain and Italy, Malta submitted draft amendments as well.204 It was suggested that 
paragraph 3.1.9 of Chapter 3 of the SAR Convention and paragraph 1-1 of Regulation 33 of 
Chapter V of the SOLAS Convention could be replaced by the following text:205 “All parties 
involved shall cooperate and collaborate to guarantee the rapid disembarkation of persons rescued at 
sea and to ensure that masters of ships, when involved in search and rescue operations by embarking 
persons in distress at sea, are released from their obligations with minimum delay, provided that 
releasing the masters of the ships from their obligations under the current regulation does not further 
endanger the safety of life at sea. The Contracting Government responsible for the search and rescue 
region, where the rescue operation takes place, shall exercise primary responsibility for ensuring that 
such coordination and co-operation occurs, so that the persons rescued at sea are disembarked from the 
vessel involved in the rescued operation and delivered to a place of safety, where persons rescued at sea 
can have timely access to post-rescue support. All Contracting Governments involved shall co-operate 
to ensure that disembarkation occurs in the nearest safe haven, that is, that port closest to the location 
of the rescue which may be deemed a place of safety.” 
 
The big difference with the 2009 FAL Principles and the proposal by Spain and Italy is 
that disembarkation should take place in the nearest safe haven, namely the port closest to 
the location of the rescue which may be deemed as a place of safety. The implementation of 
this suggestion requires that all Contracting Governments provide such a safe haven – when 
requested by the RCC involved in the rescue operation – on the basis of geographical 
proximity.206 In this proposal a clear duty to disembark is incorporated. 
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2.4.2. Appraisal 
 
Spain and Italy already stressed at COMSAR 13 that they felt that the issue of 
disembarkation was not a matter for the COMSAR, because both countries had no problems 
with regard to communication during SAR operations as they have sufficient resources and 
qualified personnel.207 Malta, on the other hand, argued that the FSI is not the right forum. 
Introducing proposals for amending the SOLAS and SAR conventions at the FSI before they 
are first launched at COMSAR is – according to Malta – not in conformity with the MSC 
Decision. The reason that Malta did put forward a proposal at FSI 17 is because the FSI 
considered the proposal by Spain and Italy. The MSC decided on purely practical grounds 
that the COMSAR should consider the matter first and after that to progress it in cooperation 
with the FSI.208 We can thus conclude –because both Sub-Committees are competent to deal 
with this matter – that the MSC did not intend to allocate a more important role to the 
COMSAR than to the FSI. 
 
The proposal by Spain and Italy is characterized by the primary responsibility of the 
Government responsible for the SAR area where the persons were rescued. The fact that both 
countries have bilateral agreements with countries of transit, like Morocco and Libya, is 
probably the reason why they support the SAR State responsibility. This means that the 
burden is being shared. However, a real duty to disembark is not included. On the one hand, 
this is a more realistic approach, but on the other hand, no fundamental differences are 
included, compared to the 2004 SOLAS and SAR Amendments. 
 
Malta’s proposal takes into account the geographic realities of each case, which would 
also permit the rapid identification of a place of disembarkation without ambiguity, ensure 
the rapid delivery of rescued persons to a place of safety and ensure minimum disruption to 
commercial shipping activities, while respecting the value of human life.209 Some SRRs – such 
as Malta’s – pose the challenge of extending considerable distances from the land territory of 
                                                 
207 COMSAR, “Draft Report to the Maritime Safety Committee”, IMO Doc. COMSAR 13/WP.5 (22 January 
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the Contracting States responsible for the coordination of SAR activities within their 
confines. It could be the case that such SRRs extend to areas near coasts of other Contracting 
States that would be in a better position to guarantee timely disembarkation of survivors 
than the coordinating State. Under the proposal by Spain and Italy, however, these third 
States are not obliged to do so. Malta’s proposal again entails a duty to disembark and, as 
mentioned before, this will be difficult to realize. 
 
The discussion ended in March 2010 at COMSAR 14. The United States stated that the 
2004 Amendments of SAR and SOLAS are sufficient and that the discussion between Malta 
on the one hand, and Italy and Spain on the other hand, is based on a regional problem 
requiring a regional solution. Australia added that the focus must be on the implementation 
and the enforcement of the existing rules. The conclusion was that new amendments are not 
needed. The IMO Secretary-General will address the problem of disembarkation in the 
Mediterranean at the next Interagency Group meeting. The goal is to develop a pilot project 
for a regional solution in the Mediterranean. If this project works, it could be applied in other 
parts of the world.210 
 
2.5. EU Council Decision 2010/252 
 
EU Council Decision 2010/252, supplementing the Schengen Borders Code, spells out 
guidelines for sea border operations coordinated by Frontex. As regards the surveillance of 
the sea external borders, the guidelines try to impose a layered duty to disembark.211 The 
operational plan, used during a joint operation at sea, should spell out the modalities for the 
disembarkation of the persons rescued. Nevertheless, when not specified in the operational 
plan, the mission’s host country carries the ultimate responsibility. Malta strongly opposes 
these guidelines and as a result stopped hosting Frontex operations.  
 
                                                 
210 COMSAR, “Report to the Maritime Safety Committee”, IMO Doc. COMSAR 14/17 (22 March 2010), paras. 
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After the adoption of the EU Council Decision 2010/252, the Dutch Government also 
declared: “Asielverzoeken kunnen alleen worden ingediend bij een voor asielverzoeken 
verantwoordelijke autoriteit van een Staat op wiens grondgebied, inclusief de territoriale wateren, een 
asielverzoek wordt gedaan. Een Nederlands schip behoort niet tot het Nederlands grondgebied […]. 
Op een Nederlands schip geldt wel de Nederlandse rechtsmacht. De commandant van het Nederlandse 
schip draagt in dit opzicht een verantwoordelijkheid in die zin dat het niet zonder gevolgen mag 
blijven indien een migrant aan boord aangeeft een asielverzoek te willen indienen. […] Deze 
migranten dienen derhalve in de gelegenheid te worden gesteld een asielverzoek in te dienen bij een 
bevoegde autoriteit. In dit verband is voor de maritieme Frontex-operaties in de operationele 
voorschriften bepaald dat lidstaten in het operationeel plan voor een Frontex-operatie de 
vervolgstappen vastleggen ten aanzien van onderschepte of geredde personen die bescherming 
behoeven en over de locatie van het aan wal brengen, conform het internationale recht en alle 
toepasselijke bilaterale overeenkomsten. Dat betekent dat in het operationele plan de expliciete bepaling 
kan worden opgenomen dat het gastland verantwoordelijk is voor de afhandeling van het aan boord 
van het deelnemende Nederlandse schip gedane asielverzoek van een onderschepte of geredde migrant. 
Nederland heeft de opname van een dergelijke bepaling als voorwaarde voor zijn deelname aan een 
Frontex-operatie gesteld.”212  
 
This means that – within a Frontex operation – The Netherlands will not be responsible 
for handling the asylum applications of rescued persons made on board a Dutch ship. The 
Netherlands considers the inclusion of a provision in the operational plan – stating that the 
host State will be responsible for dealing with asylum claims – a condition to participate in a 
Frontex operation. On the one hand, this approach could be considered as quite reasonable, 
as the Dutch navy operates far away from its territory. Therefore, the migrants’ 
disembarkation in the intervening State’s territory would simply be unfeasible. On the other 
hand, putting the disembarkation burden primarily on the host State’s shoulders seems a 
                                                 
212 Letter from the Dutch Minister of Justice HIRSCH BALLIN, E. M. H. to the President of the House of 
Representatives, Kamerstuk 21501-28 nr. 61 (3 September 2010), available online: 
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somewhat opportunistic way of avoiding any further problems arising from the transfer of 
migrants.213 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
Neither treaty law nor customary international law requires States to let rescued persons 
disembark onto their territory. By accepting a duty to disembark, States would surrender 
part of their sovereignty. However, during the last couple of years, States have done quite 
the contrary. They have assumed more and more competences by carrying out interception 
operations at sea (see Chapter II) – even on the high seas – in order to send back seaborne 
migrants. The conclusion – given the current interception trend – is that it will be almost 
impossible to ask States to accept an obligation to disembark. A possible solution is to link 
this disembarkation duty to financial arrangements and/or burden-sharing agreements, as 
was done in the CPA of 1989.  This would be in line with the principles of both burden- and 
responsibility-sharing promoted by the UNHCR.214 
 
With respect to financial arrangements, we can think, for example, of capacity-building 
for RCCs, as well as for processing and reception centres. The European Union, for example, 
is already funding projects to improve the capacities of EU Member States in the case of the 
arrival of large groups of irregular arrivals, e.g., the strengthening of reception capacity in 
Lampedusa. Likewise, the Communication on Strengthened Practical Cooperation, issued by 
the Commission in February 2006, proposed to set up rapid-reaction migration units to better 
respond to sudden influxes of irregular migrants.215 With regard to the burden-sharing 
agreements, States should be encouraged to engage in resettlement and readmission 
agreements. When States know they can share the burden after disembarkation, they will be 
less reluctant to accept a duty to disembark sea-borne migrants. Normally the political, socio-
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economic and financial costs of asylum have to be carried by one State, namely, the State of 
disembarkation. However, due to burden-sharing agreements this will not be the case. 
 
But which State should bear the duty to disembark? Is it the State of the closest port or the 
State responsible for the search and rescue? As long as a duty to disembark could be 
imposed (when linked to financial and burden-sharing agreements), compliance with the 
non-refoulement principle can be guaranteed and the definition of a place of safety becomes 
binding, it actually does not matter, as in practice this will often be the same port. 
Nonetheless, when the duty to disembark is legally connected to the duty to rescue, this 
could lead to several difficulties, as mentioned in the evaluation of the 2009 FAL Principles. 
Choosing the closest port would avoid these problems. Moreover, Malta – a State that must 
cope with a lot of migrants at sea nowadays216 – could in this way be stimulated to sign and 
to ratify the SOLAS and SAR Amendments. Recently, EU Council Decision 2010/252 
addressed the problem of disembarkation during Frontex operations at sea. According to 
these new rules, the mission’s host country carries the ultimate responsibility, unless it is 
necessary to act otherwise to ensure the safety of these persons.217 Malta strongly opposes the 
Guidelines and stated that it refuses to host future Frontex operations. This situation makes 
it clear that choosing the closest port is a better option. 
 
Disembarkation of persons – and especially migrants – rescued at sea is certainly a very 
sensitive issue, because States simply do not have a legally binding duty to grant these 
people access to their territory. Thus States would have to surrender part of their sovereignty 
to change the current situation. The discussions within the IMO show us that this is not 
likely to happen in the next couple of years. In the past decennium, States have transferred 
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the issue from the IMO to the Interagency Group, and from the Interagency Group back to 
the IMO. At COMSAR 14, States even decided that this is only a regional problem and that 
no additional international rules are needed. 
 
Although it is true that the focus should first be on the implementation and the 
enforcement of the existing rules, States must also take steps to improve and amend the legal 
framework. If States would accept a responsibility to disembark persons in the long term, 
this responsibility should definitely not be linked to the duty to rescue people in distress. 
Therefore, the closest port that can be regarded as a place of safety would be the best choice 
for both the seafarers and the persons rescued. 
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3. Regional MoU for the Mediterranean on Disembarkation 
 
3.1. From an international to a regional approach 
 
As mentioned, at the COMSAR meeting in March 2010, the United States stated that the 
discussions between Mediterranean countries concerning rescue and disembarkation of 
migrants at sea is based on a regional problem requiring a regional solution. However, Italy, 
Malta and Spain expressed their disappointment that other countries seemingly did not 
recognize that the problem was much wider than simply a regional one. Other parts of the 
world are also confronted with similar difficulties and, even more importantly, ships of all 
flags are currently involved in the resulting rescue operations. Therefore, the IMO Secretary-
General proposed to first develop a pilot project for a regional solution in the Mediterranean. 
Second, if this project works, it could be applied in other parts of the world.218 
 
One of the primary concerns of the IMO is the integrity of the search and rescue and, 
consequentially, the safety of life at sea regime.219 Therefore, the IMO wants to prevent 
incidents – which cause loss of life at sea – from recurring.220 COMSAR launched the idea of 
developing a pilot project for a regional solution in the Mediterranean in March 2010. On the 
one hand, the system of rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean Basin has to be improved. 
On the other hand, these persons also have to be disembarked at a place of safety in 
accordance with the SAR and SOLAS Conventions.221 If the project works, it could be 
extended to other parts of the world experiencing similar situations.222  
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Meanwhile, the IMO is even waiting to take steps on the international level – for example 
amending the Facilitation Convention223 – until the results of this Regional Agreement are 
ready.224 In May 2010 the IMO Secretary-General made available his good offices to take this 
matter forward for informal consultations with a group of interested parties.225 A first draft 
of the Terms of Reference for such a consultation group were established by the IMO 
Secretariat in co-operation with interested parties, including Italy, Malta and Spain.226 
 
A first meeting of the consultation group was held under the auspices of, and chaired by, 
the IMO Secretary-General on 28 July 2010. It was attended by representatives from Italy, 
Malta, Spain and the IMO Secretariat. The meeting had agreed upon the Terms of Reference 
for the group and it finalized a list of issues to be discussed in the development of a Regional 
Agreement on concerted procedures relating to the disembarkation of persons rescued at sea. 
The IMO Secretariat prepared a draft for this Regional Agreement which was tabled for the 
parties concerned to consider and to comment.227 However, since not sufficient progress 
could be made, the delegations of Italy, Malta and Spain requested an extension of the target 
completion date to 2012.228 Due to the non-availability of delegations a second meeting had 
to be postponed.229 Italy requested that the consultation group of interested parties should be 
extended to the other relevant regional institutions, for instance the European Union, in 
order to avoid the stalling of future consultations due to non-availability of delegations.230 
 
In 2011, States however realized that the situation in the Mediterranean region had 
deteriorated over the following months after the first meeting. The urgency of progressing 
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the issue was stressed, as a consequence of a wave of social uprising affecting the northern 
part of the African continent, thus resulting in a massive migration by sea towards Europe.231 
In March 2011, NATO warships as well as aircraft started patrolling the approaches to 
Libyan territorial waters as part of ‘Operation Unified Protector’. As called for in United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1973232, their purpose is to reduce the flow of arms, 
related material and mercenaries to Libya. This operation is part of the broad international 
effort to protect civilians in Libya from the violence committed by the GHADDAFI regime.233  
 
However, there were growing signs that GHADDAFI’s regime was trying to force a 
migration crisis as a weapon against his NATO enemies.234 According to IOM some migrants 
stated that they were forced onto boats by Libyan troops and police. Migrants who were 
brought to safety on the Italian island of Lampedusa said they witnessed a boat – carrying 
between 500 and 600 people – sink off the Libyan coast. Although some of the persons were 
able to swim to the shore, it is not clear how many migrants survived. After seeing what had 
happened to the first boat, many of the migrants – who had been waiting on land to take 
another boat – changed their mind about making the sea journey to Italy. However, they 
claim that Libyan soldiers and officials forced them onto a waiting boat by firing their guns 
indirectly.235 
 
On 6 April 2011, a second meeting – again under the auspices of and chaired by the IMO 
Secretary-General – was held pursuant to this debate. It was attended by representatives 
from Italy, Spain and the IMO Secretariat.236 Exactly on that day, over 250 migrants were lost 
after their vessel capsized in the Mediterranean Sea, which proved again to the meeting how 
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urgent this matter was.237 The Terms of Reference were reviewed and accepted.238 It was 
concluded that the development of the Regional Agreement was to: 
 
1. establish and strengthen co-operation among Parties to enable them to cope with 
incidents involving persons rescued at sea; 
2. establish a system of communication between the countries in the region to exchange 
information on the movement of persons by sea; 
3. ensure the safety of persons rescued at sea, pending a decision as to the place where 
such persons will be safely delivered, taking into account the prevailing weather and 
other conditions, including the safety of the delivering ships and the capacity of the 
places where they are delivered to provide care as may be necessary under the 
circumstances; 
4. arrange that delivery of persons takes place without undue delays to the rescuing 
ships which should be allowed to promptly proceed to their destination once the 
delivery operation is over; and 
5. promote co-operation for the delivery of persons rescued at sea to a port of a place of 
safety.239 
 
Next to this, the meeting prepared the draft text for the Regional Agreement which 
should be used as a basis for consideration at a future meeting.240 They agreed that the group 
should be expanded to include other interested parties concerned in the region, such as 
relevant regional and international organizations.241 Malta stated that it was unable to attend 
the second meeting and that it not completely agreed with the outcome of that meeting. 
While they had no difficulties with the essence of the Terms of Reference, the text needs to be 
revised in the interest of clarity and consistency. Moreover, Malta had reservations on both 
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the expansion of the consultation group and the draft text of the Regional Agreement. The 
country therefore proposed another meeting to discuss all these issues.242 
 
The third meeting of the consultation group was held on 15 June 2011. The meeting further 
developed the Terms of Reference and discussed a draft Regional Agreement on concerted 
procedures relating to the disembarkation of persons rescued at sea. Next to this, it was 
agreed that the consultation group – Italy, Spain and Malta – should be expanded.243 As a 
first expansion step, all Mediterranean countries were invited through Circular letter No. 
3203 of 18 August 2011.244 This regional meeting is being held back-to-back with the 
celebrations of the World Maritime Day parallel event in Rome on 12 October 2011 attended 
by 10 Member States in the Mediterranean. The ultimate goal here will be the development 
of a Regional Agreement in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 
concerted procedures relating to the disembarkation of persons rescued at sea.245 
 
At COMSAR 16, it was considered beneficial – in order to make significant progress 
towards finalizing the draft Regional MoU – to hold informal consultations among interested 
parties to agree on some of the more contentious issues and associated draft texts before 
organizing the next regional formal meeting. Accordingly, informal consultations were held 
at IMO Headquarters on 21 February 2012. Some of the most contentious aspects were 
discussed and agreements reached on sensitive subjects and the draft text of the Regional 
MoU was improved accordingly.246 However, after some discussion, taking into account that 
the work on this matter was still in progress, COMSAR decided to invite the MSC to extend 
the target completion year to 2013.247 MSC agreed to postpone the deadline to 2013.248 
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A MoU is a well-accepted type of legal instrument in international law and practice and 
it is being identified as “an informal but nevertheless legal agreement” between two or more 
parties.249 Whether this MoU is meant to be binding is not clear at the moment. However, a 
soft law agreement would not necessarily be a negative factor. Hard and soft law are used as 
alternatives or they can interact in complementary ways. Legal positivists tend to favour 
hard law as it refers to legal obligations of a formally binding nature, while soft law refers to 
those that are not formally binding but may nonetheless lead to binding hard law. 
Rationalists, in contrast, contend that hard and soft law have distinct attributes that States 
choose for different contexts and thus they can build upon each other. Lastly, constructivists 
maintain that State interests are formed through socialization processes of interstate 
interaction which hard and soft law can facilitate. Therefore, constructivists often favour soft 
law instruments for their capacity to generate shared norms and a sense of common purpose 
and identity, without the constraints raised by concerns over potential litigation.250 
 
Regardless of their views about the strengths and weaknesses of hard and soft law, all 
three schools examine how hard and soft law can serve as mutually supporting complements 
to each other.251 Moreover, soft law can sometimes be more effective than hard law. 
Effectiveness goes beyond looking at implementation or compliance to determine whether 
an international norm – whatever its source in domestic or international law – achieves its 
policy objective.252 A rule is deemed effective when it led to certain behaviour which may or 
may not meet the legal standard of compliance.253 The development of a soft law framework 
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has been succesfully applied to address gaps in international law in the past.254 BARNES states 
that – consistent with the general trend towards the use of soft law instruments – new legal 
initiatives concerning migrants at sea are most likely to take the form of non-binding 
measures.255 
 
3.2. From an interagency to a maritime approach 
 
During the meetings, it was stressed that the development of a Regional Agreement 
should be restricted to purely maritime matters, in view of IMO's primary concern for the 
integrity of the search and rescue.256 Although the competences of the IMO only extend to the 
search and rescue part at sea and to the provision of a place of safety afterwards257, it is 
definitely a shift in view towards the issue. William O’NEIL – the former IMO Secretary-
General – already stated in 2001 that the implementation of measures for safety at sea would 
not suffice since the problem of migrants at sea is not only a maritime issue. In a situation 
involving asylum-seekers, certain principles of refugee law and human rights must be 
respected.258 As a result, an Interagency Group was set up in July 2002 to deal with the 
problem of migrants at sea.259 IMO, UNHCR, UNDOALOS, UNODC, OHCHR and IOM are 
all participating in this Interagency Group. Therefore, it is quite remarkable that agencies, 
such as the UNHCR or the IOM, are not yet being involved in drafting the MoU too. 
Although this will probably happen during future meetings, when also countries outside the 
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region are invited260, it is strange that this is not the case for the moment. Even when they are 
invited, their role will definitely be limited since the agreement will be restricted to purely 
maritime matters. 
 
It is clear that past developments did not occur in the isolation of particular fields of law, 
but with a considerable degree of cooperation between international organizations and 
experts from across a number of fields. This integrated approach must thus continue.261 The 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea affirmed in the M/V Saiga Case that 
considerations of humanity must apply to the Law of the Sea as they do in other areas of 
international law.262 As TREVES correctly stated: “The Law of the Sea and the law of human rights 
are not separate planets rotating in different orbits. Instead, they meet in many situations. Rules of the 
Law of the Sea are sometimes inspired by human rights considerations and may or must be interpreted 
in light of such considerations.”263 Even the IMO itself recognizes this. In April 2011, the IMO 
stated that the problem is not entirely in IMO’s hands, as political developments – due to the 
Arab Spring – had exacerbated the situation beyond its competence.264 
 
At the end of 2011, the UNHCR developed a Draft Model framework for cooperation 
following rescue at sea operations.  This framework contains principles of burden and 
responsibility-sharing among States during and after rescue.265 It could be complementary or 
supplementary to the regional MoU. The Model Framework could be added by Standard 
Operating Procedures for Shipmasters (SOPs) when faced with distress at sea situations 
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involving undocumented migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers. SOPs could provide 
guidance as regards the appropriate procedures to be followed and they could be 
incorporated into ‘industry best practice’ guidance to be developed in conjunction with the 
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), to ensure that humanitarian and protection 
concerns are taken into account. They could inter alia include contact points for relevant 
authorities (i.e. Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres) in specific countries, a list of 
potential places of safety for disembarkation, as may be designated by Governments for their 
respective SRR, along with relevant criteria that may assist to make a determination in any 
particular case, advice on information that shipmasters may be able to collect about rescued 
persons and recommendations on proper management of the human remains and handling 
of data on deceased persons.266 
 
3.3. Malta and the Regional Agreement 
 
3.3.1. Malta: A distinct view on migrants at sea 
 
Malta is a small island of only 316 km2. Nevertheless, in some ways Malta has a bigger 
stake in the Mediterranean than most of the other coastal States. It is an island State with an 
important fishing industry, a high level of tourism and marine-related industries such as 
shipbuilding and ship repairs. Therefore, Malta is clearly one of the Mediterranean’s most 
ocean-dependent States. As a result, maritime affairs – especially those of a political kind – 
are followed keenly by the Maltese people.267 Due to its population density, the island feels 
under pressure from migrants arriving by boat across the Mediterranean.268 Malta is a Party 
to the 1982 LOSC269 and it is thus bound by the legal obligations therein. Although Malta 
accessed the 1974 SOLAS Convention on 8 August 1986 and the 1979 SAR Convention on 24 
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September 2002270, it has not yet signed the 2004 SOLAS and SAR Amendments. On 22 
December 2005, the IMO received a communication from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Malta declaring that Malta “is not yet in a position to accept these amendments”.271 The Armed 
Forces of Malta (AFM) deal with the search and rescue operations. The Department of Civil 
Aviation (DCA) operates jointly with the AFM in the event of an aeronautical incident.272 
Although there is a certain discretion in deciding when a person is in distress or not, the 
AFM is being accused of not fulfilling their duty, by for example only helping persons who 
are actually requesting assistance.273 
 
In 2001, COMSAR/Circ.27 invited States to submit all details concerning the current 
availability of their SAR services as well as the exact coordinates of their SRR.274 Malta 
submitted this information on 30 September 2005.275 Although Malta is only as small as 316 
km2, it claimed a maritime SRR that coincides with the Malta Aeronautical SRR and the 
Malta Flight Information Region (FIR).276 Since the country ‘inherited’ an enormous Flight 
Identification Region (FIR) from Great Britain, Malta is now responsible for a region that 
amounts to 250.000 km². Towards the west, the Maltese SRR almost reaches the territorial 
waters of Tunisia.  Towards the east, it nearly stretches to Crete. Moreover, towards the 
north, Malta claimed partly the same area as Italy did. This is reflected on the map which 
was attached to SAR.8/Circ.3.277 For example, the Italian island of Lampedusa is both part of 
the Maltese and the Italian SRR. Migrants coming from the North African coast and crossing 
the Mediterranean to reach Italy, have to pass through the Maltese SRR.  
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    Maritime Search and Rescue Regions – Mediterranean West278 
 
Although Italy is pressuring Malta to give up part of this vast area, this is definitely not 
an option for the Maltese government. One of the reasons is that this area is connected to the 
lucrative income the island derives from its Flight Information Region (FIR), as the size of the 
latter is bound to the SRR. Malta earns millions of euros a year from air traffic control 
charges on aircraft using the area. Next to this, there are rumours that Malta thinks the SRR 
could be an asset when delimiting its continental shelf.279 Malta’s maritime boundary system 
is only partially delimited280 and there are strong indications of oil and gas resources in the 
areas between Tunisia and Malta on the one hand and Sicily and Malta on the other hand.281 
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However, the SAR Convention is very clear on this issue. It states that the delimitation of 
SRR is not related to and shall not prejudice the delimitation of any boundary between 
States.282  
 
But is Malta actually able to operate this unilateral declared SRR? First of all, the 
unilateral declaration of the Maltese SRR is subject to the principle of good faith. This 
principle creates a need to ensure compliance with unilateral commitments.283 However, the 
SAR Convention only asks States to coordinate search and rescue services in the area under 
their responsibility. Thus, there is no obligation for States do this individually as they can act 
in cooperation with other States.284  
 
For example, on 6 April 2011, Malta informed the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination 
Centre of the presence of a boat in distress, 45 miles from the Italian island of Lampedusa. As 
Maltese patrol boats were temporarily unavailable, Italian search and rescue assets were 
shipped to the area. The boat – which had departed from the Libyan port of Zuara – carried 
some 300 persons who had been fleeing the north coast of Africa in search of a better life. 
Normally, the type of vessel was only capable of holding a maximum of 40 people. 
Moreover, the engine was severely damaged, which made it impossible to manoeuvre the 
boat. Over 250 migrants were lost after their vessel capsized due to flooding. Eventually, 
only 52 persons could be saved by the Italian Coast Guard.285 The fact that Italy was asked to 
deal with the rescue, does not mean that Malta did not live up to its obligations under the 
SAR Convention. However, is the Maltese coordination efficient enough when 250 migrants 
are lost? Moreover, due to an overlap of the Maltese and the Italian SRR, there can be a delay 
in deciding who is responsible, thus jeopardizing the lives of migrants in distress. Although 
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the SAR Convention mentions that overlaps have to be avoided as far as practicable286, it also 
states that SRR’s be established by agreement among parties.287  This is not the case up until 
today. 
 
According to Malta there is a safe place in terms of search and rescue and there is a safe 
place in terms of humanitarian law.288 As Malta did not sign the 2004 SOLAS and SAR 
Amendments and as it does not accept the 2004 IMO Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons 
Rescued at Sea, it does not recognize the link between the two concepts which was 
established in these instruments. Next to this, the country does not accept any link between 
responsibility for the search and rescue and responsibility for providing a place of safety or 
ensuring that such a place of safety is provided. Nevertheless, the Council Decision 2010/252 
also mentions that no person shall be disembarked in, or otherwise handed over to the 
authorities of, a country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.289 However, 
these guidelines are only applicable with regard to the surveillance of the sea external 
borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by Frontex, the European 
Agency for the management of operational cooperation at the external borders of the 
Member States.290 This means that when Malta is acting outside a Frontex surveillance 
operation, these guidelines will not be applicable. 
 
It is however understandable that Malta wants to divide the two concepts as the country 
is situated at the frontline of European border controls. The Dublin II Regulation is regarded 
as unfavourable for Malta as the Member State responsible for an asylum claim will be the 
State through which the asylum seeker first entered the European Union. Therefore, the 
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country considers burden-sharing a crucial element.291 DE BLOUW believes that the 
modification of the Dublin Regulation is the first and most important step to eradicating 
human rights abuses in Southern Europe as this could lessen the immigration burden on 
coastal Mediterranean Member States.292 To help Malta to cope with the migration problem, 
EUREMA (European Relocation Malta) – a pilot project for intra-EU re-allocation of 
beneficiaries of protection from Malta – was launched in July 2009. It was co-funded by the 
EU under the ERF and supported by IOM and UNHCR. Its objectives are the 
implementation of the principle of solidarity among states, the identification of resettlement 
solutions for people in need and the improvement of the situation for those who remain in 
Malta. Nevertheless, this project is not a solution to the negative impact of the Dublin II 
Regulation.293 
 
3.3.2. Malta and the regional MoU: a mutual impact 
 
Why did the IMO suddenly shift towards a purely maritime approach? One of the 
reasons could be that they definitely wanted Malta to be part of the agreement. As Malta 
does not accept a link between the maritime and the humanitarian elements of the problem, 
the country could have restraints due to the fact that the agreement could contain similar 
provisions as incorporated in the 2004 SOLAS and SAR Amendments and the IMO 
Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea. It was indeed remarkable that Malta 
was absent during the second meeting of the consultation group in April 2011. The problem 
is that if Malta is not willing to negotiate or decides not to be part of the MoU, there could 
simply not be an efficient agreement. Since Malta has an enormous SRR, it is of utmost 
importance that this country is being included. In that way, an issue that could be dealt with 
in the agreement is the coordination between the several SRR in the Mediterranean. 
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Next to this, an essential element of the agreement has to be a system of burden-sharing, 
especially if other countries want Malta to cooperate. However, a few problems arise in this 
respect. First, some European States fear that clarifying obligations and solving the problem 
through burden-sharing would produce an enormous pull factor, thus encouraging migrants 
to come to Europe by sea.294 Second, the United States of America has begun to play a small 
yet important role in resettling refugees from Malta in order to reduce the burden for this 
country.295 Yet, since this agreement is a regional one, this kind of burden-sharing cannot be 
included. Third, burden-sharing clearly goes beyond a purely maritime approach. 
 
On the one hand the regional Agreement is positive for Malta, since a system of burden-
sharing could be established. On the other hand Malta could be obliged to accept certain 
provisions in the 2004 SOLAS and SAR Amendments and the IMO Guidelines on the 
Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea. Moreover, due to the agreement Malta could be forced 
to give up part of its SRR. Therefore, it seems that it would be better for Malta to decide not 
to negotiate or to be part of this agreement as the negative consequences outweigh the 
positive ones. This is merely a rational choice. Nevertheless, it would be better for Malta to 
take part in this new agreement since it would definitely improve its reputation. For the 
moment Malta does not have a very good reputation concerning the treatment of migrants at 
sea. First, the reputational theory in international law – as part of the rational choice theory – 
will be explained. Second, this theory will be applied to Malta. 
 
GUZMAN introduced the reputational theory in international law by stating that 
reputation plays a very important role in compliance. He identified three factors which 
enhance the compliance of States with international law, namely reciprocity, retaliation and 
reputation.296 The first factor is reciprocity. Reciprocity works best in bilateral situations: if 
one of the two cooperating States refuses to comply with a legal norm, the other may react in 
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the same way. Consequently, both states lose the benefit of cooperation. However, 
reciprocity does not work in all cases. For example norms that concern human rights cannot 
be based on a reciprocal basis since reciprocal behaviour would not affect the violating State 
at all.297 The second factor is the possibility of retaliation. A State may punish another State 
for non-compliance. Nevertheless, imposing a sanction on another state may be very costly 
for the punishing state. Moreover, in multilateral situations States have an incentive to free-
ride and to hope that another state will punish the violator.298 Therefore, GUZMAN stipulates 
that the third factor – reputation – is the most important one. A State’s calculus over the 
reputational costs of non-compliance is thus the primary factor for explaining State 
compliance with international law.  
 
This theory is based upon the assumption that States are rational, self-interested actors.299 
States want to cooperate with other States when it makes them better off. Nonetheless, States 
need a ‘good’ reputation as this allows them to make more credible promises. As a result of 
this reputation for cooperativeness, States may be able to extract higher returns for their 
cooperation.300 A reputational theory must take into account the fact that not all agreements 
are the same.301 LIPSON is convinced that the more formal and public the agreement is – for 
example a treaty – the higher the reputational costs of non-compliance will be.302 Moreover, 
the more uncertain a performance standard is (e.g. vague terms in the treaty), the less clear 
that a State’s behaviour is violating that standard.  
 
However, GUZMAN’s reputational theory does not explain why States überhaupt enter 
into treaties. As a State’s reputation is influenced by its compliance with legal obligations, 
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reputational forces become relevant after a State has accepted legal obligations. Therefore, 
reputational harm can only occur if a legal obligation already exists.303 Nevertheless, 
GEISINGER & STEIN suggest that reputation also plays a role in treaty formation. A State will 
enter into a treaty when the estimated benefits it receives from this entry outweigh the costs 
of entry and compliance.304 Compliance with international law is only one of the many 
dimensions along which States are being judged. Hence, it is important to differentiate 
between the global standing of the State – or global public opinion – on the one hand and the 
State’s reputation for compliance with international law on the other hand. For example, the 
refusal to take on legal obligations – rather than the violation of international law – could 
influence the popular perception of the State more than violations of legal obligations do.305 
BREWSTER illustrates this by giving the example of the United States’ refusal to join the Kyoto 
Protocol on Global Climate Change, since this is widely believed to have hurt the reputation 
of the United States.306 On the other hand, violations of international law might sometimes 
even improve the popular perception of States.307 Although the NATO bombing of Serbia to 
stop the ethnic cleansing in the Former Yugoslavia was a violation of international law on 
the use of force, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo used the term “illegal 
but legitimate” to describe the bombing of Serbia.308 
 
Therefore, BREWSTER puts forward a distinction between ‘legality reputation’ and 
‘reliability reputation’. A legality reputation implies strict compliance with legal 
commitments, while a reliability reputation entails commitment to the goals of the regime. 
For instance, a State can completely fulfil its legal obligations and yet develop a reputation 
for being unreliable. Similarly, the two types of reputations will have different effects on 
States’ decision making. The United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty (Treaty Between 
                                                 
303 GEISINGER, Alex & STEIN, Michael A., “Rational Choice, Reputation, and Human Rights Treaties”, 106 
Michigan Law Review 1129 (2008), 1137. 
304 GEISINGER, Alex & STEIN, Michael A., “Rational Choice, Reputation, and Human Rights Treaties”, 106 
Michigan Law Review 1129 (2008), 1138. 
305 BREWSTER, Rachel, “Unpacking the State’s Reputation”, 50 Harvard International Law Journal 231 (2009), 
238-239. 
306 BREWSTER, Rachel, “Unpacking the State’s Reputation”, 50 Harvard International Law Journal 231 (2009), 
238-239. 
307 BREWSTER, Rachel, “Unpacking the State’s Reputation”, 50 Harvard International Law Journal 231 (2009), 
240. 
308 INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International 
Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 4. 
 83
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Sea) in 2001.309 Although this withdrawal was completely legal 
– the ABM Treaty specifies that either party can withdraw from the treaty with six months’ 
notice, and the United States gave the requisite notice – many States criticized the United 
States for not upholding international goals of arms limits. A reputation for legal compliance 
can thus be maintained as long as the State acts in accordance with the treaty’s terms. 
However, actions that are formally in compliance with a treaty regime might nonetheless 
signal that a State is unreliable. By contrast, a reliability reputation might permit some 
violations of the agreement. Which kind of reputation is better will be often context specific. 
If the treaty is very specific, then a reputation for strict legal compliance might be better.310 
 
As we consider Malta a rational, self-interested State, reputation will be important in 
both treaty compliance and treaty formation. We start by taking a look at the current 
international obligations of Malta, namely the rescue of persons in distress and the 
establishment of an efficient SRR. As both legal provisions are vague, we cannot say that 
Malta is not in compliance with its obligations. There is a certain discretion in deciding when 
a person is in distress or not. Next to this, it is not strictly forbidden to have a 
disproportionate SRR that overlaps with other countries. Therefore, its ‘legality reputation’ 
remains intact.  
 
But what about Malta’s ‘reliability reputation’? Until now, Malta was able to keep this 
reputation quite high. This is a result of the particular circumstances, namely a small island 
being flooded by migrants and not getting enough help from other countries. This is also the 
reason why Malta’s refusal to join the 2004 SOLAS and SAR Amendments and the IMO 
Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea did not harm its reputation in such a 
way that it felt under pressure to actually subscribe these obligations. Malta officially 
declared “that it is not yet in a position to accept these amendments”.311 It thus seems that Malta 
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does want to accept these amendments, but that it simply cannot do so because of the current 
situation. 
 
However, Malta cannot invoke these arguments in order not to negotiate the new 
Regional Agreement. After the absence of Malta during the second meeting of the 
consultation group, the country stated that it would be available for future meetings.312 
Especially due to the recent incidents as a consequence of the Arab Spring, Malta feels 
pressure to cooperate in order to find a solution. The 2004 SOLAS and SAR Amendments 
and the IMO Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea were also drafted after 
the Tampa incident in 2001. However, the big difference now is that Malta is being directly 
involved since the problem is situated in the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, Malta’s reputation is 
without any doubt at stake.  
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
The Arab Spring highlighted once more the problem of migrants at sea. Due to the 
increased loss of life in the Mediterranean in 2011, the negotiations on the Draft Regional 
Agreement on concerted procedures relating to the disembarkation of persons rescued at sea 
in the Mediterranean Basin were speeded up. Malta has an important role in this agreement 
due to its enormous SRR. One of the problems that should be tackled is the coordination 
between the several SRR in the Mediterranean. Also, a system of burden-sharing has to be 
part of the agreement. When the Regional Agreement could meet part of the concerns Malta 
has, it could even go further than purely maritime matters and thus include provisions on 
human rights and humanitarian law. For the moment Malta is losing its ‘good’ reputation. If 
Malta wants to avoid this, it should accept that the law of the sea is not isolated from other 
parts of the law. 
 
On the one hand the draft MoU contains certain elements that are negative for Malta, 
such as the provision that the primary responsibility rests with the Government responsible 
for the respective SRR. Also a definition of what constitutes a distress phase is incorporated 
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into the MoU. On the other hand the draft MoU is positive for Malta as it takes into 
consideration the respective capacities of a State when providing place of safety and the 
particular circumstances of the case. Next to this, a place of safety may be outside the SRR 
(next or nearest port). Finally, States have to cooperate in providing a suitable place of safety, 
taking into account relevant factors, risks and circumstances, particularly, when the number 
of survivors exceeds capacity of the responsible State for SRR. 
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4. State responsibility 
 
4.1. State responsibility of flag States and of coastal States 
 
First of all, the flag State – whose flag the vessel in distress is flying – can be responsible. 
Under the law of the sea, there is an obligation for every State to exercise its jurisdiction and 
control over ships flying its flag. According to Article 94(3) LOSC “[e]very State shall take such 
measures for ships flying its flag as are necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to the 
construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships”. Therefore, with regard to migrants at sea, it 
is deemed critical that flag States exercise effective jurisdiction and control over their vessels 
in order to ensure strict compliance with safety standards set out in relevant international 
instruments. Unseaworthy vessels should not be permitted to sail.313 The situation, wherein a 
State permits unseaworthy vessels carrying migrants to fly its flag, will raise questions of 
international responsibility of that State. Nevertheless, this State is not in this capacity subject 
to the obligation of Article 98 LOSC, which only refers to the flag States in the vicinity of the 
vessel in distress.314 
 
Whenever a State commits an internationally unlawful act against another State, 
international responsibility is established between the two. As a result, a breach of an 
international obligation gives rise to a requirement for reparation.315 Next to the wide range 
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of State practice in this area,316 the ILC worked extensively on this topic. In 2001, the ILC 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Draft 
Articles) were adopted.317 The ILC Draft Articles do not address issues of either the 
responsibility of international organizations or the responsibility of individuals.318 General 
Assembly Resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001 annexed the text of the Articles and 
commended them to governments.319 This is an unusual procedure which must be seen as 
giving particular weight to the status of the articles.320 
 
Under the law of State responsibility, every internationally wrongful act of a State – 
consisting of an action or omission – entails the international responsibility of that State. An 
act is internationally wrongful when the conduct is attributable to the State under 
international law and when it constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the 
State.321 The failure of a vessel to provide assistance to persons in distress at sea can be 
attributable to its flag State in two cases: (1) when the vessel is a warship or other duly 
designated State vessel and (2) when the vessel is private and the shipmaster is acting on the 
instructions of – or under the direction or control of – the flag State.322 In the first case, the 
shipmaster – with which the pertinent duty to provide assistance lies – is a de jure organ of 
the flag State. His conduct will be attributable to the flag State pursuant to Article 4 ILC Draft 
Articles. In the second case, should the flag State instruct the shipmaster to turn a blind eye 
to persons in distress at sea, this omission would be attributable to the flag State according to 
Article 8 ILC Draft Articles. However, there must be stressed that flag States – which enact a 
duty of assistance in their domestic legislation and exercise disciplinary control and 
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jurisdiction over potential infringements of this duty in accordance with their legislation – 
should be considered to meet their obligations under Article 98(1) LOSC.323 
 
There is a third – although unlikely – possibility that the conduct of a private vessel will 
be attributable to the flag State, namely when the vessel is private and the shipmaster is 
empowered by the law to exercise elements of governmental authority. In this case, the 
conduct shall be considered an act of the State, provided that the person or entity is acting in 
that capacity in the particular instance.324 Whether the shipmaster will be empowered to 
exercise ‘elements of governmental authority’ and to what extent, will be a matter of 
domestic law. Shipmasters often enjoy certain public powers, for example the power to arrest 
and to board a vessel. When there would exist a similar delegation of governmental 
authority with respect to search and rescue at sea in the national law, it would be difficult to 
contest the attribution of the conduct to the flag State.325 What is being regarded as 
‘governmental’ depends on the particular society, its history and traditions. Not only the 
content of the powers will be important, but also the way they are conferred on an entity, the 
purposes for which they are to be exercised and the extent to which the entity is accountable 
to government for their exercise. Article 5 ILC Draft Articles does not cover situations where 
internal law confers powers upon or authorizes conduct by citizens or residents generally. 326 
Therefore, it is a very narrow category. Moreover, rendering assistance can be regarded as a 
humanitarian duty, rather than a governmental activity.327 
 
The obligations for coastal States under Article 98(2) LOSC as well as under the SAR and 
SOLAS Conventions are to promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an 
adequate and effective search and rescue service, where circumstances so require cooperate 
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with neighbouring States for this purpose and to ensure that a place of safety is provided. 
The conduct of an RCC will always be attributed to its coastal States, as the RCC 
administrators are necessarily de jure organs of the State.328 Although an RCC can be operated 
either unilaterally by personnel of a single military service (e.g. an Air Force or a Navy) or 
either by a single civilian service (e.g. a national Police force or a Coast Guard), it will always 
be regarded as a State organ. Article 4(1) ILC Draft Articles reads: “The conduct of any State 
organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises 
legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of 
the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of 
the State.” The fact that the State is responsible for the conduct of its own organs – acting in 
that capacity – has long been recognized in international judicial decisions. One of the 
earliest sources of this principle was Umpire LIEBER’s statement in the Moses case, a decision 
of a Mexico-United States Mixed Claims Commission: “An officer or person in authority 
represents pro tanto his government, which in an international sense is the aggregate of all officers 
and men in authority.”329 The ICJ has also confirmed this rule. In its Advisory Opinion 
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights, it said that according to a well-established rule of international law, the 
conduct of any organ of a State must be regarded as an act of that State. This rule is of a 
customary character.330  
 
The words of Article 98(2) LOSC indicate that coastal States shall promote – not provide – 
a certain level of search and rescue services. Search and rescue services have to be ‘adequate 
and effective’. However, it is not always clear what ‘adequate and effective’ means. MOEN 
gives the example of the recent Arctic luxury eco-tourism. Cruise ships – icebreaking vessels 
that need no escort to navigate – now take advantage of ice-free conditions during the 
summer months to sail from Iceland to Alaska through the Northwest Passage. Nevertheless, 
travelling along the Northwest Passage still imposes serious risks, making the potential for a 
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humanitarian disaster real. Canada should therefore adapt its search and rescue services in 
order to adequately and effectively deal with these new risks.331 It can be concluded that 
coastal States are under an obligation of conduct, not an obligation of result.332 For State 
Parties to the 2004 SAR and SOLAS Amendments, there is an additional obligation to ensure 
that a place of safety is being provided for the persons rescued at sea. Whether this 
requirement will be met, will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
 
According to Article 98(2) LOSC, coastal States also have to cooperate where appropriate. 
But in practice, this is not always the case. On 9 November 2011, 44 people – mostly sub-
Saharans – were rescued by the Italian navy ship Foscari after two days of sending out 
distress calls from a satellite phone in the Mediterranean Sea. The delay in rescuing the boat 
led to huge risks to the lives of the persons in distress. Risks for example included drowning, 
dehydration and exposure. After the rescue, the migrants were transported to Sicily, not to 
Lampedusa or Malta which were the two closest ports. UNHCR spokesman Adrian 
EDWARDS stated that UNHCR was grateful that the Italian navy took this initiative despite 
the fact that the boat was in Maltese SRR.333 In response, the AFM and the Maltese SAR 
authorities both rejected what they characterized as the “impression conveyed” by the UNHCR 
spokesperson that Maltese SAR authorities abdicated from their responsibilities and did not 
cooperate with the relevant Italian authorities. The AFM statement – as reported by the 
newspaper Times of Malta – outlines in detail the Maltese response to the distress call from 
the migrant boat.  The AFM said that the decision for the Foscari to take the rescued migrants 
to an Italian port in Sicily was the result of Italian insistence that Lampedusa does not 
represent a place of safety for the disembarkation of migrants. According to Malta, 
Lampedusa did represent the nearest place of safety under the relevant legal regime 
applicable with the Malta SRR. Therefore, the persons should have been disembarked here.334 
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Could Malta be responsible for not cooperating? First of all, as was mentioned in the first 
part of this chapter, it will be difficult to establish a breach of the duty to cooperate. Second, 
there are migrant boats who refuse to be rescued by Malta, because they want to go to Italy. 
For example, on 9 July 2012, a boat – reportedly carrying 50 Eritreans and Somalis – was at 
sea. They refused to be rescued by Maltese military forces. UNHCR reported that over 1.000 
people on 14 boats have arrived in Malta from Libya so far in 2012. Two other boats were 
intercepted by Maltese authorities. It is striking that the majority elected not to be rescued 
and continued to Italy.335 
 
4.2. An example: the left-to-die-boat 
 
A recent incident that gave rise to a discussion on responsibility for failing to meet search 
and rescue obligations, involved a disabled boat filled with migrants fleeing Libya. It was left 
to drift for two weeks in the Mediterranean before finally landing back in Libya on 10 April 
2011. The boat ran into trouble not long after its departure from Tripoli. Despite several 
distress calls as well as sightings by survivors of a military helicopter and a warship, the boat 
received no help. It is almost certain that the helicopter must have come from a ship.336 The 
warship was of an off-white or light grey colour and the boat was close enough for them to 
see people on board wearing different coloured military uniforms. However, none of the 
survivors could remember seeing the ship’s flag.337 The situation on board the boat when 
they encountered the ship was very different to the situation when they encountered the 
helicopter. When the ship came across them, many persons had already died and there was 
no food and water. In an attempt to approach the ship, the migrants jumped into the sea and 
starting pushing their boat in its direction. They even showed the babies that had died, the 
sick women and the empty fuel tanks. However, no assistance was provided and after a 
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short while, the military vessel sailed away.338 It should have been clear that the survivors 
and the boat were in distress and that the situation required immediate rescue. As a result, in 
these circumstances there was a clear failure to intervene.339 Ultimately, 63 persons – 
including 20 women and two babies – out of the 72 passengers died. As of 24 March 2011 – 
two days before the migrant boat left Tripoli – NATO and France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, 
the United States, and Canada all had warships patrolling NATO’s Maritime Surveillance 
Area, to enforce the arms embargo on Libya.340  
 
But which military vessel ignored the calls for assistance? According to the fact finding 
PACE (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe) report of Tineke STRIK of 29 March 
2012, at least two vessels involved in NATO’s operations were in the boat’s vicinity when the 
distress call was sent, namely the Spanish frigate Méndez Núñez (11 miles away) and the 
Italian ITS Borsini (37 miles away).341 Tineke STRIK met with NATO officials in Brussels on 28 
November 2011.342 Next to this, she also requested written information from NATO and from 
the ministers of defence of countries involved in NATO operations with vessels with aircraft 
and/or helicopter-carrying facilities (Canada, France, Greece, Italy, Romania, Spain, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom and the United States).343 However, NATO stated: “In all cases, NATO 
warships did everything they could to respond to distress calls and provide help when necessary. In 
addition, through coordination with national authorities, NATO has indirectly facilitated the rescue of 
many hundreds more. Commanders of warships under NATO command were, and remain, fully 
aware of their obligations under the International Law and Law of the Sea and responded 
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appropriately.”344 As – at that time – all vessels in the area were under NATO command, the 
vessel must have been under the command of NATO, whatever its nationality was. As a 
result, according to Ms. STRIK, NATO must take responsibility for the ship’s ignoring the 
calls for assistance from the “left-to-die boat”.345 The report of Tineke STRIK was adopted by 
the PACE Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons.  It demanded that 
NATO would conduct an inquiry into the incident. Next to this, national parliaments of the 
States concerned should also carry out inquiries.346 
 
On 11 April 2012, three NGO’s – La Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'homme 
(FIDH), Groupe d'information et de soutien des immigrés (GISTI) and the European Programme 
for Integration and Migration (Migreurop) – held a press conference to announce the filing of 
a legal complaint against the French military with the Procureur de la République du Tribunal de 
Grande Instance de Paris, alleging that military forces failed to render assistance to a migrant 
boat within the NATO military zone during Operation Unified Protector.347 FIDH, GISTI and 
Migreurop conclude that the French military must have had knowledge of the distress 
situation, based upon three reasons: “(1) Compte tenu de la connaissance de la présence et de la 
localisation (33°45mn de latitude nord et 13°05 mn de longitude est) de ce bateau par un avion de 
reconnaissance français le 27 mars à 14h55. (2) Compte tenu de la présence de l’armée française dans 
le périmètre de 50 milles nautiques, à partir de la localisation de l’embarcation, lors de la diffusion du 
message de détresse le 27 mars à 20h54 (18H54 GMT) par les garde-côtes italiens. (3) Compte tenu de 
l’importante présence de l’armée française dans le périmètre de la diffusion du message Hydrolant en 
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date du 28 mars 2011 à 06h06 et de sa diffusion durant les dix jours suivants toutes les quatre 
heures.”348  
 
Information provided by the Rome MRCC indicates a sighting of a boat full of migrants 
by a French aircraft on 27 March 2011. According to the French sighting, the boat was a 
rubber dinghy, had about 50 persons on board and was under propulsion. A photograph 
taken by the aircraft was provided to Ms. STRIK by the Rome MRCC, showing distinctly a 
blue boat packed with people and steadily moving ahead. The boat in the picture was 
identified as the boat in question by two of the survivors.349 According to information 
provided by the French military, no such event occurred off the Libyan shores during the 
NATO operations. The French Minister of Defence stated that the French vessel Meuse 
encountered a vessel carrying migrants on 28 March 2011, approximately 12 nautical miles 
south of Malta. However, this could not have been the boat in question. The Minister went 
on to say that all other French assets were operating in the Gulf of Sidra. Therefore, they 
were not in the area of concern. NATO’s written reply that “based on a review of existing 
records in NATO operational headquarters, there is no record of any aircraft or ship under NATO 
command having seen or made contact with the small boat in question”. These responses fail to 
provide any concrete answers as to the identity of the French aircraft that took a picture of 
the boat.350 
 
One of the problems is the isolated nature of the ocean.  Therefore, it is difficult to prove 
a failure of search and rescue obligations. Nevertheless, satellite images for example could 
provide for proof. The European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) gathers a great deal of data 
and pictures across the globe.351 In the light of the PACE fact finding report “Lives Lost in the 
Mediterranean Sea: Who is Responsible?”, Tineke STRIK asked EUSC for satellite images. 
However, EUSC replied that the Centre did not have archived products available for the 
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indicated area and the indicated time frame. It continued stating that – considering that the 
area of interest coincided with the area of NATO Operation Unified Protector – the envisaged 
investigation could involve classified ‘NATO confidential’ information. Nevertheless, EUSC 
admitted that access to satellite imagery of the area would have been an invaluable tool to 
identify the location of ships as military vessels are certainly large enough to be spotted and 
possibly identified from such data.352 
 
In July 2012, the AFM expressed interest in benefitting from a European Union-
sponsored project involving the deployment of ‘drones’ – Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 
– to assist in migrant patrols at sea. While the AFM is fully involved in the development of 
the system, it is however not yet participating in the testing of such drones.353 Frontex’ 
Research and Development Unit is currently engaged in a study to identify more cost 
efficient and operational effective solutions for aerial border surveillance, in particular 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS’s) with Optional Piloted Vehicles (OPVs) that could be 
used during joint operations at sea.354 The United States is already using ‘Predator drones’ to 
monitor land and sea borders.  However, serious questions have been raised about the 
effectiveness of surveillance drones operating over the sea as – until now – the drones have 
had limited success in for example spotting drug runners in the open ocean.355 The use of 
drones for land and sea border surveillance is contemplated by in the EU Commission’s 
proposal on the establishment of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR).356 
The main purpose of EUROSUR is to improve the situational awareness and reaction 
capability at the external borders of the Member States and of the European Union.357 The 
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planned surveillance of the Mediterranean – using UAVs, satellites and shipboard 
monitoring systems – could aid in the rescue of refugees shipwrecked on the open seas.358 
However, EUROSUR could cover up a lack of substance. For example, maritime rescue 
services are not part of EUROSUR and border guards do not share information with them.359 
Moreover, EUROSUR should be adapted to meet the specific needs that asylum seekers may 
have. For example, the exchange of personal data with third countries should be prohibited, 
as this exchange may jeopardize both the safety and protection of asylum seekers and 
refugees, and their data protection rights.360 
 
4.3. Conclusion 
 
The failure of a vessel to provide assistance to persons in distress at sea can be 
attributable to its flag State in two cases: (1) when the vessel is a warship or other duly 
designated State vessel and (2) when the vessel is private and the shipmaster is acting on the 
instructions of – or under the direction or control of – the flag State. Coastal States have to 
promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search 
and rescue service, where circumstances so require cooperate with neighbouring States for 
this purpose and to ensure that a place of safety is provided. Also, according to Article 98(2) 
LOSC, coastal States have to cooperate where appropriate. The conduct of an RCC will 
always be attributed to its coastal States, as the RCC administrators are necessarily de jure 
organs of the State.361 
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The case with the ‘left-to-die-boat’ once more proved that international obligations are 
not always being fulfilled. One of the problems is the isolated nature of the ocean.  Therefore, 
it is difficult to prove a failure of search and rescue obligations. Nevertheless, satellite images 
for example could provide for proof. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) could assist in 
migrant patrols at sea. The use of drones for land and sea border surveillance is 
contemplated by in the EU Commission’s proposal on the establishment of EUROSUR.362 
Nevertheless, EUROSUR should be adapted to meet the specific needs that asylum seekers 
may have.363 
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5. Sanctions for the master and the ship owner 
 
5.1. Shipmaster 
 
When the 1989 Salvage Convention added Article 10(2), it placed the obligation to give 
effect to the duty to render assistance on the States, rather than on masters.364 Although 
Article 10(1) says that every master is bound – so far as he can do so without serious danger 
to his vessel and persons thereon – to render assistance to any person in danger of being lost 
at sea, para. 2 says: “The States Parties shall adopt the measures necessary to enforce the duty set 
out in paragraph 1.” Also other multinational instruments do not directly obligate masters to 
render assistance. At first sight the treaties refer to the masters of ships and they appear to 
create obligations for them. However, the binding element is on States parties.365 Also Article 
98(1) LOSC says “Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag […] to render 
assistance”. Indeed, international law seldom imposes obligations directly on individuals.366 
 
Article 2 of the 1989 Salvage Convention provides that States must bring judicial and 
arbitral proceedings regarding a breach of the duty to render assistance. Despite the fact that 
the duty to render assistance has been widely accepted, sometimes it still remains 
unenforced against masters.367 There are several reasons for this. First of all, failures to render 
assistance are rarely reported, as a survivor of a disaster at sea would have to be able to 
somehow identify a vessel whose master had failed to render assistance.368  Second, an action 
against a master requires that he is subject to the enforcing State’s jurisdiction.369 It may be 
possible for States other than the flag State to assert criminal jurisdiction due to failure by a 
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shipmaster to assist persons in need of assistance on the high seas.370 Third, many States – 
such as flags of convenience – are either unable or unwilling to enforce the duty.371 Moreover, 
even otherwise responsible flag States are unwilling to enforce the duty. For example, in the 
case Korpi v. United States, the Court held that as a matter of law “[a] private party has no 
affirmative duty to rescue a vessel or person in distress.”372 Last, as the master has a margin of 
appreciation to decide whether or not to provide assistance, as well as what kind of 
assistance to give, it is difficult to actually prove a breach of the duty he has. 
 
Article 16(1) of the 1989 Salvage Convention says: “1. No remuneration is due from persons 
whose lives are saved, but nothing in this article shall affect the provisions of national law on this 
subject. 2. A salvor of human life, who has taken part in the services rendered on the occasion of the 
accident giving rise to salvage, is entitled to a fair share of the payment awarded to the salvor for 
salving the vessel or other property or preventing or minimizing damage to the environment.” 
Therefore, States do not need to grant masters the right to a reward unless their national laws 
provide otherwise.373 Nevertheless, this could be an incentive to fulfil the legal duty to assist. 
However, one has to be careful that this does not amount to the act of smuggling. Smuggling 
is the explicit and mutually beneficial arrangement between two parties involving illegal 
entry (crossing borders without complying with the necessary requirements for legal entry 
into the receiving State) into a given country.374 
 
It has been suggested that the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) 
could be used to assist in the enforcement of the duty to render assistance.375 The GMDSS is 
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said to be “the biggest change to maritime communications since the invention of radio.”376 The 
basic concept of this system is that search and rescue authorities ashore, as well as ships in 
the vicinity, will be alerted in the event of an emergency. Therefore, it helps shipmasters and 
States to fulfil their duty to provide search and rescue services. The GMDSS makes use of the 
satellite communications provided by Inmarsat as well as terrestrial radio. The equipment 
required by ships varies according to the sea area in which they operate. For example, ships 
travelling to the high seas must carry more communications equipment than those which 
remain within reach of specified shore-based radio facilities. In addition to distress 
communications, the GMDSS also provides for the dissemination of general maritime safety 
information.  
 
The GMDSS was adopted by means of amendments to the SOLAS Convention. The 
amendments – contained in Chapter IV of SOLAS on Radiocommunications – were adopted 
in 1988 and entered into force on 1 February 1992. However, they provided for a phase-in 
period until 1 February 1999.377 The search and rescue radar transponders on ships, to 
facilitate the location of vessels in distress, are generally capable of detecting signals at a 
distance of eight nautical miles and displaying the signals on a vessel’s radar screen. It has 
been suggested that if a recording device were employed with these transponders, it could 
record distress signals as they are received from a vessel in distress. Flag States could 
compare transponder recordings with the ship’s log, inquire into discrepancies between the 
recording and the log, and hold masters to task for failing to respond. Also recording 
technology is already in place as ships need to carry voyage data recorders (VDRs) – the 
shipboard equivalent of the famous “black box” flight data recorders used in the airline 
industry – to assist in accident investigation.378 Adapting VDRs to take and record input from 
search and rescue transponders should not present a significant technical hurdle. 379 
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5.2. Ship owner 
 
Could a ship owner be liable for damages to a stranger in peril on the high seas to whom 
the shipmaster has failed to give aid? In the case Warschauer v. Lloyd Sabaudo (1934),380 the 
plaintiff WARSCHAUER – a United States citizen – brought an action against an Italian 
corporation which owned and operated the steamship Conte Biancamano. The complaint 
alleged that on the afternoon of 31 October 1931, the plaintiff and a companion were adrift 
on the high seas in a disabled motorboat. They had no gasoline and no food and when the 
defendant’s operating personnel of the Conte Biancamano observed the distress signals, they 
refused to heed them or to stop and take the plaintiff aboard. In the case at hand, they could 
have done so without peril to themselves or their vessel. Although WARSCHAUER was 
rescued by the Coastguard two days later, he had suffered permanent physical injuries due 
to the exposure and deprivations to which he was subjected by the failure of the defendant’s 
steamship to render assistance. Therefore, WARSCHAUER demanded damages for the pain 
and subsequently incurred medical expenses. This situation involved no personal dereliction 
by the ship owner. Such dereliction was that of the master. Only by applying the doctrine of 
respondeat superior it could be imputed to the ship owner. 
 
The Court referred to Article 11 of the 1910 Salvage Convention that the owner of the 
vessel incurs no liability by reason of contravention of the master’s obligation to render 
assistance. The applicant in this case held that this provision only referred to the criminal 
liability of the owner. However, the Court decided that such an interpretation would seem 
most unlikely. It said that: “Unless it was intended to cover civil liability, no reason is apparent for 
mentioning the owner’s exemption from liability. It is almost inconceivable that criminal 
responsibility should be imputed to an owner who had not directed the dereliction of his agent.  […] A 
penal statute is construed to apply only to the class of persons to whom it specifically refers.”381 
Therefore, if the 1910 Salvage Convention only refers to the master’s duty, breach of which is 
to be enforced by the criminal law, there would have been no need to express the owner’s 
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exemption from responsibility. However, if the master’s liability can be civil as well as 
criminal, then the provision referring to the owner serves a purpose as it clearly relieves him 
from civil liability. 
 
This is confirmed by the 1989 Salvage Convention. Although Article 10(1) of the 1989 
Salvage Convention requires that every master is bound – so far as he can do so without 
serious danger to his vessel and persons thereon – to render assistance to any person in 
danger of being lost at sea, para. 3 continues: “The owner of a vessel incurs no liability by reason 
of contravention of the above position.” 
 
5.3. When the rescuer becomes a smuggler 
 
As States are reluctant to accept rescued migrants onto their territory, the rescuer is 
sometimes being assimilated with a smuggler. In 2000, the Smuggling Protocol was attached 
to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) in 
2000.382 While there is no express reference to distress situations at sea, Article 7 Smuggling 
Protocol mentions that States have to cooperate in accordance with the international law of 
the sea.383 Next to this, Article 8 Smuggling Protocol stipulates that – although measures such 
as boarding are not allowed without the express authorization of the flag State – States can 
take measures necessary to relieve imminent danger to the lives of persons.384 This could for 
example be the case when a woman is in labour. Lastly, Article 19(1) Smuggling Protocol 
states that nothing in the Protocol shall affect the other rights, obligations and responsibilities 
of States and individuals under international law. 
 
In 2009, a Sicilian Court acquitted three Germans from Cap Anamur – a humanitarian 
non-profit organization that has its headquarters in Cologne – of criminal charges that they 
aided illegal migration by bringing a boatload of African migrants they rescued at sea to 
shore in Sicily in 2004. The former Cap Anamur president, as well as the shipmaster and first 
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officer faced several years in prison.385 However, the Smuggling Protocol entered into force 
for Italy on 2 August 2006 – 2 years after the Cap Anamur incident.386 Moreover, in 2007 there 
was a similar case when two Tunisian fishing boat captains rescued 44 migrants and brought 
them to Lampedusa despite being ordered by the Italian authorities not to enter the port. The 
migrant boat – which had departed from Libya – had been at sea for three days and was 
carrying asylum seekers from Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Most of the migrants were 
seriously ill. The two masters as well as their crew members were arrested and criminally 
charged with facilitating illegal immigration. Eventually, they were acquitted by the Court of 
Agrigento of these charges in November 2009.387 
 
A smuggler is someone who obtains, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit. Although this should be understood broadly – to include, for example, crimes in 
which the predominant motivation may be sexual gratification, such as the receipt or trade of 
materials by members of child pornography rings, the trading of children by members of 
paedophile rings or cost-sharing among ring members388 – the reference to ‘a financial or 
other material benefit’ as an element of the definition was especially included in order to 
emphasize that the intention was to only include the activities of organized criminal groups 
acting for profit, but to exclude the activities of those who provided support to migrants for 
humanitarian reasons or on the basis of close family ties. It was not the intention of the 
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Protocol to criminalize the activities of family members or support groups such as religious 
or non-governmental organizations.389 
 
However, the reasoning of the decision which validated the initial arrest of the captain 
and officials of Cap Anamur does contain a reference to the notion of profit: according to the 
Court they actually wanted to get the greatest media coverage and publicity in favour of the 
organization.390 Cap Anamur became well known in the 1980s for helping Vietnamese boat 
people – fleeing for the communist regime – in the South China Sea. The committee ‘Ein 
Schiff für Vietnam’ (‘A boat for Vietnam’) chartered a cargo ship – ‘Cap Anamur’ – which 
rescued more than 10.000 boat persons. 391 Rumours therefore suggest that the Cap Anamur 
activists staged a stunt in 2004 to attract news media attention.392 
 
In the case of 2007 concerning two Tunisian fishing boats, neither net, nor fish were found 
on the fishing boat by Italian authorities.393 The UN General Assembly already noted in its 
Resolution 64/72 on sustainable fisheries of 4 December 2009 that it had concerns about 
possible connections between international organized crime and illegal fishing in certain 
regions of the world.394 A 2011 UNODC study on transnational organized crime in the 
fishing industry found that there are indeed fishing vessels that are involved in smuggling of 
migrants, illicit traffic in drugs (primarily cocaine), illicit traffic in weapons and acts of 
terrorism. Fishing vessels are being used as mother ships, as supply vessels for other vessels 
engaged in criminal activities or simply as cover for clandestine activities at sea and in ports. 
Although fishers are often recruited by organized criminal groups due to their skills and 
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knowledge of the sea, they seldom seem to be regarded as the masterminds behind 
organized criminal activities involving the fishing industry or fishing vessels. Therefore, it is 
unfortunate that fishermen – rather than more centrally placed persons in the criminal 
networks – are likely to be targeted when criminal activities involving fishing vessels or the 
fishing industry are investigated and prosecuted, particularly in light of the possibility that 
some of these fishers may be victims of human trafficking.395 There are no available 
comprehensive data on the extent to which fishers are involved in smuggling of migrants at 
sea across the Mediterranean. The IMO biannual reports made by Italy, Greece and Turkey 
suggest that relatively few fishing vessels are used for smuggling of migrants at sea into Italy 
and Greece compared to the use of amongst others inflatable boats and smaller engine 
powered plastic, wooden or fiberglass boats.396 Therefore, there seems to be very little basis 
upon which to claim that fishers are involved in an organized manner in migrant smuggling 
into Europe.397 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 
The obligation to give effect to the duty to render assistance lies on the flag States, rather 
than on masters.398 Although Article 10(1) 1989 Salvage Convention says that every master is 
bound – so far as he can do so without serious danger to his vessel and persons thereon – to 
render assistance to any person in danger of being lost at sea, para. 2 says: “The States Parties 
shall adopt the measures necessary to enforce the duty set out in paragraph 1.” Also Article 98(1) 
LOSC says “Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag […] to render assistance”. 
Article 2 of the 1989 Salvage Convention provides that States must bring judicial and arbitral 
proceedings regarding a breach of the duty to render assistance. Despite the fact that the 
duty to render assistance has been widely accepted, sometimes it still remains unenforced 
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against masters.399 
 
The case with the Cap Anamur painfully demonstrates the criminalization of shipmasters 
who rescued migrants. Although every flag State must require the master of a ship flying its 
flag to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress when informed of 
their need of assistance,400 the fear of criminalization by those who go to the rescue of boats 
carrying migrants is one of the reasons why commercial vessels fail to go to the rescue of 
boats in distress. This was confirmed by a 2012 PACE report.401 
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Summary 
 
Although it is a legal obligation for shipmasters and States under customary 
international law, as well as under the LOSC to render assistance to persons in danger of 
being lost and to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, there is 
no comparable duty to disembark these persons. As a result, rescued asylum seekers can 
spend weeks on a ship before going ashore. Shipmasters are therefore reluctant to rescue 
migrants at sea. At the fourth meeting of the Interagency Group in June 2008, involving IMO, 
UNDOALOS, UNHCR, OHCHR, the International Labour Organization (ILO) and IOM, the 
participants stated: “If States fail to meet their obligations, then masters of ships cannot fulfil their 
duties either”.402 Therefore it is deemed crucial to solve the disembarkation problem. 
 
Recent international and European soft law initiatives do focus on a real disembarkation 
duty. However, they also put too much burden on the coastal States. The 2009 IMO 
Guidelines on Principles Relating to Administrative Procedures for Disembarking Persons 
Rescued at Sea mention that if disembarkation from the rescuing ship cannot be arranged 
swiftly elsewhere, the Government responsible for the SRR should accept the 
disembarkation.403 Similarly, Council Decision 2010/252404 states in its Guidelines that 
regarding disembarkation, priority should be given to the third country from where the ship 
carrying the persons departed or through the territorial waters or SRR of which that ship 
transited. If this is not possible, priority should be given to disembarkation in the Member 
State hosting the surveillance operation at sea.405 Without any prior agreements on burden-
sharing between States, the life of many migrants is being jeopardized. It is estimated that for 
every 100 people safely landing after a dangerous journey in the Mediterranean, 5 people 
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drown without leaving any trace.406 However, some States fear that clarifying obligations and 
solving the problem through burden-sharing would produce an enormous pull factor, thus 
encouraging migrants to come to Europe by sea.407 
 
The Arab Spring highlighted once more the problem of migrants at sea. Due to the 
increased loss of life in the Mediterranean in 2011, the negotiations on the Draft Regional 
Agreement on concerted procedures relating to the disembarkation of persons rescued at sea 
in the Mediterranean Basin were speeded up. Malta has an important role in this agreement 
due to its enormous SRR. One of the problems that should be tackled is the coordination 
between the several SRR in the Mediterranean. Also, a system of burden-sharing has to be 
part of the agreement. When the Regional Agreement could meet part of the concerns Malta 
has, it could even go further than purely maritime matters and thus include provisions on 
human rights and humanitarian law. 
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Introduction 
 
Huge disparities in wealth across the world, the denial of fundamental rights in some 
countries and natural disasters have resulted in broad population movements, also by sea. 
For example, in 2010, almost 10,000 irregular arrivals by sea were reported in Greece, Spain, 
Italy and Malta. Due to the uprisings in Tunisia and Libya, this number even amounted to 
nearly 70,000 in 2011. In Yemen, there were 53,382 arrivals from Somalia in 2010 and even 
103,000 in 2011.408 Nowadays, most maritime movements are so-called ‘mixed’ movements, 
involving individuals or groups travelling in an irregular manner along similar routes and 
using similar means of travel, but for different reasons. This means that the people on board 
have various profiles and needs, as opposed to being primarily refugee outflows.409 The 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as someone who is unable or 
unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, 
or political opinion.410 However, among seaborne migrants, there are also people who are 
economic migrants looking for a better life in a developed country. Therefore, States are 
quite reluctant in permitting these persons onto their territory. In order to cope with this 
problem, States are taking interception measures to prevent people from arriving at their 
territory by sea. 
 
This chapter will first deal with the content of the concept ‘interception’. Secondly, we 
will take a look at the legality of interception measures in the territorial sea and the 
contiguous zone. Nevertheless, due to the freedom of navigation, the most interesting 
maritime area to discuss the legality of interception is the high seas. This will be discussed in 
the third part. As a sea journey is often difficult and dangerous, migrants request the help of 
smugglers to reach their destination. Therefore, maritime interception in case of migrant 
smuggling will be dealt with in the fourth part. The goal of interception activities is to divert 
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or to return asylum-seekers. The return of seaborne migrants – thereby focusing on the non-
refoulement principle – is being dealt with in the fifth part. After this, we will highlight 
regional initiatives in the Mediterranean Sea as well as in the Asia-Pacific. Finally, State 
responsibility and compensation will be elaborated on. 
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1. The concept of interception 
 
1.1. The difference between interception and interdiction 
 
There is no internationally accepted definition of interception or interdiction at sea. 
According to the Executive Committee of the UNHCR (ExCom): 
 
“[I]nterception or interdiction occurs when mandated authorities representing a 
State:  
(i) prevent embarkation of persons on an international journey 
(ii) prevent further onward international travel by persons, who have 
commenced their journey 
(iii) assert control of vessels where there are reasonable grounds to believe the 
vessel is transporting persons contrary to international or national maritime 
law.”411 
 
The above can occur in the form of either physical interception or administrative 
measures.412 The UNHCR assimilates ‘interception’ and ‘interdiction’. However, in this paper 
a clear distinction will be made between both concepts. GUILFOYLE describes the concept of 
maritime interdiction as a two-step process.413  First, the stopping, boarding, inspection and 
search of a ship at sea suspected of prohibited conduct (boarding). Secondly, where such 
suspicions prove justified, taking measures including any combination of arresting the 
vessel, arresting persons aboard or seizing cargo (seizure). Seizure is always conditioned 
upon and preceded by boarding. The right of approach is not included within the concept of 
interdiction as it is not unlawful for a governmental vessel on the high seas to draw near a 
foreign vessel to observe its flag or other marks of nationality. Such actions are not being 
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regarded as hostile.414 Yet, the right of approach can be an interception measure as the 
concept of interception is much broader as set out in the UNHCR definition. In any case, it is 
clear that when vessels respond to persons in distress at sea,415 they are not engaged in 
interception or interdiction.416 
 
A first positive effect from interception measures is that they can disrupt major 
smuggling and trafficking routes.417 However, due to the increasing surveillance operations, 
smugglers are often sending migrants to navigate the sea on their own, rather than risk being 
caught with the passengers. Also, because of the likelihood that the vessels will not return, 
smugglers are utilizing less expensive materials to build the boats. With no need to transport 
fuel for a return trip, migrants are making use of this extra space by loading their boats with 
more people, resulting in more drownings.418 Moreover, a recent UNODC study illustrates 
that increased surveillances can even stimulate migrant smuggling.419  Due to tighter controls 
on immigration, prices seem to be rising and the activity of smuggling becomes more 
lucrative. A second positive consequence could be that operations at sea can help detect 
persons in distress at sea and thus can facilitate saving lives.420 However, this is not the 
primary goal of interception measures. A third positive consequence is that increasing 
controls can prevent people from choosing to leave their country. However, experience 
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shows that as soon as one illegal immigration route has been closed down, pressure shifts to 
other routes.421 
 
1.2. Interception and the right to leave 
 
Preventing embarkation from inside the intercepting State via the imposition of exit 
visas or border closures to prevent departure would for example qualify under the ExCom 
definition of interception. But could the legality of in-country activities of interception – for 
example within the territorial sea – violate the right to leave any country? The right to leave 
one’s own country is an aspect of the general concern with freedom of movement.422 It is an 
established human right recognized in a range of international instruments. Article 13 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)423 as well as Article 12(2) International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)424 stipulate that everyone has the right to 
leave any country, including his own. The scope of the right is not restricted to persons 
lawfully within the territory of a State. An alien being legally expelled from the country is 
likewise entitled to elect the State of destination, subject to the agreement of that State.425 
Both travelling abroad and departure for permanent emigration are covered.426 Also the 1969 
American Convention on Human Rights427 and Protocol No. 4 of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) mention this right 
in Article 22(2) and Article 2(2), respectively.  
 
                                                 
421 Communication from the Commission to the Council on Reinforcing the Management of the European 
Union’s Southern Maritime Borders, COM (2006) 733 final, para. 21. 
422 See in general: HARVEY, Colin & BARNIDGE, Robert P., “Human Rights, Free Movement, and the Right to 
Leave in International Law”, 19 International Journal of Refugee Law 1 (2007), 1-21. 
423 UNGA, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, UN Doc. A/RES/217A (III) (6 November 1948) [UDHR], 
available online: <http://www.un-documents.net/a3r217a.htm>. 
424 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976), 99 UNTS 171 [ICCPR]. 
425 Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens under the Covenant”, UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3 (15 August 1997), available online: 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/bc561aa81bc5d86ec12563ed004aaa1b?Opendocument>. 
426 Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 27: Freedom of Movement”, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (2 November 1999), para. 8, available online: 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/6c76e1b8ee1710e380256824005a10a9?Opendocument#5%
2F%20See%20general>. 
427 American Convention on Human Rights (22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978), 9 ILM 99. 
 115
Nevertheless, the right to leave is not an absolute right and – under certain conditions – 
there can be restrictions by law, for example when it is necessary to protect national security 
or public safety.428 In its General Comment No. 27 on Article 12 ICCPR, the UN Human 
Rights Committee has stressed that restrictive measures must conform to the principle of 
proportionality. Therefore, they must be appropriate to achieve their protective function, 
they must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve the desired 
result and they must be proportionate to the interest to be protected. The principle of 
proportionality has to be respected in the law that frames the restrictions, as well as by the 
administrative and judicial authorities in applying the law.429 Moreover, restrictions need to 
be consistent with the fundamental principles of equality and non-discrimination. Thus, 
distinctions such as those on the basis of race, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national origin, birth or other legal status are impermissible. For example, the UN Human 
Rights Committee has found on several occasions that measures preventing women from 
moving freely or from leaving the country by requiring them to have the consent or the 
escort of a male person, constitute a violation of Article 12 ICCPR.430 
 
Faced with the wave of Albanian citizens immigrating illegally into Italy, the Italian and 
Albanian authorities took a number of measures to discourage Albanians from leaving. In 
1997, both countries signed an agreement authorising the Italian navy to set up a naval 
blockade in international waters and Albanian territorial waters. The case was brought 
before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) by Albanian migrants in Xhavara and 
Others v. Italy and Albania, who were trying to enter Italy illegally when their boat Kater I 
Rades sank following a collision with an Italian warship. Although the applicants were 
rescued, 58 people – among whom were members of their family – perished in the 
shipwreck. The applicants claimed that the bilateral agreement between Albania and Italy – 
allowing for Italy’s interception of Albanian sea vessels in international waters as well as in 
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Albanian territorial waters – violated Article 2(2) Protocol 4 ECHR, namely the right to leave 
one’s country. However, as the interception activities were not aimed at preventing the 
Albanians from leaving their country, but rather at preventing them from entering Italian 
territory – the ECtHR held that this right was not violated.431 However, this decision is being 
criticized in doctrine. It has been argued that when the most accessible safety route is sealed 
off, the result is to lock migrants into their home countries or to cause them to risk more 
perilous journeys. Therefore, Italy's actions would have significantly undermined both the 
right to leave one’s country and the right to seek asylum.432 Nevertheless, in this case, the 
most accessible safety route was not sealed off as persons could still choose to migrate by 
land or by air, both safer routes than by sea. Therefore, the result of the interception 
measures was not to lock migrants into their home country, nor to cause them to risk more 
perilous journeys. 
 
1.3. Interception and the right to seek and to enjoy asylum 
 
The right to leave must be read in conjunction with the right to seek and to enjoy asylum 
in Article 14(1) UDHR. Thus, States have an obligation to respect an individual’s right to 
leave his or her country in search of protection.433 Nevertheless, there is no obligation for 
States to grant asylum and individuals do not have the right to be granted asylum.434 During 
the drafting of the UDHR, the proposal to substitute ‘to be granted’ for ‘to enjoy’ was 
vigorously opposed.435 Moreover, LAUTERPACHT noted that there was no intention among 
States to assume even a moral obligation in the matter, as granting asylum was regarded as 
the sovereign right – and not the duty – of every State.436 Draft texts of the 1951 Convention 
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relating to the Status of Refugees437 (Refugee Convention) contained an article on the 
admission of refugees which said: “(1) In pursuance of Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights the High Contracting Parties shall give favourable consideration to the position of 
refugees seeking asylum from persecution or the threat of persecution on account of their race, religion, 
nationality or political opinions. (2) The High Contracting Parties shall to the fullest possible extent 
relieve the burden assumed by initial reception countries which have afforded asylum to persons to 
whom paragraph 1 refers. They shall do so, inter alia, by agreeing to receive a certain number of 
refugees in their territory.”438 However, the Ad Hoc Committee decided that the Convention 
should not deal with asylum and that it should merely provide for a certain number of 
improvements in the position of refugees.439 At the Conference of the Plenipotentiaries, the 
British delegation stressed again that the right of asylum is only the right of a State to grant 
or to refuse asylum and not a right belonging to the individual entitling him to insist on it 
being extended to him.440 This view was reflected in the 1967 United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) Declaration on Territorial Asylum, that provides that asylum granted by 
a State – in the exercise of its sovereignty – to persons entitled to invoke Article 14 UDHR, 
has to be respected by all other States. The State of asylum has the authority to evaluate the 
grounds for the grant of asylum.441 
 
In 1977, the world community again passed over an opportunity to grant to individuals 
the right to asylum vis-à-vis the State of refuge. The 1977 United Nations Conference on 
Territorial Asylum – convened with the goal of adopting a Convention on Territorial Asylum 
– adjourned without finishing its work, due to the considerable disagreement among 
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States.442 Also regional instruments do not provide for an individual’s right to be granted 
asylum. The ECHR makes no reference to asylum and although African and American 
regional instruments address asylum, they do so with great respect for State sovereignty. 
Article 12(3) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights states that every 
individual has the right to seek and obtain asylum, but in accordance with laws of those 
countries and international conventions.443 Similarly, the American Convention on Human 
Rights provides in Article 22(7) that every person has the right to seek and be granted 
asylum in a foreign territory, in accordance with the legislation of the State and international 
conventions.444 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
 
There is no internationally accepted definition of interception or interdiction at sea. The 
UNHCR even assimilates both concepts.445 We will use the concept of interception in a broad 
sense, namely to prevent embarkation, to prevent further onward travel or to assert control 
over vessels. The concept of interdiction will be used in a narrow sense, being boarding and 
seizure of ships at sea. Interdiction – and the legality of intediction measures – will be 
particularly relevant on the high seas. Interception measures have to respect the fact that 
everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own. In the case Xhavara and 
Others v. Italy and Albania, the ECtHR held that this right was not violated  as the interception 
activities were not aimed at preventing the Albanians from leaving their country, but rather 
at preventing them from entering Italian territory.446 The right to leave must be read in 
conjunction with the right to seek and to enjoy asylum in Article 14(1) UDHR. Although 
there is a right to seek asylum, there is no right of individuals vis-à-vis the State of refuge to 
be granted asylum. 
                                                 
442 See: GRAHL-MADSEN, Atle, Territorial Asylum (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1980), 231 
p.; WEIS, Paul, “The Draft United Nations Convention on Territorial Asylum”, 50 British Yearbook of 
International Law 151 (1979), 151-171. 
443 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1987, entered into force 21 October 1986), 
21 ILM 58. 
444 American Convention on Human Rights (22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978), 9 ILM 99. 
445 ExCom, “Protection Safeguards in Interception Measures Problems Related to the Rescue of Asylum-Seekers 
in Distress at Sea”, Conclusion No. 97 (LIV) (2003), available online: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f93b2894.html>. 
446 ECtHR, Xhavara and Others v. Italy and Albania, 11 January 2001, Appl. No. 39473/98 (2001). 
 119
2. Maritime interception in the territorial sea and in the contiguous zone 
 
2.1. Interception in the territorial sea 
 
The sovereignty of a coastal State extends to its territorial sea, a maritime area of up to 
12 nautical miles measured from the State’s baselines.447 All the laws of the coastal State may 
be made applicable. However, in this territorial sea ships of all States enjoy the right of 
innocent passage.448 Passage has to be continuous and expeditious and can be regarded as 
innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal 
State. Nevertheless, States are entitled to regulate innocent passage through the territorial 
sea. Non-compliance with these regulations may make passage non-innocent. Article 19(2) 
LOSC contains a list of activities that are considered to threaten the peace, good order or 
security, for example the loading or unloading of any person contrary to immigration laws 
and regulations of the coastal State.449 
 
Whether or not a vessel will be in breach of the conditions of innocent passage is partly a 
question of fact. However, also the exact scope of Article 19 LOSC is important and more 
particular the question whether the list in Article 19(2) LOSC is exhaustive or not. If the list is 
not exhaustive, one could argue that the coastal State may enjoy a discretion to characterize a 
broader range of migration matters as prejudicial to their peace, good order or security and 
also to take action against suspected vessels. Although a minority of authors takes the view 
that the list is exhaustive450 – thereby limiting the authority of coastal States – this position is 
far from being settled as a matter of law.451 It is certainly arguable that coastal States may 
take other steps necessary to protect their security.452 Article 19(2)(l) LOSC provides for “any 
other activity not having a direct bearing on passage”. Although this phrase was criticized during 
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UNCLOS III – as conferring on Article 19 LOSC as a whole an ‘open-ended’ character – the 
attempts which were made to change this were not successful. For example, the International 
Chamber of Shipping expressed its concerns and suggested that – if Article 19(2)(l) LOSC 
could not be deleted – it should be amended to read: “Any similar activity not having direct 
bearing on passage.”453 The opposite view is largely based upon the ‘Joint Statement on the 
Uniform Interpretation of Norms of International Law Governing Innocent Passage’ 
concluded between the USSR and the United States.454 This document states that Article 19(2) 
LOSC is exhaustive. However, as the United States is not a Party to the LOSC, the statement 
cannot be regarded with too much weight in terms of subsequent practice for the purpose of 
Article 31(3) VCLT.455 Next to this, State practice supports the interception of vessels in the 
territorial sea for matters not explicitly listed in Article 19(2) LOSC. For example, the 
‘Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation of Security Initiative’ (PSI) allow for the 
interception of vessels in the territorial sea reasonably suspected of carrying weapons of 
mass destruction.456 We can therefore conclude that a coastal State has some discretion in 
determining what activities could render passage of a foreign ship as not innocent. The word 
‘activities’ emphasizes the behaviour of the ship as the determining factor.457 
 
Article 25(1) LOSC stipulates that a State may take the necessary steps in its territorial 
sea to prevent passage that is not-innocent.458 While Article 25 LOSC does not explicitly 
permit removal of ships from the territorial sea, this must be considered as implicit in the 
Convention as vessels exercising non-innocent passage become subject to the full jurisdiction 
of the coastal State.459 Moreover, when passage becomes non-innocent, there is no longer a 
right for the vessel to be present in the territorial sea. This right of removal is also being 
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regarded as being part of customary international law.460 However, the powers exercised in 
the territorial sea should be exercised proportionally with the need to prevent or punish such 
infringements.461 For example, the Schengen Borders Code states “Border control should be 
carried out in a professional and respectful manner and be proportionate to the objectives pursued”.462 
In all cases, the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction has to be consistent with requirements of 
general international law concerning the use of force and police powers. The International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) stated in the M/V Saiga Case (No. 2), referring to the 
I’m Alone Case463 and the Red Crusader Case,464 that general international law requires that the 
use of force must be avoided as far as possible, both while boarding a vessel and situations 
arising once aboard.465 Although the use of force is a measure of last resort, where it is 
unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. 
However, what amounts to a reasonable use of force can be quite subjective. For example, in 
the case of the M/V Tampa – a Norwegian vessel that rescued over 400 migrants at sea – in 
2001, Australia sent out a naval vessel when the M/V Tampa reached its territorial waters. 
Although captain RINNAN entered Australian territorial waters seeking medical and 
humanitarian assistance, armed personnel from the Special Air Service unit took control of 
the vessel and demanded that the M/V Tampa left Australian territorial waters.466 Although in 
this case the use of force can be considered a measure of last resort, the measures were 
definitely not reasonable. 
 
When the ship is proceeding to internal waters, which will indeed be the intent of 
migrant boats, the coastal State also has the right to take the necessary steps to prevent any 
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breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships to internal waters is subject.467 
Coastal States may prescribe conditions for admission to ports, such as ensuring respect for 
immigration rules. Next to this, the coastal State may – without discrimination in form or in 
fact among foreign ships – suspend temporarily the innocent passage. The reference to non-
discrimination ‘in form or in fact’ requires equality of treatment.468 The suspension has to be 
essential for the protection of its security and has to be duly published.469 The publication 
requirement in combination with the non-discrimination provision prevents an ad hoc 
suspension of innocent passage in respect of any particular ship.470 A consistent and 
generally applied policy of suspending passage to vessels suspected in certain activities – 
such as illegal immigration – might satisfy the criteria. However, such a policy would be 
difficult to apply in practice. In addition, it would undermine the essential navigational 
guarantees assured by the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea.471 
 
As coastal States exercise sovereignty over their territorial sea, it is generally accepted 
that other States are not permitted to exercise enforcement jurisdiction. This can be 
problematic when for example a foreign vessel – engaged in unlawful activities beyond the 
territorial sea – may flee to this zone and the coastal State lacks resources or does not 
consider it to be a priority to police certain activities within its territorial sea. Therefore, in 
order to response to certain threats, States have concluded agreements where coastal States 
grant permission for other States to exercise enforcement jurisdiction within their territorial 
sea, subject to certain conditions.472 A recent example is the CARICOM (Caribbean 
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Community) Maritime and Airspace Security Co-operation Agreement, which allows for 
State Parties to patrol and conduct law enforcement operations in the territorial seas of other 
States Parties. This agreement covers a variety of maritime security threats. Therefore, it does 
not only involve illegal migration and migrant smuggling, but also piracy, terrorism, arms 
trafficking and drug trafficking.473 A major objective of this agreement is to promote co-
operation among the parties to enable them to conduct such law enforcement operations as 
may be necessary to address more effectively the security in the region.474 The 2008 
CARICOM Agreement is being supplemented by the CARICOM Arrest Warrant Treaty.475 It 
deals with arrest warrants issued by the issuing judicial authority of one State Party with the 
view to the arrest and the surrender of a requested person by the executing judicial authority 
of another State Party for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a 
custodial sentence.476  
 
Another possibility is that a coastal State law enforcement official is being brought onto 
the host State’s ship. This kind of arrangement is commonly referred to as a ‘shiprider’ 
agreement. A shiprider may – subject to specific treaty arrangements – authorize 
interventions aboard the host State’s vessels. For example, Spain signed a MoU with Senegal 
and Mauretania to bring on board Senegalese and Mauritanian immigration officers for 
interceptions carried out in their respective territorial waters.477 In 1997, Italy and Albania 
signed an agreement to intercept migrants in Albanian territorial waters. Albanian officials 
were brought onto Italian naval vessels.478 A last example is the agreement between the 
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United States and the Dominican Republic to bring officials of one country on board vessels 
of the other country while carrying out patrols in their respective territorial waters.479 
 
2.2. Interception in the contiguous zone 
 
The contiguous zone is a functional maritime area – adjacent to the territorial sea – up to 
24 nautical miles from the baseline.480  The coastal State has limited competences in this area. 
Even before the crystallization of State competence in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone,481 it was already widely recognized that jurisdiction might be 
exercised – for law enforcement purposes or in order to preserve national safety – beyond 
the exact boundaries of a State’s territory.482 In the contiguous zone, the coastal State may 
exercise the control necessary to prevent infringement of – inter alia – its immigration laws 
and regulations within its territory or territorial sea.483 There is some discussion with regard 
to what exactly constitutes the ‘control necessary’. The jurisdictional rights available in the 
contiguous zone do not clearly include the interception of vessels believed to be carrying 
asylum-seekers, premised on the notion that only those powers permitted under 
international law may be exercised in the contiguous zone.484 In extreme cases – for example 
when the incursion of illegal immigrants presents a real danger to the preservation of the 
State – it is clear that the coastal State will be allowed to act to prevent this.485 Nevertheless, 
what is the threshold in less serious cases? It is submitted that a State can act in any situation 
where there is a reasonable risk of any domestic law – within the limited competences in this 
area – being breached.486  
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Which steps can coastal States take to prevent infringements of immigration laws and 
regulations? First, the coastal State will be permitted to board the vessel for inspection 
purposes.487 Moreover, States will also be allowed to exercise a degree of coercion (e.g. 
warnings) sufficient to prevent the vessel entering into territorial waters, so long as this is 
done in a manner consistent with provisions of domestic law.488 The connotations of ‘control’ 
limit the preventive State action to the aforementioned acts. The act of arresting vessels will 
thus not be part of the preventive powers.489 Next to the prevention of infringements, coastal 
States may also punish infringement of the immigration laws and regulations committed 
within its territory or territorial sea.490 Some authors argue that this also allows for the 
prosecution of vessels for acts committed in the contiguous zone that produce a breach of 
laws applicable in the territorial sea.491 This opinion is based upon the idea of objective 
territorial jurisdiction. This principle permits States to apply their law to acts initiated 
outside their territory, but completed within their territory.492 As Judge LAING noted in his 
separate opinion to the M/V Saiga Case (No. 2): “I believe that it is tenable that conduct occurring 
in the contiguous zone which is part of the jurisdictional facts or actus reus of conduct intended or due 
to occur or actually occurring in the territorial sea or other territorial areas can be punished as long as 
the vessel is apprehended in the course of the exercise of some legitimate means of control […].”493 
However, in practice few coastal States will take this course of action when it is likely to 
commit them to assuming responsibility for the asylum claims of those aboard any such 
vessel arrested.494 
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Also the doctrine of ‘constructive presence’ can be used to justify prosecution of vessels 
for acts committed in the contiguous zone. This can include hovering mother-ships 
transferring illicit cargoes to smaller boats to complete smuggling offences within State 
territory.495 The narrow view on constructive presence holds that constructive presence was 
only made out where the mother ship’s own boats were used to make contact with the shore. 
The extensive view however also includes that other vessels may come out from shore to 
make contact with a mother ship in the contiguous zone. The latter seems to be the generally 
applicable rule.496 The same approach is taken in the LOSC provisions on hot pursuit.497 
These allow coastal States to commence pursuing a vessel outside its territorial waters, 
contiguous zone or EEZ, following offences completed within an area of its jurisdiction by 
the vessel’s small boats or other craft working as a team with it.498 
 
When there are thus reasonable grounds to believe that a migrant boat has the intention 
to enter the territorial sea in violation with immigration laws and regulations, interception 
will be justified. Nevertheless, the powers exercised in the territorial sea and in the 
contiguous zone should be exercised proportionally with the need to prevent or punish such 
infringements. The degree of force will have to be determined in the light of all the 
circumstances, such as the safety of the passengers, the consequences of the interception, the 
vessel’s likely next port of call, etc.499 The EU Schengen Borders Code, for example, 
underpins this in stating: “Border control should be carried out in a professional and respectful 
manner and be proportionate to the objectives pursued.”500 
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2.3. Conclusion 
 
In the territorial sea, ships of all States enjoy the right of innocent passage.501 Article 19(2) 
LOSC contains a list of activities that are considered to threaten the peace, good order or 
security, for example the loading or unloading of any person contrary to immigration laws 
and regulations of the coastal State.502 As this list is not exhaustive, coastal States may enjoy a 
discretion to characterize a broader range of migration matters as prejudicial to their peace, 
good order or security. Interception – for example removal from the territorial sea – will be 
justified in these cases. However, the use of force is a measure of last resort and it must not 
go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. The force used in the case 
of the M/V Tampa was definitely not reasonable. As coastal States exercise sovereignty over 
their territorial sea, it is generally accepted that other States are not permitted to exercise 
enforcement jurisdiction. However, in order to response to certain threats, States have 
concluded agreements where coastal States grant permission for other States to exercise 
enforcement jurisdiction within their territorial sea, subject to certain conditions.503 Another 
possibility is that a coastal State law enforcement official is being brought onto the host 
State’s ship (‘shiprider’ agreement). 
 
In the contiguous zone, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to prevent 
infringement of – inter alia – its immigration laws and regulations within its territory or 
territorial sea.504 A State can act in any situation where there is a reasonable risk of any 
domestic law – within the limited competences in this area – being breached.505 Next to the 
prevention of infringements, coastal States may also punish infringement of the immigration 
laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.506 Based upon the idea 
of objective territorial jurisdiction, this also allows for the prosecution of vessels for acts 
committed in the contiguous zone that produce a breach of laws applicable in the territorial 
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sea.507 Also the doctrine of ‘constructive presence’ – in case mother ships are being used – can 
be used to justify prosecution of vessels for acts committed in the contiguous zone. The 
powers exercised in the territorial sea and in the contiguous zone should at all times be 
exercised proportionally with the need to prevent or punish such infringements. 
                                                 
507 GUILFOYLE, Douglas, “Maritime Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, 12 Journal of Conflict & 
Security Law 1 (2007), 7. 
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3. Maritime interception in the EEZ and on the high seas 
 
3.1. Freedom of navigation 
 
States are not to interfere with foreign-flagged vessels pursuant to the freedom of the 
high seas.508 Both Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas509 and Article 87 of the 
LOSC affirm the customary international law principle that the high seas are open to all 
countries. Also in the EEZ, all States enjoy, subject to the relevant LOSC provisions, the 
freedoms referred to in Article 87 LOSC.510 The latter provides a non-exhaustive list of the 
freedoms that fall within its scope, including freedom of navigation. The ILC discussed the 
permissive and the obligatory nature of the freedom of the high seas as follows: “La liberté de 
la haute mer, essentiellement négative, ne peut pas cependant ne pas comporter des conséquences 
positives. … Tous les pavillons maritimes ont un droit égal à tirer de la haute mer les diverses utilités 
qu'elle peut comporter. Mais l'idée d'égalité d'usage ne vient qu'en second lieu. L'idée essentielle 
contenue dans le principe de liberté de la haute mer est l'idée d'interdiction d'interférence de tout 
pavillon dans la navigation en temps de paix de tout autre pavillon.”511  
 
This means that the essential idea contained in the principle of the freedom of the high 
seas is the idea of prohibition of all flag States from interference in navigation in time of 
peace with all other flag States. However, not all measures taken relating to a foreign vessel 
constitutes an actual interference. For example, a request for information does not constitute 
an interference with the exercise of rights of navigation, since inclusive interests are not 
impinged or threatened.512 The full extent of the concept of freedom of navigation itself is not 
defined in customary or conventional international law. However, the principal claim is the 
demand for freedom to enter upon the oceans and to pass there unhindered by efforts of 
other States or entities to prohibit that use or to subject it to regulations unsupported by a 
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general consensus among States.513 This freedom, which may also be expressed as the right of 
unimpeded passage, is a theme that runs through the LOSC, taking different forms in the 
different maritime areas.514 Freedom of navigation is at its lowest ebb in a coastal State’s 
internal waters and at its highest level in the areas beyond 200 nautical miles. Consequently, 
the freedom of navigation should not be viewed as an absolute right possessed by a vessel, 
but rather as a continuum of freedoms available in certain marine areas.515 
 
States need to exercise their navigational freedoms: (1) subject to the conditions laid 
down by the LOSC; (2) subject to other rules of international law; and (3) with due regard for 
the interests of other States.516 Although the freedom of navigation permits vessels of any 
State to traverse the high seas with minimal interference from any other State, the freedom is 
to be exercised in the interests of all entitled to enjoy it and, as such, must be regulated. 
Hence, the law of the high seas contains rules which are designed not to limit or restrict the 
freedom of the high seas, but to safeguard its exercise in the interests of the entire 
international community.517 
 
First, conditions laid down by the LOSC include the definition of certain crimes such as 
piracy, slavery, and unauthorized offshore broadcasting, (and the situation of a vessel being 
stateless) which, when conducted or existing, allow enforcement measures, such as the 
exercise of certain policing rights towards vessels found to be in violation, by other parties to 
the LOSC.518 Secondly, obligations under ‘other rules of international law’ are echoed 
throughout the Convention. For example, Article 88 LOSC stipulates that the high seas are to 
be reserved for peaceful purposes and Article 301 LOSC refers to the requirement to refrain 
from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
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any State or acting in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law 
embodied in the United Nations Charter.519 Lastly, navigational freedoms need to be 
exercised with due regard for the interests of other States. This means that all States are 
required to refrain from any acts that might adversely affect the use of the high seas by 
nationals of other States.520  
 
Although Article 87 LOSC provides a ‘test of reasonableness’ by which States may 
evaluate their actions as either cooperative or disruptive,521 it does not contain specific 
prohibitions or requirements.522 Thus, where this reasonableness test is inconclusive, where 
the United Nations Charter contains no relevant provision and where no other rules of 
international law apply, the LOSC allows for multilateral regulation. Article 94 LOSC 
requires a State to effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical 
and social matters over ships flying its flag and to conform to generally accepted 
international regulations, procedures, and practices and to take any steps which may be 
necessary to secure their observance. In other words, the LOSC permits States to define 
reasonable conduct through multilateral enactment of regulations or procedures.523 An 
illustration of this is the Convention for the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea (COLREGS).524 
 
3.2. Exclusive flag State jurisdiction 
 
From the principle of the freedom of the high seas flows the customary principle of 
exclusivity of flag State jurisdiction,525 as laid down in Article 6(1) of the 1958 Convention on 
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the High Seas (CHS)526 and Article 92(1) of the LOSC.527 The concept of jurisdiction has many 
different meanings under both international and domestic law. CASSESE defines jurisdiction 
as the power of central authorities of a State to exercise public functions over individuals 
located in a territory.528 There are three different categories of jurisdiction in international 
law: prescriptive jurisdiction; enforcement jurisdiction; and adjudicative jurisdiction. 
Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to the authority of the law-making arm of the State to 
prescribe legal rules applicable in a particular context. Enforcement jurisdiction refers to the 
authority of the State to enforce the rules it has prescribed. Finally, adjudicative jurisdiction 
is the power of a court to lawfully exercise its authority over a person or property to resolve 
a legal dispute.529 
 
There can be no enforcement jurisdiction unless there is prescriptive jurisdiction. 
However, there may be a prescriptive jurisdiction without the possibility of enforcement 
jurisdiction, for example when an accused person is outside the territory of the prescribing 
State and is not amenable to extradition. States enjoy prescriptive jurisdiction within their 
own territory, including waters under their sovereignty (territorial jurisdiction). While 
national law could cover any subject matter, a State may not attempt to alter the legislative, 
judicial or administrative framework of a foreign State by so legislating.530 Although the 
prescribing State would have no enforcement jurisdiction, also the mere act of legislating 
would already amount to an interference with the subject State’s sovereignty.531 
Extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction can arise as a result of: (1) nationality or active 
personality; (2) passive personality; (3) the protective principle; and (4) universal 
jurisdiction.532 
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The nationality principle, or active personality principle, entails that a State has 
prescriptive jurisdiction over objects and persons having the nationality of that State. This 
principle is the basis of flag State jurisdiction: a ship is subject to the jurisdiction of the State 
under whose flag it sails. The exclusive flag State jurisdiction comprises prescriptive as well 
as enforcement jurisdiction.533 However, interdiction on the high seas, boarding and seizure, 
also concerns the extraterritorial exercise of enforcement jurisdiction, but by States other than 
the flag State. 534 The exclusive flag State jurisdiction principle renders a vessel immune from 
foreign interference unless: (1) there is a permissive rule of international law allowing the 
interference; or (2) the flag State itself consents to the interdiction.535 An example of a 
permissive rule of international law allowing the interference is the right of visit, which is 
discussed below. 
 
3.3. Flag State consent 
 
Consent by the flag State can be ad hoc or stipulated in a bilateral or a multilateral 
agreement. For example, the 2000 Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, 
and Air (Smuggling Protocol)536 empowers a State Party, that has reasonable grounds to 
suspect that a vessel flying the flag of another State Party is engaged in the smuggling of 
migrants by sea, to notify the flag State and request authorization to take appropriate 
measures. The flag State may authorize the requesting State, inter alia, to board and to search 
the vessel. Furthermore, when evidence is found that the vessel is engaged in the smuggling 
of migrants by sea, the boarding State can take appropriate measures as authorized by the 
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flag State.537 A State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel is engaged in 
the smuggling of migrants by sea and is without nationality or may be assimilated to a vessel 
without nationality, may board and search the vessel. If evidence confirming the suspicion is 
found, the boarding State may take appropriate measures.538 
 
The United States has extensive experience in conducting drug interdictions under a 
network of bilateral agreements which address consensual boarding on the high seas (or 
sometimes also in each other’s territorial waters) and seizure of vessels, their cargo or crew. 
The consent can be either actual or presumed. The latter can occur where pursuant to a treaty 
no response to a request from a boarding State by a flag State within a certain amount of time 
after the request can be a presumed consent.539 For example, the United States-Guatemala 
Agreement states: “If there is no response […] within two (2) hours […] the requesting Party will 
be deemed to have been authorized to board the suspect vessel.”540 Sometimes an agreement 
includes automatic consent to boarding where officials act upon reasonable suspicion.541 
Treaties may also contain various provisions on seizure where a crime is detected following 
boarding.542 Also within the framework of PSI, State consent is required. PSI is a global effort 
– launched in 2003 – aiming to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their 
delivery systems and related materials. The system – set up by a group of 11 States – seeks to 
establish a set of principles based on international law that permits, inter alia, the boarding on 
the high seas of a foreign State’s vessels if reasonably suspected of transporting WMD or 
related material. However, State consent is always necessary.543 The consent of the flag State 
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may include the right to visit and simultaneously the right to bring the vessel to the port of 
the boarding State and prosecute any offences. However, it can also be given in consecutive 
stages. For example, in the case of the migrant smuggling vessel F/V Jin Yinn, Taiwan – being 
the flag State – gave its consent to the US Coast Guard to board the F/V Jin Yinn on the high 
seas. However, Taiwan did not give further consent to the US to prosecute the smugglers 
aboard.544 
 
One strand of legal doctrine suggests that the master of a commercial vessel can provide 
authorization for boarding by a warship. They argue that, although there is no codified rule 
of international law expressly authorizing the master of a vessel to grant consent to board his 
vessel, both longstanding maritime custom – derived from the master’s plenary authority 
over the ship in international waters – and State practice, support this view.545 In the case of 
the United States for example, the practice of requesting the master’s consent is clearly 
delineated in The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, a military publication 
that applies to naval operations of the United States navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard.546 
However, also other countries than the United States share this opinion. After reviewing the 
NATO practice in ‘Operation Active Endeavour’ – under which NATO ships patrol the 
Mediterranean Sea and monitor shipping to help detect, deter and protect against terrorist 
activity547 – SYRIGOS concluded that also German and French warships consider that they are 
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allowed to board as long as they get the captain’s consent.548 Therefore, masters may allow 
anyone to come on board the vessel as their guest, including foreign law enforcement 
officials and military forces. The scope and duration of a consensual boarding are subject to 
the conditions imposed by the master and may be terminated by the master at his discretion. 
When the vessel’s flag State is a party to a bilateral or a multilateral agreement including a 
provision on the right of visit, boarding shall be conducted under the terms of that 
agreement.549 Although the voluntary consent of the master permits the boarding, it does not 
allow the assertion of law enforcement authority. 
 
Boarding and searching a ship based on the master’s consent allows for rapid 
verification of the legitimacy of a vessel’s voyage by obtaining or confirming vessel 
documents, the cargo and the navigation records, without undue delay to the boarded 
vessel. Especially in urgent situations, a legal regime rooted in flag State jurisdiction can be 
understood to require an individual on board every ship who has the authority to take the 
necessary steps to maintain minimum public order at sea. When the request to board has to 
be made of authorities in the flag State, it can take a long time for a government bureaucracy 
to respond as high-level intervention may be necessary.550 
 
Nevertheless, another strand of legal doctrine finds it difficult to understand how a 
master can give the necessary consent to make a boarding legal. This is based on the fact that 
international law does not recognize the master of a vessel, whereas it does recognize the 
flag State.  Next to this, it is arguable that boarding with the consent of the master is either an 
extension of the right of approach or of the right of visit. The clear difference of State opinion 
on the matter undermines the existence of a customary law principle.551 For example, during 
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the NATO ‘Operation Active Endeavour’, British and Greek warships needed to know the 
flag State’s position about the boarding.552 The United States, an apparent proponent of the 
international legal sufficiency of a master’s consent, has nevertheless entered into several 
bilateral Ship Boarding Agreements, which respect flag State consent.553 As a result, the 
master’s consent – without clear authority from the flag State – will not be sufficient. 
Therefore, there is no codified rule of international law, nor is there a rule of international 
customary law, expressly authorizing the master of a vessel to grant consent to board his 
vessel. 
 
The widespread use of flags of convenience can have negative effects on the ability of 
States to obtain flag State consent during exigent situations. The International Transport 
Workers’ Federation (ITF) uses the term ‘flags of convenience’ or ‘open registry’ in reference 
to ships flagged in a State in which both the ships and their owners have little or no contact, 
but for the registration itself.  The motivating factors behind a ship owner’s decision to ‘flag 
out’ are cheap registration fees, low or no taxes and freedom to employ cheap labour. The 
ITF argues that because there is no ‘genuine link’ between the merchant ship’s actual owner 
and the ship’s nationality, open registry States fail to enforce labour standards and adhere to 
international standards.554 The genuine link principle was first articulated in 1955 by the ICJ 
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in the Nottebohm Case.555 Both the 1958 CHS and the 1982 LOSC require a genuine link 
between the flag State and a ship that flies its flag.556 There is no conclusive, globally accepted 
definition of ‘genuine link’.557 What are the consequences are if a genuine link is missing? 
One theoretically conceivable sanction would be to refuse to recognize the flag State's flag. 
CHURCHILL and LOWE suggested that the instrument of non-recognition of a flag could be a 
valid one.558 As a legal consequence, the vessel would probably become stateless.559 In its 
draft Article 29 of 1956, the ILC held “[F]or purposes of recognition of the national character of the 
ship by other States, there must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship.”560 Although 
there were extensive discussions about whether a non-recognition clause in case of a missing 
genuine link should be inserted in the CHS,561 this provision was not included in the CHS, 
nor in the LOSC. In the M/V Saiga Case, ITLOS held that the requirement for a genuine link 
between a ship and its flag State is to secure more effective implementation of the duties of 
the flag State and not to establish criteria by reference to which the validity of the registration 
of ships in a flag State may be challenged by other States. Therefore, States are not supposed 
to rely on the apparent lack of a genuine link to challenge the validity of a ship’s 
registration.562 Flag State consent will therefore be necessary, even in the case of a flag of 
convenience State. It has been suggested in doctrine that – because of the absence of a 
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genuine link between flag of convenience states and their ships – the master’s role has 
evolved to compensate for the failure of flag of convenience states to fulfil their international 
duties as flag states.563 Therefore, when the flag State – having no genuine link to the ship – is 
unwilling or unable to cooperate, the master’s consent would be sufficient. Nevertheless, this 
opinion is not supported in State practice. 
 
Next to the problem of flags of convenience, the ability to request consent from the flag 
State can be impeded in situations of political upheavals or government instability. When the 
flag State is unwilling or unable to exercise its rights and meet its obligations, a significant 
tension in the jurisdictional balance between flag States and coastal States is being created.564 
However, there seems to be no immediate consequences in international law if a flag State 
neglects to exercise effective jurisdiction and control over its vessels despite the fact that 
Article 94 LOSC requires flag States to do so. The LOSC merely sets out in Article 94(6) that a 
State which has clear grounds to believe that proper jurisdiction and control with respect to a 
ship have not been exercised, may report the facts to the flag State. The flag State shall 
investigate the matter and – if appropriate – take any action necessary to remedy the 
situation. Therefore, a ship – flying the flag of a State not exercising effective control over its 
vessels – cannot be considered to be a stateless vessel. 
 
Based upon the wording of Article 5 CHS, some authors are of the opinion that ‘effective 
jurisdiction and control’ is the definition of the ‘genuine link’ and not an additional test. 
Article 5(1) CHS states that there must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship 
and that – in particular – the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in 
administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag. The words ‘in 
particular’ lead BOCZEK to conclude: “The failure of the second committee of the conference to 
define the genuine link points to the fact that the centre of gravity has been shifted by the framers of 
the article from the various criteria, such as ownership […] to the exercise of jurisdiction and control. 
This interpretation is consonant with the institution of nationality, and is also corroborated by the 
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French text of art. 5, where the English words “in particular” are rendered by the adverb 
“notamment,” which in English corresponds more to the words “that is” than “in particular.” 
Therefore the view […] that “there must exist a genuine link between the state and the ship, i.e., the 
state must exercise its jurisdiction and control effectively in administrative, technical and other related 
matters,” correctly solves the problem under inquiry.”565 However, there is a very important 
difference between Article 91 LOSC and Article 5 CHS. The sentence “in particular, the State 
must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters 
over ships flying its flag” is no longer included in the Article 91 LOSC. Instead, it was moved 
to Article 94 LOSC, illustrating that the concept of the genuine link and flag State control 
have been deliberately separated. They can therefore hardly be regarded as being totally the 
same.566 
 
It has to be noted that – within the international legal framework of the necessity of flag 
State consent for boarding and searching of its vessels on the high seas – significant change is 
occurring regarding the expectation and/or duty that a flag State will give consent to 
boarding and inspection of its vessels by other States. This is inter alia the case where the 
vessel is suspected of being engaged in or contributing to acts of terrorism.567 The 2005 
Protocol to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (SUA Protocol) for example, stipulates that State Parties can directly 
consent to have vessels flying their flag – suspected of a terrorist offence – be boarded and 
inspected by other State Parties after notifying all State parties.568 Thus, flag State consent can 
be freely given when requested and there is no direct legal right to board and inspect a 
foreign flagged ship. Nevertheless, the 2005 SUA Protocol creates a certain expectation that 
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where a suspect vessel is involved, the consent of the flag State will be forthcoming as a State 
Party is legally committed to the overall objectives of the Protocol, namely the suppression of 
unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation. The same reasoning could be made 
in case of migrant smuggling and flag State consent under the 2000 Smuggling Protocol. 
 
Three months after 9/11, intelligence sources reported that the M/V Nisha – a cargo ship 
registered in St. Vincent – was believed to head for London with terrorist material. Flag State 
consent was asked and received for an interdiction of the Royal Navy and UK Special Forces 
which lead to the ship being diverted and searched. Although no terrorist material was 
found, this case demonstrates that the requirement to gain flag State consent can be 
successfully managed.569 However, other cases have proven to be more problematic. For 
example, in the case of Regina v. Charrington and others, the high seas boarding of a Maltese 
registered merchantman – M/V Simon de Danser – on 5 May 1997 by members of the British 
Royal Marines Special Boat Squadron, was deemed unlawful as the procedural requirements 
to ask for flag State consent were not fulfilled. 570 
 
3.4. The right of visit 
 
3.4.1. The concept and its relationship with the UN Charter 
 
The right of visit is an exception to the general principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the flag State over ships flying its flag, set out in Article 92 LOSC. The right of visit entails the 
right of a warship, or any other duly authorized ship, to board a vessel and, more 
importantly, the right to search the vessel in circumstances of extreme suspicion.571 Article 
110 LOSC stipulates that the right of visit is only justified when there are reasonable grounds 
for suspecting that the ship is engaged in piracy, slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting or 
when the ship is without nationality or though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its 
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flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship.572 States can conclude 
treaties which confer the right of visit on the high seas to the respective Parties.573 
 
There is a general consensus that high seas maritime interdiction operations authorized 
by Article 110 LOSC are not prohibited by the UN Charter.574 Article 2(4) of the Charter 
states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” These wordings can also be found in 
Article 301 LOSC. Further, Article 103 of the Charter states: “In the event of a conflict between 
the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations 
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”  
 
ITLOS stated in the M/V Saiga Case (No. 2), referring to the I’m Alone Case575 and the Red 
Crusader Case,576 that general international law requires that the use of force must be avoided 
as far as possible, both while boarding a vessel and in situations arising once aboard.577  The 
use of force is a measure of last resort. However, where it is unavoidable, it must not go 
beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. For example, firing shots 
across the bow of a ship does not constitute a use of force.578 However, sinking a vessel to 
prevent its escape, as happened in the I’m Alone Case, does amount to the use of force.579 An 
interdiction, not authorized by Article 110 LOSC or by flag State consent, will be prohibited 
as this automatically involves a threat or a use of force.580 
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3.4.2. Slave trade as a ground for applying the right of visit 
 
Another possible legal basis afforded by the LOSC for exercising the right of visit is 
slave trade. Article 99 LOSC on the prohibition of the transport of slaves stipulates that every 
State shall take effective measures to prevent and punish the transport of slaves in ships 
authorized to fly its flag and to prevent the unlawful use of its flag for that purpose. Slaves 
taking refuge on board a ship shall ipso facto be free. Already in 1956, the ILC addressed the 
issue of slavery specifically in terms of provisions on the high seas. In its commentary on 
draft Article 37, the ILC noted that the duty of States to prevent and punish the transport of 
slaves in ships authorized to fly their colours is generally recognized in international law.581 
The ILC’s language was included in the 1958 CHS as Article 13: “Every State shall adopt 
effective measures to prevent and punish the transport of slaves in ships authorized to fly its flag, and 
to prevent the unlawful use of its flag for that purpose. Any slave taking refuge on board any ship, 
whatever its flag, shall ipso facto be free.” 
 
In support of the general prohibition set out in Article 99 LOSC, Article 110(1)(b) 
provides for the right of visit when there is reasonable ground for suspecting that a ship is 
engaged in slave trade. Next to this, there are also several human rights instruments that 
prohibit slavery and slave trade. The UDHR states in Article 4 that “No one shall be held in 
slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms”.582 The ICCPR 
contains a similar prohibition against slavery and servitude in Article 8 and adds a provision 
which prohibits the use of forced or compulsory labour subject to certain limited 
exceptions.583 The importance accorded by the ICCPR to the slavery provision is emphasized 
by its status as a non-derogable right under Article 4(2). The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recognizes the right to work which includes 
the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or 
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accepts.584 Articles 5, 7 and 8 ICESCR further set certain conditions and rights that must be 
upheld and protected by the States Parties such as fair wages and equal remuneration for 
work of equal value and the right to form and join trade unions. Article 7(2)(c) of the 1998 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) characterizes ‘enslavement’ as a 
crime against humanity falling within the jurisdiction of the Court.585 Article 4 ECHR 
provides that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude and no one shall be required to 
perform forced or compulsory labour. Finally, the most recent reference to slavery in an 
international instrument is in Article 3(a) of the Protocol to Prevent and Suppress Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Trafficking Protocol), which criminalizes 
trafficking in persons for the purpose of exploitation including, “at a minimum, the exploitation 
of the prostitution of others, or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or 
practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs”.586 
 
The LOSC does not provide for a definition of what constitutes ‘slavery’ or ‘slave trade’.  
Nevertheless, Article 99 LOSC serves as a link between the general law regarding the 
abolition of slavery and the law of the sea.587 The 1926 Slavery Convention defines slavery as 
“the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership are exercised”.588 ‘Slave trade’ encompasses the capture, acquisition or disposal of a 
person with intent to reduce him to slavery and, in general, every act of trade and transport 
in slaves.589 The 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention also provides for international 
protection against institutions and practices similar to slavery, such as debt bondage, 
serfdom, bride-purchase, inheritance or sale of wives and child indenture.590 These practices 
are identified collectively as ‘servile status’, not as ‘slavery’. Although several appeals have 
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been made for a redefinition of slavery in the context of today’s world, the definition has 
actually remained unchanged.591 Thus, in the international legal context, the definition has 
not been altered substantially since 1926.592 For example, Article 7(2)(c) of the 1998 Rome 
Statute of the ICC defines ‘enslavement’ as “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership over a person . . . includ[ing] the exercise of such power in the course of 
trafficking in persons, in particular women and children”. This definition is essentially the same 
as the original definition adopted in 1926, adding only a specific reference to trafficking. 
Clearly, this definition only goes to say that a person may be enslaved in the course of being 
trafficked and certainly not that all forms of exploitation constituting trafficking are 
slavery.593 In the Kunarac Case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) found that the practice, whereby two young women had been abducted by Serb 
soldiers, kept in a locked apartment, threatened with murder if they left, obliged to cook, 
clean and wash clothes and repeatedly sexually assaulted, constituted ‘enslavement’.594 
However, the ICTY stated that the term ‘enslavement’ in this case had a broader meaning 
than the concept of ‘slavery’ in general international law.595 Practices punishable as 
‘enslavement’ may thus include those lacking the ownership features characteristic of 
slavery.596 
 
Also the definition of ‘trafficking’ in the Trafficking Protocol does not add new elements 
to the definition of ‘slavery’. Article 3(a) Trafficking Protocol stipulates: “Trafficking in persons 
shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the 
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of 
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve 
                                                 
591 See for example: ECOSOC, “Report on Slavery submitted to the Sub-Commission in 1966: Special 
Rapporteur – Report by Mr. Benjamin Whitaker, Special Rapporteur”, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/20 (1982). 
592 OHCHR, “Abolishing Slavery and Its Contemporary Forms”, Report by David WEISSBRODT and Anti-
Slavery International (2002), para. 18, available online: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/slaveryen.pdf>. 
593 GUILFOYLE, Douglas, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 228. 
594 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, 22 February 2001, IT-96-23-T 
& IT-96-23/1-T (2001), paras. 68, 75, 587 and 747-782. 
595 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, 22 February 2001, IT-96-23-T 
& IT-96-23/1-T (2001), paras. 541, 542 and 781. 
596 Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings and Its Explanatory Report 
(adopted 16 May 2005) Council of Europe Treaties Series No. 197, para. 95 available online: 
<http://www.coe.int/T/E/human_rights/trafficking/PDF_conv_197_trafficking_e.pdf>. 
 146
the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms 
of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the 
removal of organs.” This means that slavery is listed as one exploitative practice among many 
relevant to whether a person has been trafficked. Thus, elements of control and ownership, 
often accompanied by the threat of violence, will always be central to identifying the 
existence of slavery. In the modern context, the circumstances of the enslaved person are 
crucial to identifying what practices constitute slavery. These include (i) the degree of 
restriction of the individual’s inherent right to freedom of movement; (ii) the degree of 
control of the individual’s personal belongings; and (iii) the existence of informed consent 
and a full understanding of the nature of the relationship between the parties.597 Taking into 
account the definition of slavery, migrants at sea – when they are being trafficked into 
slavery-like practices – can thus not ipso facto be equated to slaves as the requisite element of 
de jure ownership is absent. Only when the crucial condition of ownership is present, 
trafficking migrants amounts to slavery. 
 
However, PAPASTAVRIDIS suggests that human trafficking – or similar practices – could 
be connected to slavery for the purpose of the application of Article 110(1)(b) LOSC. 
Although he admits that there is no actual State practice or any judicial decision on this issue, 
he interprets the notion ‘slavery’ in Article 110(1)(b) LOSC in an evolutionary way, based 
upon Article 31(3) VCLT.598 This Article provides that any subsequent agreement or practice 
of the Parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty must be taken into account as well as 
any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the Parties. The 
trafficking of persons today is often being viewed as the modern equivalent of the slave 
trade of the nineteenth century.599 Therefore, the LOSC could be interpreted in the light of a 
more contemporary legal meaning – also including slavery-like practices – and not only in 
the light of the meaning when the LOSC was drafted. Moreover, the principle of 
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effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat) entails that the interpreter of any treaty 
provision should aim at an interpretation which would give full effect to the provision 
concerned, in casu the interpretation that will most effectively suppress slave trade on the 
high seas. As slave trade in the traditional and strict sense is almost extinct, this provision 
can be characterized as quasi-desuetude or obsolete. PAPASTAVRIDIS therefore concludes that 
– although he does not want de jure equate human trafficking to ‘slavery’ – trafficking of 
migrants could thus come within the purview of the boarding provision of Article 110(1)(b) 
LOSC through an evolutionary interpretation.600 MENEFEE similarly argues that – read in the 
current expansive international context – it could be argued that the provisions in the LOSC 
cover more than classic chattel slavery.601 
 
This approach could meet pragmatic and contemporary needs of human beings under 
conditions akin to slavery. However, is there really such a need? First of all, victims 
trafficked internationally seem more likely to be moved individually or in small groups by 
scheduled international flights and/or by land rather than sea.602 Secondly, trafficked persons 
often enter a country legally either on tourist visas or their own passports.603 Lastly, it is 
becoming increasingly common for a person to begin his/her journey by sea as a smuggled 
migrant, only to become trafficked upon arrival when forced or tricked into an exploitative 
situation.604 But maybe the most important argument against broadening the definition for 
the purpose of Article 110(1)(b), is that the participating States during both UNCLOS I and 
III were not equally open to it. For example, at the 1971 session of the Sea-Bed Committee, 
Malta proposed a working paper expanding the scope of Article 13 CHS by adding 
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references to the presence of “slaves or persons in conditions akin to slavery in the vessel”.605 
However, this proposal was not accepted. The proposition to construe migrant trafficking 
within the meaning of the term ‘slavery’, does not find wide support.606  Therefore it cannot 
be used to exercise the right of visit.  
 
3.4.3. Statelessness as a ground for applying the right of visit 
 
The absence of vessel nationality in Article 110(1)(d) LOSC seems to be the most relevant 
ground for the interdiction of vessels with migrants on board.607 Interestingly, the 1958 High 
Seas Convention contains no similar provision. PFEIFER, the delegate of the German Federal 
Republic to the Geneva Conference commented that, under the 1958 Convention, “ships could 
sail without flying a flag, without having a nationality and without being subject to the legislation of 
any State.”608 However, the obligation to sail under the flag of a recognized State predates the 
1958 Convention, which simply failed to codify the customary right to assert the right of visit 
against stateless vessels. The purpose of the right of visit vis-à-vis stateless ships lies in the 
premise that there is concern about having ships sailing on the high seas which are not 
subject to the jurisdiction of any State and, therefore, there is a risk that they do not comply 
with any generally accepted international regulations to ensure the minimum public order at 
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sea.609 In this regard, the ILC emphasized the importance of ships sailing under the flag of a 
State: “The absence of any authority over ships sailing the high seas would lead to chaos. One of the 
essential adjuncts to the principle of freedom of the seas is that a ship must fly the flag of a single State 
and that it is subject to the jurisdiction of that State.”610 
 
According to Article 91 LOSC, ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are 
entitled to fly. Nevertheless, formal registration of ships is not required in order to enjoy 
nationality since many States’ legal systems allow smaller vessels to fly their flag if owned by 
a national and only require vessels of a certain size to be formally registered.611 
Consequently, not every unregistered vessel is at the same time stateless as States may 
regard such ships as having its nationality if they are owned by its nationals.612 Stateless 
vessels are those lacking any claim to nationality. Nevertheless, a ship which sails under the 
flags of two or more States may be assimilated to a ship without nationality.613 As a result, 
not every migrant boat will be a stateless vessel ipso facto. There are three ways in customary 
international law by which a vessel can establish nationality: (1) flying a flag or national 
emblem, (2) producing registry papers, or (3) an oral claim by the head of the vessel that the 
asserted state does not deny.614 BARNES refers to the case of United States v. Maynard (1988) to 
determine how the status is to be established at an operational level.615 In this case it was 
held that the test of statelessness can be satisfied in two ways. First, when a vessel makes a 
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claim of nationality which is denied by the flag State. Second, when the shipmaster fails to 
make a claim of nationality upon request.616 
 
The case of the M/V So San is a recent example of statelessness offering a legal basis for 
exercising the right of visit. In 2002, two Spanish Navy vessels boarded and searched the 
cargo ship on the high seas, 600 miles off the coast of Yemen as there were concerns about 
the nationality of the M/V So San. The Spanish Navy justified its boarding of the vessel on 
grounds that it was not flying a flag and its national markings were obscured by paint.617 
 
3.5. Seizure 
 
3.5.1. Seizure on the high seas 
 
The right of visit does not automatically imply the right to seize a ship and arrest the 
persons on board. For example, in the case of piracy on the high seas, Article 110(1)(a) LOSC 
allows warships – or any other duly authorized ships – to exercise the right of visit when 
there is reasonable ground for suspecting that a ship is engaged in piracy. However, Article 
105 LOSC explicitly allows for the seizure of a piracy ship. Also, where a flag State consents 
with a State seeking to interdict its vessel, such permission does not always constitute a full 
waiver of flag State jurisdiction. Permission to board seldom automatically includes 
permission to seize. 
 
3.5.2. Seizure of stateless vessels – No nexus required 
 
Even if certain vessels with migrants on board could be regarded as stateless vessels and 
other States thus possess the right of visit, does this mean that the boarding States may also 
seize these vessels and subject them to their laws? The LOSC is silent on this question. Ship-
users do not commit unlawful acts solely because they are not under the authority of a 
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particular State.618 Nevertheless, stateless vessels may suffer extraordinary penalties which 
are being justified by the danger that these vessels pose to the international regime of the 
high seas. Stateless vessels ipso facto lack a flag State competent to seek redress on its behalf 
and are, therefore, vulnerable to the exercise of jurisdiction by any State. Therefore, these 
ships are almost completely without protection.619 The boarding State is substituting for a 
flag State in ensuring that such vessels abide by international regulations,620 otherwise ships 
without nationality would be immune from interference on the high seas.621 Therefore, a 
boarding State may take enforcement measures based on its own legal provisions as there is 
no rule of international law that forbids this.622 
 
This line of reasoning is supported by a number of judicial pronouncements concerning 
stateless vessels, either in general or specifically with regard to illegal immigration. In the 
case United States v. Marino-Garcia (1982) it was held that international law permits any 
nation to subject stateless vessels on the high seas to its jurisdiction as this does not result in 
impermissible interference with another sovereign nation’s affairs.623 Pursuant to this 
approach no proof is needed of a nexus between the stateless vessel and the State seeking to 
effectuate jurisdiction. Jurisdiction exists solely as a consequence of the vessel’s status as 
stateless. Such a status makes the vessel subject to action by all nations proscribing certain 
activities aboard stateless vessels and subjects the persons aboard to prosecution for 
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violating the proscriptions. The Court in United States v. Juda (1995) disposed entirely of the 
nexus requirement where US law had been applied to persons on stateless vessels. The Court 
emphasized that its conclusion was “fully supported by international law principles, which aid us 
in defining the jurisdictional reach of extraterritorial legislation,” and which provide that “any 
nation may assert jurisdiction over stateless vessels.”624 Individuals on board stateless vessels take 
the chance that any State might exercise jurisdiction over their illegal activities.625 United 
States v. Caicedo (1995) reaffirmed in strong terms this reliance on international law, 
explaining that “[t]he radically different treatment afforded to stateless vessels as a matter of 
international law convinces us that there is nothing arbitrary or fundamentally unfair about 
prosecuting” defendants with no nexus to the United States. Therefore, in the case of stateless 
vessels, United States prescriptive, enforcement and judicial jurisdictional authority does not 
need to be grounded in territorial, protective or universal jurisdiction.626 A recent example is 
the case United States v. Matos-Luchi (2010), where the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
decided that since the vessel failed to meet any of the criteria that would classify it as 
possessing nationality, the US Coast Guard had authority to seize the vessel and subject the 
suspected traffickers to criminal prosecution in the United States.627 
 
Nevertheless, the general international principle that criminal activity aboard stateless 
vessels is subject to the jurisdiction of all States might not fulfil one of the notice elements, 
namely notice of what is illegal. Consider the case of the high-stakes Australian poker 
players sailing on the high seas on a stateless vessel: would the application of a US anti-
gambling statute to them comply with due process simply by virtue of the vessel’s status? 
The answer should be no, since gambling is not a generally recognized crime.628 In United 
States v. Gonzalez, jurisdiction was determined to exist in cases of acts “generally recognized as 
a crime under the laws of States that have reasonably developed legal systems.”629 This theory of 
generally recognized crime was used in Martinez-Hidalgo to reject the need for a nexus in 
applying US law to drug smugglers on the high seas consistent with due process on the 
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grounds that “[i]nasmuch as the trafficking of narcotics is condemned universally by law-abiding 
nations, we see no reason to conclude that it is ‘fundamentally unfair’ for Congress to provide for the 
punishment of persons apprehended with narcotics on the high seas.”630 Asylum seekers may 
breach certain immigration law provisions of the State they flee to, thus facing the possibility 
of criminal sanction. However, PALLIS argues that seeking asylum is not an act ‘generally 
recognized as a crime’.631  
 
Although seeking asylum is not a crime, illegal migration can certainly be regarded by 
States as constituting a crime. For example, in the English case of Naim Molvan v. Attorney-
General for Palestine (1948)632 a British destroyer seized the stateless motor vessel Asya 
carrying illegal immigrants on the high seas and escorted the vessel to Haifa, where it was 
confiscated. Naim MOLVAN, the ship owner, brought an action against the seizure and 
confiscation of the ship. The United Kingdom Privy Council referred to a passage from 
Oppenheim’s, International Law, which says that the freedom of navigation on the high seas is 
a freedom of ships which fly and are entitled to fly the flag of a State.633 The Privy Council 
observed: “[T]he freedom of the open sea, whatever those words may connote, is a freedom of ships 
which fly, and are entitled to fly, the flag of a State which is within the comity of nations. The Asya 
did not satisfy these elementary conditions. [...] Having no usual ship’s papers which would serve to 
identify her, flying the Turkish flag, to which there was no evidence she had a right, hauling it down 
on the arrival of a boarding party and later hoisting a flag which was not the flag of any State in being, 
the Asya could not claim the protection of any State nor could any State claim that any principle of 
international law was broken by her seizure.”634 Similarly, in the Pamuk and others Case (2001), the 
stateless vessel ground was considered by an Italian court as sufficient for the arrest and trial 
of illegal migrants on the high seas bound for the coast of Italy.635 Italian custom officers had 
arrested on the high seas a stateless vessel transporting illegal immigrants who had been 
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transferred, on the high seas, to another vessel directed to the Italian coast and had 
subsequently entered the Italian territorial waters. 
 
3.5.3 Seizure of stateless vessels – Further nexus required 
 
However, according to another strand of doctrine, some jurisdictional nexus or 
permissive rule is required to justify seizure of a stateless vessel.636 Their arguments are 
mainly based upon the fact that the LOSC is silent on the question of the seizure of stateless 
vessels contrary to, for example, the seizure of a pirate vessel expressly dealt with in Article 
105 LOSC. CHURCHILL & LOWE argue that: “Ships without nationality are in a curious position. 
Their statelessness’ will not, of itself, entitle each and every State to assert jurisdiction over them for 
there is not in every case any recognized basis upon which jurisdiction could be asserted over stateless 
ships on the high seas ... there is a need for some jurisdictional nexus in order that a State may extend 
its laws to those on board a stateless ship and enforce the laws against them.”637  
 
But even if a further jurisdictional nexus or permissive rule is necessary to seize a 
stateless vessel, in the case of migrant vessels the law offers several possibilities. Firstly, the 
protective principle (or security principle) allows States to exercise prescriptive and 
enforcement jurisdiction over aliens for acts done abroad which affect the security of the 
State. While all the elements of the crime occur outside the territory of the State, jurisdiction 
exists because these actions have a potentially adverse effect upon security or governmental 
interests.638 It is a concept that takes in a variety of political offences, but also currency, 
immigration and economic offences are frequently punished.639 It is true that, based on the 
protective principle, it is questionable whether a State can exercise enforcement jurisdiction 
to seize a vessel on the high seas based on the mere fact that the vessel committed an 
                                                 
636 See, for example, BARNES, Richard A., “The International Law of the Sea and Migration Control”, in RYAN, 
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637 CHURCHILL, Robin & LOWE, Alan V., The Law of the Sea (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 3rd ed. 
1999), 214. 
638 See: United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10, 2d Cir., cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968), 10-11. 
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immigration offence. Arguably, an immigration offence alone does not seem to constitute a 
threat to the security of a State.640 As stated in the case United States v. James-Robinson (1981): 
“The question before the Court, however, is whether the stipulated facts could possibly show an effect 
on our sovereignty sufficient to allow protective principle jurisdiction. That boils down to whether, as 
a matter of law, the presence of foreign crewmen on a stateless ship carrying marijuana on the high 
seas 400 miles from the United States by definition represents a threat to our national security or to 
our government's functions. It does not. More than that must be alleged and proven.”641 However, 
when the vessel that commits an immigration offence is also stateless, and hundreds of these 
vessels try to reach Europe by sea every year, it is highly likely that this can constitute a 
threat to the security of a State. As GUILFOYLE writes: “[A]s irregular migration by sea increases 
worldwide there appears a growing perception among ‘point of entry’ states that they are unable to 
cope with the numbers arriving and preventative maritime patrols are a legally permissible 
response.”642 
 
Second, in United States v. Davis (1990), the Court applied the territorial principle and 
more specifically the objective territorial principle according to which jurisdiction is founded 
when any essential constituent element of a crime is consummated on State territory.643 It 
was decided that: “[w]here an attempted transaction is aimed at causing criminal acts within the 
United States, there is sufficient basis for the United States to exercise its jurisdiction.”644 Other US 
drug cases similarly have relied upon such a territorial link to uphold the application of US 
law to conduct on the high seas where it ‘was likely to have effects in the United States’.645 
Therefore, in US law an actual effect within the State is required under the objective 
territorial principle. When the ship with drugs is bound ultimately for the United States, a 
sufficient nexus exists. The same reasoning could be made for migrant vessels. Also 
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MCDOUGAL & BURKE hint at a nexus in cases of prevention of infringement of a State's laws 
and regulations within its territory or territorial sea.646 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
States are not to interfere with foreign-flagged vessels pursuant to the freedom of the 
high seas.647 It must not be viewed as an absolute right possessed by a vessel, but rather as a 
continuum of freedoms available in certain marine areas.648 From the principle of the 
freedom of the high seas flows the customary principle of exclusivity of flag State 
jurisdiction.649 However, the flag State may authorize the requesting State, inter alia, to board 
and to search the vessel. As there is no rule in international law expressly authorizing the 
master of a vessel to grant consent to board his vessel, the flag State itself has to give its 
consent. The widespread use of flags of convenience can have negative effects on the ability 
of States to obtain flag State consent during exigent situations. Also, the ability to request 
consent from the flag State can be impeded in situations of political upheavals or 
government instability. However, a ship – flying the flag of a State not exercising effective 
control over its vessels – will not be considered to be a stateless vessel. 
 
The right of visit is an exception to the general principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the flag State over ships flying its flag, set out in Article 92 LOSC. Article 110 LOSC stipulates 
that the right of visit is only justified when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that 
the ship is engaged in piracy, slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting or when the ship is 
without nationality or though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in 
reality, of the same nationality as the warship.650 States can conclude treaties which confer the 
right of visit on the high seas to the respective Parties.651 
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The proposition to construe migrant trafficking within the meaning of the term ‘slavery’, 
does not find wide support.652  As a result, it cannot be used to exercise the right of visit. The 
absence of vessel nationality in Article 110(1)(d) LOSC seems to be the most relevant ground 
for the interdiction of vessels with migrants on board.653 Nevertheless, not every migrant 
boat will be a stateless vessel ipso facto. There are three ways in customary international law 
by which a vessel can establish nationality: (1) flying a flag or national emblem, (2) 
producing registry papers, or (3) an oral claim by the head of the vessel that the asserted 
state does not deny.654  
 
The right of visit does not automatically imply the right to seize a ship and arrest the 
persons on board. However, a boarding State may take enforcement measures vis-à-vis 
stateless vessels based on its own legal provisions as there is no rule of international law that 
forbids this.655 This line of reasoning is supported by a number of judicial pronouncements 
concerning stateless vessels, either in general or specifically with regard to illegal 
immigration. Even if a further jurisdictional nexus or permissive rule would be necessary to 
seize a stateless vessel, in the case of migrant vessels the law offers several possibilities, such 
as the protective principle (or security principle) and objective territorial principle.
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4. Maritime interception in case of migrant smuggling 
 
4.1. The problem of migrant smuggling 
 
Smuggling of migrants by sea takes place in four main known areas: across the 
Mediterranean and the Atlantic into Europe, across the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden into 
Yemen, from Central America towards the United States and from Asia to Australia.656 
Although the proportion of migration that occurs by use of smuggling by sea must be put 
into perspective, it is probably the riskiest modus operandi. Although more migrant 
smuggling occurs by land and by air, more deaths occur by sea. Yet, sea smuggling can be 
considered the predominant means of smuggling when considered from the perspective of 
particular categories of smuggled migrants. It involves for example a much lower risk of 
detection than land and air routes.657 Moreover, in some parts of the world, for some people 
it may be the only means of travel available. For example, economically disempowered 
persons at the low-cost sector of the smuggling market may undertake risky sea journeys 
because of the lack of resources to afford safer methods of travel. Therefore, while smuggling 
by sea accounts only for a small portion of overall migrant smuggling around the world, 
some States are disproportionately being affected. Added to this is the fact that the particular 
dangers of irregular travel at sea make it a priority concern for response.658 
 
Migrant smuggling itself is considered to be a ‘crime against maritime security’.659 For 
example, the money earned may be used for other criminal activities, such as drug traffic 
and arms trade.660 Some States try to reduce migrant smuggling purely through national 
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measures, even though the phenomenon is transnational. Just as the crimes of terrorism, 
arms smuggling, piracy and illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, migrant smuggling involves 
not only a single nation, but rather the whole community of States.661 Cooperation among 
States is therefore crucial for dealing with the problem. As a result, the transnational nature 
of migrant smuggling does not seem to allow for a purely national or unilateral solution. 
During smuggling operations, several countries can be affected, for example the State of 
origin, the transit State, the flag State (when being transported by sea) and the State of 
destination.662 As States realized that the problem was international in nature, several 
initiatives were taken on both the international and the regional level to combat smuggling.  
 
4.2. The IMO interim measures 
 
In October 1997, Italy submitted a proposal to the IMO for an international convention to 
combat the smuggling of illegal migrants by sea. This initiative resulted from a considerable 
increase in the phenomenon in the Adriatic Sea during previous years.663 In view of the 
importance of the problem, a significant number of States supported this proposal, although 
they also expressed several doubts about its inclusion in the work of the IMO.664 First, many 
delegations questioned whether the IMO was the appropriate body to prepare a convention 
involving international criminal law. Second, the IMO could only deal with smuggling by 
sea, not by air or by land. Lastly, it was upheld that it might cause overlaps, confusion and 
other problems, as the matter had also been taken up by other bodies of the UN. In 
September 1997, Austria’s Permanent Representative to the UN had already addressed a 
letter to the UN Secretary-General, presenting a draft ‘International Convention Against the 
Smuggling of Illegal Migrants’. This draft was submitted at the 52nd Session of the UN 
General Assembly.665 
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Consequently, the IMO General Assembly declared itself not competent in the matter, 
but the appropriate IMO bodies were invited in Resolution A.867(20) of 27 November 1997 to 
consider the issue of trafficking and transport of migrants by sea.666 To this end, the MSC 
established an ad hoc correspondence group to further develop the provisional elements on 
combating unsafe practices associated with the trafficking or transport of illegal migrants by 
sea.667 In 2001, an IMO Circular was approved on interim measures for combating unsafe 
practices associated with the trafficking or transport of illegal migrants by sea.668 MSC also 
implemented a biannual reporting procedure to keep track of incidents of unsafe practices 
associated with the trafficking or transport of illegal migrants by sea. To this end, 
governments and international organizations were urged to report promptly such practices 
of which they became aware. Nonetheless, not all States are using this procedure. For the 
moment, only Italy, Turkey and Greece are making the reports according to the official 
format.669 
 
The IMO measures are intended to achieve the following objectives: (1) adequate 
protection of human life at sea; (2) compliance with the relevant provisions of safe 
navigation; and (3) prompt and efficient international co-operation for the purpose of 
attaining the above two objectives.670 Although the IMO circular is of a recommendatory 
nature and is thus not binding, the relevant provisions are also reflected in Chapter II 
‘Smuggling of Migrants by Sea’ of the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, 
Sea, and Air (Smuggling Protocol).671 Under the Smuggling Protocol, the rather technical 
criterion of ‘unsafe practices associated with the trafficking or transport of illegal migrants by 
                                                 
666 IMO, “Combating Unsafe Practices Associated with the Trafficking or Transport of Migrants at Sea”, 
Resolution A.867(20) (5 December 1997), para. 6. 
667 MSC, “Unsafe Practices Associated with the Trafficking or Transport of Illegal Migrants by Sea – Report of 
the Correspondence Group (Submitted by the United States)”, IMO Doc. MSC 70/17/Rev.1 (22 October 1998). 
668 MSC, “Interim Measures for Combating Unsafe Practices Associated with the Trafficking or Transport of 
Illegal Migrants by Sea”, IMO Doc. MSC.1/Circ. 896/Rev. I (12 June 2001). 
669 See for example: MSC, “Unsafe Practices Associated with the Trafficking or Transport of Migrants by Sea – 
First Biannual Report”, IMO Doc. MSC.3/Circ.18 (18 February 2010). 
670 MSC, “Combatting unsafe practices associated with the trafficking or transport of migrants by sea”, Annex: 
“Draft Guidelines for the prevention and suppression of unsafe practices associated with the trafficking or 
transport of migrants by sea”, IMO Doc. MSC 69/21/2 (29 December 1997), 2, para. 8. 
671 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 28 January 
2004), 2241 UNTS 507 [Smuggling Protocol]. 
 161
sea’, is being replaced by the concept of ‘smuggling of migrants’, an illegal activity and 
moreover a crime.672 Safety concerns make thus place for security considerations. 
 
4.3. The UN Smuggling Protocol 
 
4.3.1. Defining migrant smuggling 
 
In Resolution 52/85 of 12 December 1997, the UN General Assembly decided to establish 
an inter-sessional open-ended intergovernmental group of experts to prepare a draft of a 
possible comprehensive international convention against organized transnational crime.673 
As a result, both the Protocol to Prevent and Suppress Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children674 (Trafficking Protocol) and the Smuggling Protocol were attached to 
UNTOC in 2000.675 Thus, both migrant trafficking and smuggling are regarded as a form of 
organized crime. The Protocols give a definition of human trafficking and human smuggling 
under international law. The crime of trafficking is defined as forcing clear victims into 
activities against their will to which they did not consent or understand676, while smuggling 
is regarded as an explicit and mutually beneficial arrangement between two parties 
involving illegal entry (crossing borders without complying with the necessary requirements 
for legal entry into the receiving State) into a given country.677  
 
Therefore, the mere transport of migrants is excluded from the scope of the Protocol. 
Also stowaways do not do not fall under the application of the Protocol. A stowaway is “[a] 
person who is secreted on a ship, or in cargo which is subsequently loaded on the ship, without the 
consent of the ship owner or the master or any other responsible person and who is detected on board 
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the ship after it has departed from a port, or in the cargo while unloading it in the port of arrival, and 
is reported as a stowaway by the master to the appropriate authorities.”678 In this case, the vessel as 
a unit is not engaged in an illicit activity.679 
 
While we will only deal with the crime of migrant smuggling, trafficking and smuggling 
are related and sometimes even overlap.680 Nevertheless, they are regulated separately in 
international law. For example, a person who was smuggled into a country could end up in a 
situation of debt bondage and therefore may be considered a victim of human trafficking 
instead of smuggling. Consequently, the examination of such circumstances must go beyond 
a mere consideration of the initial purpose of contact between the victim and the smuggler to 
inquire whether exploitation is taking place at the point of destination.681 As trafficking 
however requires attention to be given to post-arrival conduct – in order to prove the 
element of coercion – enforcement action may well not be taken in maritime zones or at the 
border.682 Therefore, this paper is limited to analysing the legal framework that deals with 
smuggling. 
 
4.3.2. Criminalizing migrant smuggling 
 
The Smuggling Protocol requires States to take all necessary measures within their 
domestic legal systems to criminalize the behaviour of parties involved in the smuggling of 
migrants.683 In doing so, the Protocol aims to achieve a sense of harmonization in States 
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Parties’ domestic law. Without such a comprehensive uniform approach, States would act 
inconsistently, perhaps making one State more attractive to the smuggler than the other. This 
would unfairly burden the attractive State.684 According to a report submitted to the 
Conference of Parties – which monitors the implementation of the UNTOC as well as the 
Trafficking and Smuggling Protocols – most State Parties either already had legislation, or 
have adopted legislation subsequent to the adoption of the Smuggling Protocol to 
criminalize the act of smuggling and related offences.685 Article 4 Smuggling Protocol limits 
the scope of application to the prevention, investigation and prosecution of offences that are 
transnational in nature and involve an organized criminal group. However, evidence of a 
link with a criminal group sometimes seems to be difficult to establish in case of smuggling 
by sea.686 
 
Concerning the prosecution of migrant smugglers, Article 15(1) UNTOC states: “Each 
State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the 
offences […] when [t]he offence is committed on board a vessel that is flying the flag of that State 
Party […] at the time that the offence is committed.” This entails an obligation upon flag States to 
exercise jurisdiction over masters, officers and crew members in the service of their ships 
who are involved in the smuggling of migrants.687 Furthermore, a State Party may establish 
jurisdiction over any such offence when the offence is committed by or against a national of 
that State Party.688 Therefore, the flag State has been granted preferential jurisdiction, while 
the jurisdiction of the State of nationality is discretionary.689 
 
                                                 
684 BROLAN, Claire, “An Analysis of the Human Smuggling Trade and the Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Air and Sea (2000) from a Refugee Protection Perspective”, 14 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 561 (2002), 594. 
685 Second session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
organized Crime, “Implementation of the Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime: Updated Information 
Based on Additional Responses received from States for the First Reporting Cycle”, UN Doc. 
CTOC/COP/2005/4/Rev. 1 (8 August 2006), paras. 21–23 and 29–30. 
686 MOMTAZ, Djamchid, “La lute contre ‘l’introduction clandestine’ de migrants par mer’, 4 Annuaire du droit de 
la mer 49 (1999), 52. 
687 See: MSC, “Interim Measures for Combating Unsafe Practices Associated with the Trafficking or Transport 
of Illegal Migrants by Sea”, IMO Doc. MSC.1/Circ. 896/Rev. I (12 June 2001), Annex para. 4(3). 
688 UNTOC, Art. 15(2) 
689 HINRICHS, Ximena, “Measures against Smuggling of Migrants at Sea: A Law of the Sea Related Perspective”, 
36 Revue belge de droit international 413 (2003), 427. 
 164
4.3.3. Migrant smuggling by sea 
 
4.3.3.1. Obligation to cooperate 
 
Article 7 Smuggling Protocol stipulates that States must cooperate ‘to the fullest extent 
possible’ to prevent and suppress the smuggling of migrants by sea, in accordance with the 
international law of the sea. The travaux préparatoires indicate that the international law of the 
sea includes the LOSC as well as other relevant international instruments. Nevertheless, 
references to the LOSC do not prejudice or affect in any way the position of any State in 
relation to that Convention. 690 The LOSC imposes a duty of cooperation on States with a 
view to repressing criminal activities. For example, Article 108(1) LOSC mentions the 
obligation to cooperate to suppress illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances. With respect to this duty to cooperate, TREVES notes that it “[…] ne font que 
confirmer le droit exclusif de l’Etat du pavillon. Celui-ci peut demander la cooperation d’autres Etats 
au cas où un de ses navires est soupçonné de se livrer au traffic de stupéfiants ou de substances 
psychotropes, mais on ne mentionne pas la situation où un Etat different de celui du pavillon 
demanderait la cooperation de l’Etat don’t le navire est soupçonné.”691 
 
A number of loopholes seriously impair the effectiveness of the duty to cooperate.692 For 
example, the wordings of the obligation leaves it unclear as to the specific conduct required 
in fulfilment of that obligation. Although this duty to cooperate ‘to the fullest possible extent’ 
may seem a strong obligation, the international community has not agreed that it has any 
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specific minimum content. Identifying a breach of a duty to cooperate will be notoriously 
difficult.693 
 
4.3.3.2. Measures against non-flag State vessels 
 
Article 8(2) of the Smuggling Protocol empowers a State Party that has reasonable 
grounds to suspect that a vessel – exercising the freedom of navigation and flying the flag of 
another State Party – is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea, may so notify the flag 
State and may request authorization to take appropriate measures. The term ‘reasonable 
grounds to suspect’ appears to exclude situations of mere suspicion, although it does not 
require actual knowledge of an offence.694 The flag State may authorize the requesting State, 
inter alia to board and to search the vessel. Furthermore, when evidence is found that the 
vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea, the State can take appropriate 
measures as authorized by the flag State. This is consistent with the right of visit on the high 
seas enclosed in Article 110 LOSC. The right of visit entails the right to board the vessel and, 
more importantly, the right to search the vessel in circumstances of extreme suspicion.695 For 
example, flag State consent can allow for this right of visit to be exercised. Where the 
grounds for measures taken pursuant to Article 8 Smuggling Protocol prove to be 
unfounded, the vessel shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been 
sustained, provided that the vessel has not committed any act justifying the measures 
taken.696 States are at least partially obliged to compensate even for their lawful conduct.697 
 
It has to be noted that – within the international legal framework of the necessity of flag 
State consent for boarding and searching of its vessels on the high seas – significant change is 
occurring regarding the expectation and/or duty that a flag State will give consent to 
boarding and inspection of its vessels by other States. This is inter alia the case where the 
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 166
vessel is suspected of being engaged in or contributing to or transporting individuals or 
materials to terrorism.698 The 2005 Protocol to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Protocol) for example, 
stipulates that State Parties can directly consent to have vessels flying their flag – suspected 
of a terrorist offence – be boarded and inspected by other State Parties after notifying all 
State parties.699 Thus, flag State consent can be freely given when requested and there is no 
direct legal right to board and inspect a foreign flagged ship. Nevertheless, the 2005 SUA 
Protocol creates a certain expectation that where a suspect vessel is involved, the consent of 
the flag State will be forthcoming as a State Party is legally committed to the overall 
objectives of the Protocol, namely the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of 
maritime navigation. The same reasoning could be made in case of migrant smuggling and 
flag State consent under the 2000 Smuggling Protocol. 
 
The original language of Article 8(2) Smuggling Protocol is derived from Article 17(3) of 
the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (Drugs Convention)700 and from paragraph 12 of the IMO interim 
measures.701 Presumably, Article 8(2) reflects a similar intent that these measures are 
‘disjunctive’ – meaning that permission to board does not automatically include permission 
to seize the vessel – and sequential.702 For example, in the case of the migrant smuggling 
vessel F/V Jin Yinn, Taiwan – being the flag State – gave its consent to the US Coast Guard to 
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board the F/V Jin Yinn on the high seas. However, Taiwan did not give further consent to the 
US to prosecute the smugglers aboard.703 
 
As mentioned, some authors suggests that the master of a vessel can provide 
authorization for boarding by a warship. They argue that, although there is no codified rule 
of international law expressly authorizing the master of a vessel to grant consent to board his 
vessel, both longstanding maritime custom – derived from the master’s plenary authority 
over the ship in international waters – and State practice, support this view.704 However, it is 
difficult to understand how a master can give the necessary consent to make a boarding 
internationally legal. This is based on the fact that international law does not recognize the 
master of a vessel, whereas it does recognize the flag State.  Next to this, it is arguable that 
boarding with the consent of the master is either an extension of the right of approach or of 
the right of visit. The clear difference of State opinion on the matter undermines the existence 
of a customary law principle.705 For example, during the NATO ‘Operation Active 
Endeavour’, British and Greek warships needed to know the flag State’s position about the 
boarding.706 
 
4.3.3.3. Measures against stateless vessels 
 
Many boats used by migrant smugglers are stateless vessels.707 Article 8(7) Smuggling 
Protocol stipulates that a State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel is 
engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea and is without nationality may board and 
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search the vessel. The word ‘engaged’ should be understood broadly as including vessels 
engaged both directly and indirectly in the smuggling of migrants.708 This is consistent with 
the right of visit in Article 110 LOSC,709 which is when there is reasonable ground for 
suspecting that the ship is without nationality or – though flying a foreign flag or refusing to 
show its flag – the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship.710 Although the 
1958 Convention on the High Seas contains no provision on a right of visit against stateless 
vessels, it simply failed to codify this customary right.711 If evidence confirming the suspicion 
is found, Article 8(7) Smuggling Protocol says that the boarding State shall take ‘appropriate 
measures’ in accordance with relevant domestic and international law. At the informal 
consultations during the 9th session of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the term ‘shall’ was replaced by 
‘may’.712 OBOKATA suggests that, as the obligation is not absolute, many migrant vessels may 
go unnoticed.713 Moreover, it is difficult to establish accountability for non-compliance.714 
 
But what exactly are ‘appropriate measures’? For example, is the seizure of a stateless 
ship allowed according to this provision? To understand why the words ‘appropriate 
measures’ were included and what they exactly imply, we have to take a look at the drafting 
history. The language of Article 8(7) Smuggling Protocol is derived from paragraph 16 of the 
IMO Circular on interim measures for combating unsafe practices associated with the 
trafficking or transport of illegal migrants by sea.715 The latter stipulates: “When there are 
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reasonable grounds to suspect that a ship is engaged in unsafe practices associated with trafficking or 
transport of migrants by sea and it is concluded in accordance with the international law of the sea 
that the ship is without nationality, or has been assimilated to a ship without nationality, States 
should conduct a safety examination of the ship, as necessary. If the results of the safety examination 
indicate that the ship is engaged in unsafe practices, States should take appropriate measures in 
accordance with relevant domestic and international law.”716 
 
Originally, the draft version read as follows: “When there are reasonable grounds to suspect 
that a vessel is engaged in unsafe practices associated with trafficking or transport of illegal migrants 
by sea and it is concluded in accordance with the international law of the sea that the vessel is without 
nationality, States should conduct a safety examination of the vessel, as necessary. If the results of the 
safety examination indicate that the vessel is engaged in unsafe practices, States should take 
appropriate measures in accordance with relevant law.”717 In the drafting stage of the interim 
measures, the Russian Federation already stated that – in view of the political, financial, and 
legal aspects of the problem – the term ‘appropriate measures’ and ‘relevant law’ were 
insufficient and should be clarified. According to this delegation it was however obvious that 
the legal grounds for such action in respect of the vessels mentioned will be in each case 
defined by the international law regime of the region where the stoppage, visit and arrest of 
the vessels are undertaken (high seas, exclusive economic zone, contiguous zone or 
territorial sea).718 Denmark added that international law does not give States a general right 
to adopt and enforce measures on the high seas with respect to vessels having no nationality. 
According to the LOSC, a ship without nationality may be boarded and inspected in order to 
establish its nationality. Nevertheless, as the LOSC does not contain provisions which permit 
further action with regard to safety measures, Denmark concludes that seizure for example is 
not allowed.719 
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As a result of these remarks, ‘relevant law’ was replaced by ‘with relevant domestic and 
international law’. Yet, the term ‘appropriate measures’ was not being clarified. Thus, some 
authors suggest that there must be a form of jurisdictional link to exercise further 
enforcement action (other than to board and to search the ship), for example to actually seize 
the ship and apprehending the persons on board.720 However, MALLIA refers to Article 8(1) 
Smuggling Protocol: “A State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel that is 
flying its flag or claiming its registry, that is without nationality or that, though flying a 
foreign flag or refusing to show a flag, is in reality of the nationality of the State Party 
concerned is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea may request the assistance of other States 
Parties in suppressing the use of the vessel for that purpose. The States Parties so requested shall 
render such assistance to the extent possible within their means.” She argues that in the context of 
drug smuggling, a similar provision – namely Article 17(2) 1988 Drugs Convention – has 
been interpreted as placing a ship without nationality in the same category as a ship in 
respect of which a state exercises jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that it sails under its flag. 
As a result, a State can take the same enforcement measures with respect to ships without 
nationality as it can with respect to ships flying its flag.721 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
Smuggling is regarded as an explicit and mutually beneficial arrangement between two 
parties involving illegal entry (crossing borders without complying with the necessary 
requirements for legal entry into the receiving State) into a given country.722 Migrant 
smuggling by sea is considered to be a ‘crime against maritime security’.723 Article 8(2) 
Smuggling Protocol is consistent with the right of visit on the high seas enclosed in Article 
110 LOSC as it requires flag State consent to exercise the right of visit vis-à-vis a vessel on the 
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high seas suspected of being engaged in migrant smuggling. Nevertheless, the Smuggling 
Protocol influences the expectation and/or duty that a flag State will give consent to boarding 
and inspection of its vessels by other States.  
 
Many boats used by migrant smugglers are stateless vessels.724 Article 8(7) Smuggling 
Protocol stipulates that a State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel is 
engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea and is without nationality may board and 
search the vessel. If evidence confirming the suspicion is found, Article 8(7) Smuggling 
Protocol says that the boarding State shall take ‘appropriate measures’ in accordance with 
relevant domestic and international law. ‘Appropriate measures’ means that a State can take 
the same enforcement measures with respect to ships without nationality as it can with 
respect to ships flying its flag.725 
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5. Return 
 
After interception, migrants at sea are often returned to the place where they embarked. 
However, the non-refoulement principle entails that a person cannot be returned to a place 
where their life or freedom would be threatened. According to the Italian Prime Minister 
Silvio BERLUSCONI in 2009, it is almost a theoretical exception that migrants at sea in the 
Mediterranean are in need of international protection. He stated: “There’s hardly anyone on 
these boats who has the right to asylum, as the statistics show. Only in exceptional cases.”726 
However, official numbers show a different picture. In 2009, 1,475 persons arrived by boat in 
Malta; 1,308 of these persons asked for asylum and 65% of these asylum seekers were 
granted international protection. Due to the recent developments in countries like Tunisia 
and Libya, this percentage amounted to 91% of all migrants that arrived in Malta during the 
first half of 2011.727 In this part, we will take a look at the content of the non-refoulement 
principle – in the refugee law context, the human rights context and in customary 
international law – and its application at sea. 
 
5.1. Refugee law context 
 
5.1.1. Concept 
 
The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees728 (Refugee Convention) was 
adopted by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, held in Geneva from 2 to 25 July 1951. The object of the Refugee 
Convention is to endeavour to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations729 as well as 
the UDHR.730 Originally, the application of the Refugee Convention was limited to the 
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729 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945), 1 UNTS XVI. 
730 Refugee Convention, Preamble. 
 173
refugee who acquired such status as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951.731 An 
optional geographical limitation also permitted States to limit their obligations to refugees 
resulting from events occurring in Europe.732 The 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees removed geographical and temporal restrictions from the Refugee Convention.733 
The Protocol is often referred to as ‘amending’ the 1951 Convention, but it is in fact an 
independent instrument and not a revision. 147 States are Parties to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol.734  
 
Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention states that: “No Contracting State shall expel or 
return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion.” Article 42(1) Refugee Convention precludes the making of 
reservations in respect inter alia of Article 33 concerning non-refoulement. The ratio legis of this 
article is that the turning back of a refugee to the frontiers of a country where his life or 
freedom would be threatened, would be tantamount to delivering him into the hands of his 
persecutors.735 Reference is made not only to the country of origin but also to other countries 
where the lift or freedom of the refugee would be threatened for the reasons mentioned.736 
Non-refoulement is not limited to those formally recognized as refugees. Therefore, the 
prohibition on States is applicable to recognized refugees as well as for all asylum-seekers. 
Any other approach would significantly undermine the effectiveness and utility of the 
protective arrangements of the Refugee Convention. 737  
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The idea that a State ought not to return persons to other States in certain circumstances 
was already referred to in Article 3 of the 1933 Convention relating to the International 
Status of Refugees.738 The State Parties to this Convention undertook not to remove resident 
refugees or keep them from their territory, by application of police measures, such as 
expulsions or non-admittance at the frontier (refoulement), unless dictated by national 
security or public order. Next to this, each State agreed not to refuse entry to refugees at the 
frontiers of their countries of origin. Although the 1933 Convention was not widely ratified, a 
new era began with the UNGA Resolution 8(I) of 1946 that endorsed the principle that 
refugees with valid objections should not be compelled to return to their country of origin.739 
 
Article 35(1) Refugee Convention provides that the Contracting States undertake to 
cooperate with UNHCR in the exercise of its functions, particularly its supervisory 
responsibility. In 1946, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) was established by the 
UNGA as a UN Specialized Agency of limited duration.740 As a result of the prospective 
termination of the IRO mandate and the continuing concerns over refugees, the UNGA 
decided to establish the UNHCR.741 The UNHCR Statute describes the functions of the 
UNHCR as follows: “The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, acting under the 
authority of the General Assembly, shall assume the function of providing international protection, 
under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the present Statute 
and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees by assisting Governments and, subject 
to the approval of the Governments concerned, private organizations to facilitate the voluntary 
repatriation of such refugees, or their assimilation within new national communities.”742 Although 
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the UNHCR is accorded a special status as the guardian of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, it is not limited to the application of the 
substantive provisions of these two treaties in the exercise of its protective functions. 
 
ExCom was established by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) at the 
request of the UNGA.743 Therefore, ExCom is formally independent of the UNHCR and it 
operates as a distinct body of the United Nations. It determines the general policies under 
which the UNHCR shall plan, develop and administer its programmes and projects.744 In the 
exercise of its mandate, ExCom adopts Conclusions on International Protection addressing 
particular aspects of UNHCR’s work. While ExCom Conclusions are not formally binding, 
regard may properly be had to them as elements relevant to the interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention.745 ExCom Conclusions constitute expressions of opinion which are broadly 
representative of the views of the international community. Moreover, the specialist 
knowledge of ExCom and the fact that its Conclusions are taken by consensus add further 
weight.746 
 
5.1.2. Application at the borders of a State 
 
Although the non-refoulement principle could be violated with regard to all asylum 
seekers who are already present on the territory of a State, it is not always clear whether this 
is also the case for people who are at the border and want to be admitted to the territory of a 
State. 
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5.1.2.1. Maritime frontier 
 
First of all, we will have to answer the question of what the maritime frontier exactly is. 
The sovereignty of a coastal State extends – beyond its land territory and internal waters – to 
the territorial sea.747 Article 29 VCLT says: “Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or 
is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory.” The ILC 
already stated in 1956 that the rights of the coastal State over the territorial sea do not differ 
in nature from the rights of sovereignty which the State exercises over other parts of its 
territory.748 The maritime frontier will thus be the territorial sea border. Therefore, one strand 
of legal doctrine is convinced that the non-refoulement principle will be applicable within the 
territorial waters as it is on land territory.749 
 
However, another opinion is that – while sovereignty certainly follows from a State’s 
possession of territory – the exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights over a space or object 
does not make it territory. Consequently, the argument that territorially limited international 
obligations would necessarily apply in the territorial sea in the same manner as on land is 
thus unconvincing.750 In this case, the maritime frontier is being transferred into the internal 
waters of a State. Nevertheless, the non-refoulement principle will still be applicable within 
territorial waters. It seems consistent with the spirit of the Refugee Convention that a person 
should be able to claim asylum once they are within the jurisdiction of a State.751 The far 
reaching de jure jurisdiction of the coastal State into its territorial waters is a very strong 
indication for corresponding de facto control. For example, vessels exercising non-innocent 
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passage become subject to the full jurisdiction of the coastal State.752 As such, the prohibition 
of non-refoulement will apply in the territorial sea.753 
 
Despite the fact that the link between territory and territorial sea is strong, it is not 
settled that the territorial sea is to be considered as territory strictu sensu.754 As pointed out by 
GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, the question of whether entering a State’s territorial waters 
constitutes entry – where ‘entry’ is the judicial fact necessary and sufficient to trigger the 
application of a particular system of international rules – to State territory remains 
unresolved.755 Although entry within territorial waters may be an ‘entry’ for certain 
purposes, it is not correct to generalize.756 Indeed, if all the provisions of the Refugee 
Convention became operative upon entry into the territorial waters, then a potential conflict 
arises between Article 31(1) Refugee Convention and Article 25(1) LOSC. The former states: 
“The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on 
refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense 
of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present 
themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.” 
The latter on the contrary permits coastal States to take action necessary to prevent non-
innocent passage. The full application of the Refugee Convention to the territorial sea would 
effectively negate or severely constrain the authority of a coastal State to control non-
innocent passage. As the potential interference posed to the right to regulate navigation in 
the territorial sea goes far beyond limited aims of the Refugee Convention to restrict the 
undue penalization of irregular migrants, the full application of the Refugee Convention to 
the territorial sea would provide an unworkable basis for dealing with migration issues.757 
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However, there appears to be little reason to doubt the applicability of non-refoulement in 
the territorial sea, irrespectively of which approach is applied.758 As ExCom noted: “The State 
within whose sovereign territory, or territorial waters, interception takes place has the primary 
responsibility for addressing any protection needs of intercepted persons.”759 
 
5.1.2.2. Non-admittance at the borders of a State 
 
It is important to note that the Refugee Convention – and also international law 
generally – does not contain any right to asylum for individuals. Therefore, international 
law, as it stands today, does not guarantee asylum seekers a right to enter a State's territory. 
Article 33 Refugee Convention does not imply that a refugee must in all cases be admitted to 
the country where he seeks entry.760 However, BETHLEMEM & LAUTERPACHT argue that this 
does not mean that States are free to reject at the frontier, without constraint, those who have 
a well-founded fear of persecution.761 First, the words ‘in any manner whatsoever’ would 
seem to indicate that the provision also applies to non-admittance at the frontier. Secondly, 
in Belgian and French law 'refoulement' covers rejection at the frontier.762 Thirdly, several key 
instruments in the field of refugee protection concluded subsequent to 1951 explicitly refer to 
‘rejection at the frontier’ in their recitation of the nature of the act prohibited. This is the case, 
for example, in the Asian-African Refugee Principles of 1966763, the 1967 UNGA Declaration 
on Territorial Asylum764 and the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa of 1969.765 While these provisions cannot be regarded as determinative of 
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the meaning of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention, they could nevertheless offer useful 
guidance for the purposes of interpretation. Lastly, this view is also supported by various 
ExCom Conclusions. ExCom has confirmed that it is of utmost importance that the principle 
not be violated on the territory of a State or at the borders.766   
 
But what are the actual consequences for States at their borders? Where non-refoulement 
applies, a series of related procedural guarantees could become applicable as well. There 
appears to be a growing support for a norm of refugee status determination – implicitly 
present in the Refugee Convention – in both doctrine and the iterations of the UNHCR.767 
This means that, as non-admittance would constitute refoulement, asylum-seekers should be 
admitted to refugee status determination. Refugee status determination is declaratory, 
meaning that a person is a refugee by virtue of the fact of being outside the country of 
nationality, having fled due to a well-founded fear of persecution. Therefore, status as a 
refugee does not depend on any constitutive act of the State processing the claim. A person 
does not become a refugee because of recognition, but is recognized because he or she is a 
refugee.768 In order to enable States Parties to the Refugee Convention to implement their 
provisions, refugees have to be identified.769 Thus, UNHCR believes that States will be 
required to grant individuals seeking international protection access to fair and efficient 
asylum procedures in order to give effect to their obligations under the 1951 Convention 
and/or 1967 Protocol.770  
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This view has very important consequences in the maritime context, as asylum-seekers 
arriving by sea who manage to reach a State’s territorial waters should not be turned away. 
PALLIS takes the view that any interdiction and re-direction of vessels may amount to a 
breach of an obligation to determine the status of asylum-seekers.771 Thus, a refusal to 
refugee status determination would amount to a breach of international law, unless the State 
adopts another course that does not amount to refoulement, for example the removal to a safe 
third country or temporary protection.772 TREVISANUT for example bases herself on the 1967 
UNGA Declaration on Territorial Asylum773 to argue that the first State of arrival has a duty 
to at least temporarily host the asylum seekers.774 She considers vessels – except those 
enjoying the right of innocent passage – that have entered the territorial sea to have ‘arrived’ 
at a State. As a result, this State should carry out a first screening of the persons. Vessels with 
asylum seekers can therefore not be redirected towards the high seas.  
 
However, this expansive reading of an obligation of refugee status determination is 
rejected by other authors. The aforementioned arguments could make sense with regard to 
land boundaries, as rejection at one State’s border could result in refoulement if the 
neighbouring State is the country of persecution.775 With respect to asylum-seekers arriving 
by sea however, this would require bringing the vessel and the people on board into port. 
This would contradict the fact that there is no right of entry into ports, nor under the law of 
the sea, nor under refugee law.776  
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This view is also supported by State practice. It is quite common for States to apply 
migration law only to those arriving on ‘dry land’, e.g. persons presenting themselves within 
the geographic area of a port.777 For example, Article 3(1) Dublin II Regulation says: “Member 
States shall examine the application of any third-country national who applies at the border or in their 
territory to any one of them for asylum.”778 This application has to be examined in conformity 
with Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States 
for granting and withdrawing refugee status. 779 The Directive applies to all applications for 
asylum made in the territory, including at the border of the Member States.780 However, 
Article 2(2) Schengen Borders Code defines an external border as the Member States’ land 
borders, including river and lake borders, sea borders and their airports, river ports, sea 
ports and lake ports, provided that they are not internal borders.781 Thus, as sea ports are 
considered to be located at the external border, it is doubtful whether the territorial sea 
border could be regarded as constituting an external border for the purpose of applying 
refugee status determination.782 
 
Nevertheless, an obligation of refugee status determination – or another act that does not 
amount to refoulement, such as temporary protection – may exist when the act of rejection 
necessarily results in the person being returned to the place of persecution. Theoretically, the 
vessel – where seaworthy and adequately supplied – could travel to any coastal State in the 
world.783 However, when every country would send migrant boats back into the ocean, those 
on board become persons ‘in orbit’. These people are looking for a place to request asylum, 
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but are pushed back to sea each time.784 As a result, if the combined effect of multiple States 
expelling the same vessel from their waters is that a refugee must return to a place of 
persecution, this is said to constitute ‘chain’ or ‘collective’ refoulement.785 Therefore, in order 
to be able to give effect to their obligations, Parties to the Refugee Convention should, at a 
minimum, conduct some form of individual refugee screening process when actually 
repatriating persons, turning boats back to their points of departure or in case of collective 
refoulement.786 This has to be opposed to mere rejection at the frontier.787 The simple denial of 
entry of ships to internal waters or territorial waters does not necessarily amount to the 
return of these persons to a place where their life or freedom would be threatened. In its 
commentary on the draft text of the Refugee Convention, the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Statelessness and Related Problems noted that the prohibition of refoulement does not entail a 
duty for the State to accept a person onto its own territory. The Committee illustrated this by 
saying that the return of a migrant ship to the high seas would not constitute a refoulement.788 
Therefore, this refusal must be differentiated from the physical return of persons on a ship to 
a place where their life or freedom would be threatened.789  
 
We can conclude that the duty of non-refoulement not only encompasses non-return at the 
frontier, but also non-rejection at the frontier, only when the latter poses an actual threat.790 
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5.1.3. Extraterritorial application 
 
A point of discussion, and probably the most debated one, is the question whether the 
non-refoulement principle is applicable extraterritorially during interdictions on the high seas. 
According to an advisory opinion the UNHCR, the principle is definitely applicable 
extraterritorially, based upon the ordinary meaning of the text, the context and the 
humanitarian object and purpose of the Refugee Convention as well as subsequent State 
practice and relevant rules of international law.791 First, the extraterritorial scope is said to be 
clear from the ordinary meaning of the text of the provision itself as the obligation set out in 
Article 33(1) Refugee Convention is subject to a geographic restriction only with regard to 
the country where a refugee may not be sent to. Next to this, the terms ‘return’ and ‘refouler’ 
do not support an interpretation which would restrict its scope to conduct within the 
territory of the State concerned, nor is there any indication that these terms were understood 
by the drafters of the Refugee Convention to be limited in this way.792 As HELTON stated: 
“The right of non-refoulement becomes a hollow promise if nations can circumvent it by stopping the 
refugees before arrival.”793 Secondly, subsequent State practice is for example expressed 
through ExCom Conclusions which attest to the overriding importance of the principle of 
non-refoulement irrespective of whether the refugee is in the national territory of the State 
concerned.794 Lastly, other international refugee and human rights instruments – treaties as 
well as non-binding texts – drawn up since 1951 do not place territorial restrictions on States’ 
non-refoulement obligations. These include for example the 1969 Convention Governing the 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,795 the 1969 American Convention on Human 
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Rights,796 the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees797 and 1967 UNGA Declaration on 
Territorial Asylum.798 Next to the advisory opinion of the UNHCR, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights also asserted that Article 33 Refugee Convention has no 
geographical limitations.799 
 
Although UNHCR's interpretation of the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol is considered an authoritative view and is being supported by some 
authors,800 this opinion is not shared by everyone. It is argued that the UNHCR 
interpretation of the Refugee Convention reads into the non-refoulement provisions a far more 
liberal principle than the language can bear.801 A restrictive reading of Article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention suggests that non-refoulement is limited to those who have already 
entered the territory of a receiving State. This reading is consistent with the text of the 
Convention, based on the drafters’ choice to use the key words ‘expel or return’, as these 
words imply that only asylum seekers within the territory of the receiving State cannot be 
subject to refoulement. Records from the Conference of the Plenipotentiaries in 1951 indicate 
that several delegates had this conception of Article 33, including, for example, the Swiss, 
French and Dutch delegations.802 Furthermore, with regard to expulsion, Article 32 
specifically addresses refugees in the territory of a receiving State.803  
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The British Court of Appeals upheld the restrictive approach in a 2003 case reasoning 
that no permissible construction of Article 33 confers a right on refugees to access the 
territory of another country. The Court concluded that States are entitled to take active steps 
to prevent their arrival.804 In the case of Sale v. Haitian Ctr. Council, the US Supreme Court 
ruled that the correct textual interpretation of Article 33 did not prohibit the US Coast Guard 
from intercepting Haitian refugees before they reached the border.805 Although in doctrine 
this case is criticized, no State Party to the Refugee Convention, including the UNHCR, 
issued an official complaint regarding the US Supreme Court's interpretation of Article 33.806 
As D’ANGELO concludes: “Strong normative principles drive the 1951 Convention; however, only 
those principles the treaty embodies can provide the source of binding legal obligations on states.”807 
 
5.2. Human rights context 
 
5.2.1. Concept 
 
The non-refoulement principle is also included, explicitly or implicitly, in several human 
rights treaties. Next to the express prohibition of refoulement in Article 3 of the 1984 
Convention Against Torture (CAT)808, the principle has been construed as being implicitly 
present in the pertinent prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
enshrined in various human right treaties, such as the ICCPR809 (Article 7), the ECHR810 
(Article 3) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights811 (Article 22(8)). 
                                                 
804 European Roma Rights Ctr. and others v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport, E.W.C.A. Civ. 666 (2003), 
37-43. 
805 Sale v. Haitian Ctr. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 158 (1993). See also decisions of the High Court of Australia: 
High Court of Australia, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Hali Ibrahim, 26 October 2000, 
(2000) HCA 55, para. 136 and High Court of Australia, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v 
Khawar, 11 April 2002, (2002) HCA 14, para. 42. 
806 Inter-Am. CHR, The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v. United States, 13 March 1997, Case 10.675, 
Report No. 51/96. 
807 D’ANGELO, Ellen F., “Non-Refoulement: The Search for a Consistent Interpretation of Article 33”, 42 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 279 (2009), 291-297. 
808 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 10 
December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987), 1465 UNTS 85 [CAT]. 
809 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976), 99 UNTS 171 [ICCPR]. 
810 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 
1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 222 [ECHR]. 
811 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1987, entered into force 21 October 1986), 
21 ILM 58. 
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The protection enjoyed against non-refoulement in the human rights context is considered 
to be much broader than the one in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, both ratione 
personae and ratione materiae. In contrast to the principle in the refugee context, non-
refoulement in the human rights context is not predicated on any given status of the 
individuals at risk. Therefore, it applies to all persons – not only asylum-seekers – compelled 
to remain or return in a territory where substantial grounds can be shown for believing that 
they would face a real risk of being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment. Moreover, while the Refugee Convention prescribes exceptions to non-refoulement 
in Articles 32 and 33(2), the principle of non-refoulement in the human rights context is 
absolute and non-derogable, preventing extradition, expulsion, or removal in any manner 
whatsoever. 
 
5.2.2. Extraterritorial application 
 
The Human Rights Committee has stated that States are required by Article 2(1) ICCPR 
to respect and to ensure the Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their territory 
as well as to all persons subject to their jurisdiction.812 A State Party must thus respect and 
ensure the rights laid down in the ICCPR to anyone within the power or effective control of 
that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party. Consequently, 
States can be held accountable for violations of rights under the ICCPR which its agents 
commit on the territory of another State, whether with the acquiescence of the Government 
of that State or in opposition to it.813 In certain circumstances, persons may fall under the 
subject-matter of a State Party to the ICCPR, even when outside that State’s territory.814 Also 
                                                 
812 Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 31 – Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
States Parties to the ICCPR”, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (26 May 2004), para. 10, available online: 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/58f5d4646e861359c1256ff600533f5f?Opendocument>. 
813 See for example: Human Rights Committee, Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, UN Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979 (29 
July 1981), para. 12.3; Human Rights Committee, Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979 (29 July 1981), para. 10.3; Human Rights Committee, Pereira Montero v. Uruguay, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/18/D/106/1981 (31 March 1983), para. 5. 
814 See for example: Human Rights Committee, “Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee – 
United States of America”, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (3 October 1995), para. 284, available online: 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/hrcuscomments.html>;  Human Rights Committee, “Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Committee – Israel”, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (18 August 1998), para. 
10, available online: 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/7ea14efe56ecd5ea8025665600391d1b?Opendocument>; Human Rights 
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the ICJ has confirmed that the ICCPR is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the 
exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory.815 The Court observed that, while the 
jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be exercised outside the 
national territory. In the latter case, considering the object and purpose of the ICCPR, States 
Parties to the ICCPR should therefore be bound to comply with its provisions.816 Similarly, 
the Committee against Torture has affirmed that the non-refoulement obligation – contained in 
Article 3 CAT – applies in any territory under a State Party’s jurisdiction, including all areas 
under the de facto effective control of the State Party, by whichever military or civil 
authorities such control is exercised. The provision applies to, and is fully enjoyed, by all 
persons under the effective control of its authorities, of whichever type, wherever located in 
the world.817 The Marine I Case was the first case involving a European State in which an 
international human rights body, the Committee against Torture, offered some guidance on 
determining responsibility for safeguarding the human rights of migrants who are rescued at 
sea. Although the Committee against Torture declared the case inadmissible, it noted that 
Spain exercised constant de facto control over the migrants from the time of their rescue and 
throughout their detention in Mauritania. Consequently, the alleged victims were subject to 
Spanish jurisdiction and Spain incurred responsibility for their protection under the CAT.818 
 
KLUG and HOWE argue that de jure jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas ipso facto 
provides evidence for a sufficient level of de facto control to trigger the application of human 
                                                                                                                                                        
Committee, “Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee – Israel”, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR 
(21 August 2003), para. 11, available online: 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/CCPR.CO.78.ISR.En?OpenDocument>; Human Rights 
Committee, “Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee – United States of America”, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (18 December 2006), para. 10, available online: 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/34d0a773a44de02bc125725a0034cbdf?Opendocument>. 
815 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Advisory 
Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 136 (2004), para. 111; ICJ, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 168 
(2005), para. 216. 
816 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Advisory 
Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 136 (2004), para. 109. 
817 Committee against Torture, “Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the 
Convention – Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: United States of America”, 
UN Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (25 July 2006), paras. 15 and 20, available online: 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/cats36.htm>. 
818 Committee against Torture, Marine I Case, J.H.A. v. Spain, 21 November 2008, Communication No. 
323/2007, UN Doc. CAT/C/41/D/323/2007, para. 8.2. For an extensive discussion on this case see: WOUTERS, 
Kees & DEN HEIJER, Maarten, “The Marine I Case: A Comment”, 22 International Journal of Refugee Law 1 
(2010), 1-19. 
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rights law. In any case, physical control over intercepted persons would trigger State 
jurisdiction. But even where the level of de facto control is limited, it is likely that human 
rights bodies would consider that the intercepting State has established jurisdiction.819 The 
Committee against Torture interpreted the term jurisdiction – as the crucial condition for 
enlivening a State’s extraterritorial human rights obligations – based on the tenet that 
‘factivity creates normativity’.820 Therefore, a State’s human rights obligations are triggered 
whenever there is de facto control, even when there is no de jure jurisdiction. In the Marine I 
Case, it would therefore not have mattered whether the factual exercise of control was duly 
grounded in the diplomatic agreement concluded with Mauritania, which allowed for the 
temporary presence on Mauritanian territory of Spanish security forces. While such an 
agreement is important in determining whether Spain has the authority to act outside its 
own territory – and possibly also for the determination of the ‘lawfulness’ of certain 
infringements of human rights – it is not as such relevant in establishing whether Spain’s 
human rights obligations were engaged. As a result, as soon as, and for as long as, the 
passengers were under the actual de facto control of Spain, Spain was responsible for their 
human rights protection.821 
 
Also at the regional level, the extraterritorial applicability of human rights treaties is 
established. The question of extraterritorial applicability of the non-refoulement principle – as 
implicitly present in Article 3 ECHR – on the high seas was decided by the European Court 
of Human Rights on 23 February 2012 in the case Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy.822 The 
applicants – 11 Somali and 13 Eritrean nationals – relied on Article 3 of the ECHR to argue 
that the decision of the Italian authorities to intercept the vessels on the high seas, and send 
the applicants directly back to Libya, exposed them to the risk of ill-treatment there, as well 
as to a serious threat of being sent back to their countries of origin, where they might also 
                                                 
819 KLUG, Anja & HOWE, Tim, “Extraterritorial Interception Measures”, in RYAN, Bernard & MITSILEGAS, 
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822 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09 (2012). See also: UNHCR, 
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face ill-treatment. The applicants were part of a group of about two hundred individuals 
who left Libya aboard three vessels with the aim of reaching the Italian coast. However, after 
they were noticed by ships of the Italian Coast Guard, the persons on board were transferred 
onto Italian military ships and returned to Tripoli. This return was carried out based on a 
bilateral agreement between Italy and Libya.823 
 
Although the European Court of Human Rights affirmed that only in exceptional cases 
could acts of the Member States performed, or producing effects, outside their territories 
constitute an exercise of jurisdiction by them, it held that in this case there had been a 
violation of Article 3 of the ECHR because the applicants had been exposed to: (1) the risk of 
ill-treatment in Libya; and (2) of repatriation to Somalia or Eritrea. The Court found that the 
applicants had fallen within the jurisdiction of Italy in the period between boarding on to the 
Italian ships on the high seas and being handed over to the Libyan authorities and that 
during this period the applicants had been under the continuous and exclusive de jure and de 
facto control of the Italian authorities. Finally, the Court stated that the transfer of the 
applicants to Libya had been carried out without any examination of each individual 
situation and thus constituted a form of collective expulsion, in breach of Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR.824 It can be concluded that the non-refoulement principle in 
Article 3 of the ECHR applies extraterritorially when there is a continuous and effective 
control over the persons concerned. 
 
5.2.3. The relationship between international refugee law and human rights law 
 
International refugee law and international human rights law are complementary and 
mutually reinforcing legal regimes.825 Therefore, Article 33(1) – embodying the humanitarian 
essence of the Refugee Convention and safeguards fundamental rights of refugees – must be 
interpreted in a manner which is consistent with developments in international human rights 
law. As a result, the scope ratione loci of States’ non-refoulement obligations under 
international human rights law is particularly pertinent to the question of the extraterritorial 
                                                 
823 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09 (2012), paras. 9-11. 
824 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09 (2012), para. 70 et seq. 
825 ExCom, “General Conclusion on International Protection”, Conclusion No. 95 (LIV) (2003), para. l, available 
online: <http://www.unhcr.org/41b041534.html>. 
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applicability of the prohibition on returning a refugee to a danger of persecution under 
international refugee instruments.826 Given the similar nature of the obligations and the 
object and purpose of the treaties which form their legal basis, the reasoning adopted by 
courts and human rights treaty bodies in their authoritative interpretation of the relevant 
human rights provisions is – according to the UNHCR – also relevant to the prohibition of 
refoulement under international refugee law.827 Therefore, as with non-refoulement obligations 
under international human rights law, the decisive criterion is not whether such persons are 
on the State’s territory, but rather, whether they come within the effective control and 
authority of that State.828 
 
5.3. International customary law 
 
The majority doctrinary opinion is that the principle of non-refoulement has acquired the 
status of customary international law. Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute defines international 
custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.829 For a rule to become part of 
customary international law, two elements are required: (1) consistent State practice and (2) 
opinio juris. The latter means the understanding held by States that the practice is obligatory 
due to the existence of a rule requiring it.830 The evolution of customary international law 
rules is important with regard to States that are not Parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol.831 Also, some States Parties did not implement the non-refoulement 
principle into domestic legislation. Domestic courts might be able to treat customary 
international law as part of the law of the land. For example, in 2008 the customary legal 
                                                 
826 UNHCR, “Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 
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argument found favour before Justice HARTMANN of the Hong Kong Court of First 
Instance.832 The applicants argued that non-refoulement was allowed,833 this was refused by 
the Court since it determined that it must be recognized that the principle of non-refoulement 
– as it applies to refugees – has grown beyond the confines of the Refugee Convention and 
has matured into a universal norm of customary international law.834 
 
As the ICJ accepted in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, conventional principles can 
exist side-by-side with customary principles of similar content.835 In the Nicaragua Case, the 
ICJ stated that the fact that the customary principle was embodied in a multilateral 
convention did not mean that it ceased to exist as a principle of customary law, even as 
regards States that were parties to the convention.836 Moreover, the existence of a 
conventional principle not only precludes the existence of a customary principle of similar 
content, but it even may influence the creation of such a rule of custom.837 Could the 
conventional principle of non-refoulement be regarded as reflecting or crystallising – at least 
emergent – rules of customary international law? Three elements will be material to 
determine of whether such a process of crystallization has occurred: (1) the conventional rule 
should – at all events potentially – be of a fundamentally norm-creating character such as 
could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law,838 (2) even without the 
passage of any considerable period of time, a very widespread and representative 
participation in the convention might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States 
whose interests were specially affected839 and (3) within whatever period has passed since 
the first expression of the conventional rule, State practice, including that of States whose 
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interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the 
sense of the provision invoked – and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to 
show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.840 BETHLEHEM & 
LAUTERPACHT extensively argue that these conditions are fulfilled. Next to the near-universal 
acceptance of a non-refoulement duty in various international and regional treaties as well as 
in the 1967 UNGA Declaration on Territorial Asylum,841 there is an absence of express 
opposition to the principle by the States which neither signed a relevant treaty nor were 
present in the UNGA when the 1967 Declaration was adopted.842 
 
Nevertheless, a minority of authors does contest the customary international law 
character of non-refoulement. The most prominent opposing argument concerns the lack of 
general practice in certain regions. FELICIANO, HYNDMAN & KÄLIN all expressed degrees of 
cautious reservation with respect to the scope of any customary international law rule in 
1982.843 Yet, taking into account numerous ratifications of the Refugee Convention since 1982, 
party-membership is now widespread. However, more recently, it has been pointed out that 
the Arabic and Asian regions – which are specially affected – still show no significant 
increase in Convention ratifications.844 HATHAWAY adds that – as compliance is not in fact 
advanced by the assertion of words alone as customary international law845 – there is no 
necessity to claim that non-refoulement is customary international law.846 In contrast, if the 
scope of extant legal obligation would be exaggerated, we impliedly jettison accrued gains 
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and descend into the realm of pure policy. As the latter is a space in which refugee rights are 
far too often deemed dispensable in the pursuit of narrow definitions of state self-interest, 
we must avoid this.847 
 
However, this opinion cannot be shared. It is true that questions remained as to the 
customary nature of the norm of non-refoulement during the Cold War era. However, after the 
Soviet era the norm quickly attained a customary nature as no State – Party or not to the 
Refugee Convention – will claim it has a general right to commit refoulement.848 Also, 
violations of non-refoulement may in fact even strengthen the norm. The ICJ stressed that if a 
State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by 
appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then – whether or 
not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis – the significance of that attitude is to 
confirm rather than to weaken the rule.849 Although serious breaches of the principle have 
been signalled, none have been deemed of sufficient weight to question the customary 
nature of the norm. Moreover, according to a number of authors, if States do act contrary to 
the principle, they do so with a certain attempt at justification, which indicates that they feel 
they are infringing upon a rule of law.850 At present, it is thus clear that the norm prohibiting 
refoulement is part of customary international law and therefore binding on all States whether 
or not they are party to the 1951 Convention. 
 
Still, it remains uncertain whether that norm has achieved the status of jus cogens. Claims 
have been made that the principle of non-refoulement is not only customary international law, 
but that it has even attained the status of a norm of jus cogens. Doctrine confirming this is 
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primarily based on ExCom Conclusions.851  In Conclusion No. 25 of 1982, ExCom observed 
that the principle of non-refoulement was progressively acquiring the character of a 
peremptory rule of international law.852 By the late 1980s, ExCom concluded that all States 
are bound to refrain from refoulement on the basis that such acts are contrary to fundamental 
prohibitions against these practices.853 In 1996, ExCom concluded that non-refoulement 
determined that the principle of non-refoulement is not subject to derogation.854 Next to the 
ExCom Conclusions, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees – on the international 
protection of refugees in Latin America – stipulates that the prohibition of non-refoulement “is 
imperative in regard to refugees and in the present state of international law should be acknowledged 
and observed as a rule of jus cogens.”855 The acceptance by Latin American States of the norm of 
non-refoulement as jus cogens is regarded to be manifest in intergovernmental bodies like the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Organization of American States 
General Assembly, which have acknowledged the conclusions of the Cartagena colloquium 
with approval.856 Although it would undoubtedly be of beneficial effect to the overall 
international protection of refugees, the existence of a peremptory norm of non-refoulement 
cannot be considered realistic.857 ExCom Conclusions are not sufficient by themselves to 
generate customary norms. There has to be evidence of additional State practice which is 
consistent with those Conclusions. As a result, the state of the art is not yet permitted to 
affirm the peremptory nature of the principle of non-refoulement. 
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The substantive content of the customary international law obligation is generally 
thought to more or less mirror the CAT and ICCPR non-refoulement obligations in relation to 
all persons and – with regard to refugees specifically – additionally to mirror the Refugee 
Convention obligation.858 But is the extraterritorial character of non-refoulement also part of 
the customary obligation? Some authors state that the non-refoulement obligation in 
customary international law is engaged upon an asylum seeker coming within the effective 
control of an agent of that State, wherever in the world this occurs.859 Nevertheless, many 
States are not prepared to concede that this position is correct.860 For example, during the 
Caribbean Interdiction Program, the preliminary screening of Haitian asylum claims by the 
United States on the high seas was suspended by Executive Order 12.807, also known as the 
Kennebunkport Order.861 Fleeing persecution and/or poverty, Haitian asylum seekers began 
arriving in the United States by boat in 1963. Numbers started becoming significant in the 
1970s and surged dramatically in 1980 and 1981. In response to this influx, President Ronald 
Reagan entered into an agreement with the Haitian government. The agreement authorized 
the United States to board Haitian vessels on the high seas and question the passengers.862 
When a violation of either US or Haitian law occurred, the US could return the boat to Haiti. 
Nevertheless, anyone found to be a refugee would not be returned to Haiti.863 However, as 
reception facilities were felt to be at full capacity, the government changed course in 1992.864 
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Executive Order 12.807 asserted that the Refugee Convention non-refoulement principle did 
not apply outside US territory, stating: “The international legal obligations of the United States 
under the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees […] to apply Article 33 of the 
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees do not extend to persons located 
outside the territory of the United States.”865 
 
However, the ICJ noted in the Nicaragua Case: “The Court does not consider that, for a rule to 
be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity 
with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that 
the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State 
conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not 
as indications of the recognition of a new rule.”866 The aforementioned decisions of the 
Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee already constituted this kind 
of evidence. Moreover, since the Hirsi Case there is also a court decision dealing with this 
issue. Therefore, this case plays a crucial role towards the possible future recognition of the 
extraterritorial application of the non-refoulement principle as international customary law. 
 
5.4. The concept of effective control and the ECtHR 
 
5.4.1. Effective control and extraterritorial jurisdiction 
 
The scope of application of the ECHR is governed by Article 1 ECHR, under which the 
States Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in the Convention. In the Bankovic Case (2001), the ECtHR ruled that jurisdiction in 
international law is generally framed territorially.867 The application in this case was brought 
by six people living in Belgrade (Serbia) against 17 NATO member States which were also 
State Parties to the ECHR. The applicants complained about the NATO bombing, as part of 
its campaign of air strikes during the Kosovo conflict, of the Serbian Radio-Television 
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headquarters in Belgrade which caused damage to the building and several deaths. The 
ECtHR stressed that, while international law does not exclude a State’s exercise of 
jurisdiction extraterritorially, jurisdiction was – as a general rule – defined and limited by the 
sovereign territorial rights of the other relevant States. The Court found that other bases of 
jurisdiction are exceptional. As the ECHR is a multilateral treaty operating in an essentially 
regional context and notably in the legal space of the Contracting States and as – at that time 
– the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia clearly did not fall within that legal space, the ECtHR 
was not persuaded that there was any jurisdictional link between the victims and the 
respondent States. Therefore, it declared the application inadmissible.868 Although the 
ECtHR conclusion in this case has attracted a lot of criticism, the premise set out here is in 
line with general international law. 
 
Nevertheless, extraterritoriality does not prevent human rights obligations from being 
engaged in particular circumstances.869 The ECtHR considers the exercise of ‘effective 
control’ over the territory (for example the Loizidou Case870) or over the persons concerned 
(for example Issa Case871) to be the crucial element giving rise to state responsibility. In the 
case of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom (2009), for example, the ECtHR decided that 
the UK authorities had had total and exclusive control over the detention facilities in which 
the applicants were held, first through the exercise of military force and then by law. The 
ECtHR found that the applicants had been within the UK’s jurisdiction and had remained so 
until their physical transfer to the custody of the Iraqi authorities. 872 
 
MILLER states that existing categories of extraterritorial jurisdiction must be understood 
as limited exceptions to the rule of territorial jurisdiction because they all require some 
significant connection between a signatory State’s physical territory and the individual 
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whose rights are implicated.873 However, the ways in which the ECtHR has interpreted 
extraterritorial jurisdiction bear little resemblance to the terms’ meaning in public 
international law. The word ‘jurisdiction’ is meant to denote solely a sort of factual power 
that a State exercises over persons or territory. However, it cannot be regarded as being a 
legal competence, nor as the notion of jurisdiction in general international law which 
delimits the municipal legal orders of States.874 Therefore, exercising ‘effective control’ over a 
territory or over a person does not mean that the State is necessarily exercising its 
‘jurisdiction’ – as general international law speaks of the term – over the territory or 
persons.875 In the human rights context, the question of jurisdiction is about whether in a 
specific instance a particular State is bound to respect relevant human rights obligations, 
rather than whether the State’s claim to exercise authority or some legal competence is 
lawful.876 
 
5.4.2. Effective control and State responsibility 
 
It is also necessary to distinguish the notion of State jurisdiction in human rights treaties 
from that of State responsibility, attribution or imputability in particular. As MILANOVIC 
points out,877 ‘effective control’ is a homonym as there is (1) the effective control test for the 
purposes of attribution, as developed by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case,878 (2) effective control 
of an area as sometimes used in humanitarian law to describe the threshold of the beginning 
of a belligerent occupation of a territory,879 (3) effective (overall) control of an area as a test 
developed by the ECtHR for the purpose of determining a State’s jurisdiction over territory 
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or persons, and (4) effective control as used in international criminal law to describe the 
relationship a superior has to have over a subordinate so his command responsibility could 
be engaged.880 
 
The purpose of the doctrine of jurisdiction in general international law is to establish 
whether a claim by a State to regulate some conduct is lawful or unlawful.881 However, when 
it comes to the notion of ‘jurisdiction’ in various human rights treaties, the notion of 
jurisdiction refers to a power which a State exercises over a territory and its inhabitants. The 
scope of human rights obligations of States depend on the degree of control and authority 
they exercise.882 The ‘control entails responsibility’ approach elides the distinction between 
jurisdiction and responsibility the ECtHR has made. As the ECtHR stated in the Loizidou 
Case: “The Court would emphasise that it is not called upon at the preliminary objections stage of its 
procedure to examine whether Turkey is actually responsible under the Convention for the acts which 
form the basis of the applicant's complaints. Nor is it called upon to establish the principles that 
govern State responsibility under the Convention in a situation like that obtaining in the northern 
part of Cyprus. Such questions belong rather to the merits phase of the Court's procedure. The Court's 
enquiry is limited to determining whether the matters complained of by the applicant are capable of 
falling within the “jurisdiction” of Turkey even though they occur outside her national territory.”883  
 
Jurisdiction under the ECHR is a procedural hurdle intended to delineate the scope of 
the ECHR. If the ECHR had been intended to look only to State responsibility, it could have 
omitted the words ‘within their jurisdiction’ from Article 1 ECHR. Although signatory States 
are clearly responsible under international law for acts outside the espace juridique of the 
ECHR in violation of international human rights law, the ECtHR is not necessarily obliged to 
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seize jurisdiction over all such violations.884 Next to this, it is not desirable to uphold the 
‘control entails responsibility’ approach from a policy perspective. As this approach sets the 
threshold for jurisdiction at such a low level, it would – in practice – transform the current 
character of the ECHR system. As millions of individuals around the world would have the 
ability to mount a challenge to such practices in the forum of the ECtHR, this would be 
unworkable.885 
 
5.4.3. Effective control and legal fictions 
 
Positively establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction has been motivated by a desire to 
avoid double standards or – as was stated by the ECtHR in the Cyprus v. Turkey Case (2001) – 
a regrettable vacuum in human rights protection.886 This case related to the situation that has 
existed in northern Cyprus since the conduct of military operations there by Turkey in July 
and August 1974 and the continuing division of the territory of Cyprus. Cyprus, on the one 
hand, contended that – despite the proclamation of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus’ (TRNC) in November 1983 – the TRNC was an illegal entity under international law. 
Therefore Turkey was the accountable State for a broad range of ECHR violations there. 
Turkey, on the other hand, argued that the TRNC was politically independent from Turkey. 
Consequently, Turkey could not be held responsible for its acts. However, the ECtHR 
stressed that Turkey’s responsibility under the ECHR could not be confined to the acts of its 
own soldiers and officials operating in northern Cyprus, but was also engaged by virtue of 
the acts of the local administration (the TRNC), which survived by virtue of Turkish military 
and other support. As a result, Turkey had jurisdiction under the ECHR. 
 
A number of States have claimed that certain international areas or transit zones in ports 
or airports do not legally form part of their national territory. For example, in the case of 
Amuur v. France, France held before the ECtHR that the international zone at Paris-Orly 
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airport was different from French territory.887 Within this international zone, no interpreters, 
legal assistance or private assistance was allowed to asylum-seekers. The legal status of the 
international zone was considered as different from that of French territory. As a result, the 
‘French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons’ (OFPRA) was not legally 
obliged to examine the request as they would have been if the request had been made by 
someone already on French territory. Therefore, OFPRA denied the applicants access to the 
asylum procedure on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction. The ECtHR, however, 
confirmed that despite its name, the international zone did not have extraterritorial status 
and that the ECHR did apply in this case.888  
 
Also Australia has a somewhat original way of dealing with the problem of asylum-
seekers. This country created ‘territorial excision’ of more than 3.500 of its islands. The 
Australian 2001 Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act defines certain 
places as ‘excised offshore places’. The effect of this excision legislation is that non-citizens 
who have first entered Australia at an excised offshore place without lawful authority – 
namely without a valid visa that is in effect – are barred from making valid visa applications 
on arrival or during their stay in Australia. These non-citizens may be detained and removed 
from Australia.889 HRW has criticized this practice of excluding parts of Australian territory 
from the Australian migration zone as asylum seekers processed in excised places such as 
Christmas Island do not enjoy the same legal rights as those processed on mainland 
Australia. According to HRW, all asylum seekers under Australian jurisdiction should be 
able to file a claim for asylum and have full access to legal assistance, an independent appeal 
process, work permits and community support.890 However, Australia claims to meet its 
international obligations through the protection assessment process which includes a 
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primary assessment against protection obligations under the Refugee Convention and 
complementary protection obligations.891 
 
We can conclude that situations of extraterritoriality do not arise despite legal fictions in 
national legislation. A State must be assumed to exercise jurisdiction within its entire 
territory, unless this assumption can specifically be rebutted. However, we must bear in 
mind that the applicability of refugee law or human rights law does not preclude States from 
installing special border procedures under national law, as long as they are consistent with 
international obligations.892 
 
5.4.4. Effective control and extraterritorial migration control 
 
But when is extraterritorial migration control equivalent to effective control? Merely 
denying onward passage or escorting vessels back may be insufficient to establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the individuals. Although the establishment of jurisdiction is 
the premise for subjecting States to relevant obligations under international refugee and 
human rights law, not any exercise of migration control will necessarily entail an exercise of 
jurisdiction.893 First of all, situations such as detention or arrest constitute an exercise of 
control over persons on board vessels sufficient to trigger human rights responsibility. For 
example, in the Medvedyev Case894, the ECtHR noted that from the date on which the Winner 
was arrested and until it arrived in Brest, the Winner and its crew were under the control of 
French military forces. Although they were outside French territory, they were within the 
jurisdiction of France for the purposes of Article 1 ECtHR. What remained unclear until the 
Hirsi Case is whether situations other than those amounting to detention or arrest constitute 
an exercise of control over persons on board vessels sufficient to trigger human rights 
responsibility. 
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In the Hirsi Case, the ECtHR observed that – although the persons were not arrested or 
detained – there was effective control as the events took place entirely on board ships of the 
Italian armed forces and the crews were composed exclusively of Italian military 
personnel.895 Article 29 LOSC gives a definition of a warship: “For the purposes of this 
Convention, “warship” means a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external 
marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly 
commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list 
or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.” An 
important element in this definition is that a warship is under the direct command of an 
officer duly commissioned by the government of the State. Therefore, SHAW considers a 
warship “a direct arm of the sovereign of the flag State”.896 Also, the Italian Navigation Code 
stipulates: “Italian vessels on the high seas […] are considered to be Italian territory.”897 This 
provision – together with the principle of exclusive flag State jurisdiction – led the Court to 
recognize cases of extraterritorial exercise of the jurisdiction of that State with respect to acts 
carried out on board vessels flying its flag. This is de jure control exercised by the State, 
capable of engaging State responsibility. Moreover, there was also de facto continued and 
uninterrupted control.898 It must, however, be noted that in the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others 
v. Italy the migrants were brought onto an Italian military ship and physically handed over 
to the Libyan authorities. Therefore, whether this effective control is also present when a 
vessel’s course is diverted is not clear. This point will be discussed in detail in Chapter III of 
this dissertation. 
 
5.5. Physical return 
 
As mentioned, there is a lot of discussion concerning the exact scope of the non-
refoulement principle in relation to the interdiction of migrants at sea, especially when the 
migrant vessel is forced to change its course. However, in certain situations it does happen 
that migrants at sea are not simply returned to the high seas, but to a certain country, 
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sometimes based upon an agreement with that State. In certain cases, this can be in violation 
of the non-refoulement principle. In 2009, the UNHCR reported that Frontex had admitted that 
‘it may be helping’ the Italian Coast Guard in its policy of interdicting boats of migrants in the 
Mediterranean and sending them back to Libya.899 Libya was considered a ‘safe’ place, since 
it was only a country of transit for most asylum seekers. The practice of return to Libya has 
long been controversial since Libya has not signed the Refugee Convention and it does not 
have a sufficient asylum system. Before 2011, return to Libya could therefore be seen as a 
form of indirect refoulement for asylum seekers coming from Sub-Saharan Africa, since Libya 
would send them back to their country of origin without an adequate asylum procedure. 
 
As a response to the large numbers of persons seeking to cross the Mediterranean to 
reach Europe, extraterritorial processing is on the agenda. Extraterritorial processing 
involves the interception of migrants at sea and their removal to a ‘safe third country’ (STC) 
for processing.900 Although some authors consider the STC concept an attack on the 
fundamental principle of asylum,901 States are not obliged to process asylum applications or 
to grant asylum. Therefore, States may choose to remove individuals to third countries 
without considering their protection claims, provided that the principle of non-refoulement is 
being respected. As the STC has managed to ground itself so firmly in the discourse of 
governments, academics and even NGOs, the debate does not address the lawfulness of the 
practice itself, but rather focuses on the specific requirements that are to be met for a State to 
be considered a safe third country.902 The right of States to remove refugees is conditional on 
a determination that ‘effective protection’ is in fact available in the destination country. 
Although the UNHCR and others has used the term ‘effective protection’ frequently, no 
comprehensive definition has been advanced.903 Many of the third countries to which asylum 
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seekers are returned under safe third country provisions are assumed to be safe because they 
are not likely to persecute the particular applicants and do not consciously refoule people to 
their persecutors (indirect refoulement). When an inadequate refugee status determination 
procedure prevents an actual refugee from establishing his or her status, this can also result 
in refoulement.904 Therefore, third countries should have sufficiently developed asylum 
procedures in order to be regarded as ‘safe’. This means that – in order to avoid (indirect) 
refoulement – States willing to deport or return individuals to a third country, should base 
their action on a careful assessment. 905 
 
Could countries that are not a Party to the Refugee Convention or the Protocol be 
regarded as a STC? In these non-party States, UNHCR has less access to refugees, less 
opportunity to supervise and less capacity to verify and promote the safety of those refugees 
who are returned there. Therefore, UNHCR raises a strong objection against the designation 
of a non-party State as a STC.906 HATHAWAY submits STC determinations are not restricted to 
States parties to the Refugee Convention or Protocol. A country can be deemed a STC if it 
will respect in practice whatever Convention rights the refugee has already acquired by 
virtue of having come under the jurisdiction or entered the territory of a State party to the 
Refugee Convention. Moreover, there has to be a judicial or comparable mechanism in place 
to enable the refugee to insist upon real accountability by the host state to implement those 
rights. 907 Although the non-refoulement principle is traditionally of a negative character, 
States will thus be under a positive obligation to make an assessment that – primarily – 
concerns the receiving country’s ratification of international refugee law instruments as well 
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the Hirsi Case”, 18 Journal of  International Maritime Law 59 (2012), 67 and 73. 
906 UNHCR, “UNHCR’s Observations on the European Commission’s Proposal for a Council Directive on 
Minimum Standards on Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status” (July 2001), para. 35, 
available online: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,LEGAL,,COMMENTARY,,3c0e3f374,0.html>. 
907 HATHAWAY, James C., The Rights of Refugees Under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 332-333. 
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as the formal adoption of domestic legislation on asylum, including assistance to migrants 
upon their arrival.908  
 
In the MSS Case – on the return of an Afghan national from Belgium to Greece based on 
the Dublin II Regulation909 – the ECtHR found Belgium to be in violation of the prohibition of 
refoulement for having not verified the practical application by the Greek authorities of their 
legislation on asylum. Belgium knew or should have known that the applicant’s asylum 
claim would not have been seriously examined by the Greek authorities. 910 Moreover, in 
order to comply with the non-refoulement principle, it is not sufficient for the removing 
country to rely on diplomatic assurances offered by the receiving country, when such 
assurances only concern the legislation in force without containing any relevant information 
about the situation in practice.911 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) also upheld this 
reasoning in two cases of 2011. The ECJ concluded that States may not transfer an asylum 
seeker to a country where systematic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the 
reception conditions of asylum seekers amount to a real risk for the asylum seeker of being 
subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment.912 Although Belgium, Italy and Poland upheld 
that they lacked the ability to assess in practical terms both the other States’ compliance with 
fundamental rights and the risks to which asylum seekers would be exposed, the ECJ 
information such as UNHCR’s reports makes this entirely possible.913 In the aforementioned 
Hirsi Case, the ECtHR reiterated the importance of reliable and independent information, 
stating that “[T]he numerous reports by international bodies and nongovernmental organisations 
paint a disturbing picture of the treatment meted out to clandestine immigrants in Libya at the 
material time.”914 
                                                 
908 TONDINI, Matteo, “The Legality of Intercepting Boat People under Search and Rescue and Border Control 
Operations with Reference to Recent Italian Interventions in the Mediterranean Sea and the ECtHR Decision in 
the Hirsi Case”, 18 Journal of  International Maritime Law 59 (2012), 67 and 73. 
909 Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national, OJ L 50 of 25 February 2003. 
910 ECtHR, MSS v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011, Appl. No. 30696/09 (2012), para. 358. 
911 ECtHR, MSS v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011, Appl. No. 30696/09 (2012), para. 354. 
912 ECJ, NS v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 21 December 2011, Case C-411/10 (2011) and ECJ, 
ME et al v. Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 21 
December 2011, Case C-493/10 (2011), para. 106. 
913 ECJ, NS v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 21 December 2011, Case C-411/10 (2011) and ECJ, 
ME et al v. refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 21 
December 2011, Case C-493/10 (2011), para. 91. 
914 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09 (2012), 123. 
 207
 
Also the High Court of Australia dealt with the STC issue in 2011. The Court decided 
that the deportation of two Afghan asylum seekers from Christmas Island to Malaysia 
violated the non-refoulement principle. The deportation was based upon a bilateral agreement 
between the two States stating that asylum claims – from people that had irregularly traveled 
to Australia by sea and had been intercepted – would be dealt with directly in Malaysia.915 
Although the Court did not conclude that such an agreement was unlawful per se, it said that 
– in order to comply with the non-refoulement principle – three conditions have to be met. The 
receiving State must be legally bound by international law or its own domestic law to 
provide asylum seekers: (1) access to ‘effective procedures’ for assessing their claim for 
protection, (2) protection pending determination of their refugee status, and (3) protection in 
case – after the acknowledgement of their refugee status – they decide to return to their 
country of origin or resettle in another country.916 According to the Court, Malaysia did not 
fulfil these conditions.917 
 
However, effective protection is not the only relevant factor to determine whether return 
to a third country is permissible. Also issues concerning the necessary links between the 
applicant and the third country require discussion. UNHCR has already expressed its 
concerns about the absence of attention to the applicant’s ties. Mere presence in a territory is 
often the result of fortuitous circumstances. Therefore it does not necessarily imply the 
existence of any meaningful link or connection.918 Additionally, there should be respect for 
human rights and human needs. One specific and highly controversial issue is detention of 
asylum-seekers. Although UNHCR has laid out careful and detailed standards on 
detention,919 many countries – including prominent third countries – do not meet them. 
                                                 
915 Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Malaysia on Transfer and 
Resettlement (adopted 25 July 2011), available online: <http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/media-
releases/_pdf/20110725-arrangement-malaysia-aust.pdf>. 
916 High Court of Australia, Plaintiff M70/2011 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, 31 August 2011, 
(2011) HCA 32, paras. 125-126 and 243. 
917 High Court of Australia, Plaintiff M70/2011 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, 31 August 2011, 
(2011) HCA 32, para. 135. 
918 UNHCR, “UNHCR’s Observations on the European Commission’s Proposal for a Council Directive on 
Minimum Standards on Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status” (July 2001), para. 37, 
available online: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,LEGAL,,COMMENTARY,,3c0e3f374,0.html>. 
919 UNHCR, “Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum 
Seekers” (February 1999), available online: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3c2b3f844.pdf>; ExCom, 
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Detention practices have been questionable throughout large regions of the world. Also 
other human rights and human needs are not always fully observed. STC provisions seldom 
take housing and other basic subsistence needs into account.920 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
The non-refoulement principle in Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention states that: “No 
Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” Non-refoulement is not 
limited to those formally recognized as refugees. Therefore, the prohibition on States is 
applicable to recognized refugees as well as for all asylum-seekers. There appears to be little 
reason to doubt the applicability of non-refoulement in the territorial sea.921 The duty of non-
refoulement not only encompasses non-return at the frontier, but also non-rejection at the 
frontier, only when the latter poses an actual threat.922 
 
The most debated point of discussion, is the question whether the non-refoulement 
principle is applicable extraterritorially during interdictions on the high seas. Concerning 
non-refoulement obligations under international and European human rights law, the decisive 
criterion is not whether such persons are on the State’s territory, but rather, whether they 
come within the effective control and authority of that State.923 As international refugee law 
and international human rights law are complementary and mutually reinforcing legal 
regimes, this view has also an impact in refugee law.924The principle of non-refoulement is 
considered to have the status of customary international law. Moreover, the Hirsi Case plays 
                                                                                                                                                        
“Detention of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers”, Conclusion No. 44 (XXXVII) (1986), available online: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae68c43c0.html>. 
920 See: LEGOMSKY, Stephan H., “Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third 
Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection”, 15 International Journal of Refugee Law 567 (2003). 
921 BARNES, Richard A., “Refugee Law at Sea”, 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 47 (2004), 69. 
922 HATHAWAY, James C., The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 301. 
923 UNHCR, “Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol” (26 January 2007), para. 43, 
available online: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45f17a1a4.html>. 
924 ExCom, “General Conclusion on International Protection”, Conclusion No. 95 (LIV) (2003), para. l, available 
online: <http://www.unhcr.org/41b041534.html>. 
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a crucial role towards the possible future recognition of the extraterritorial application of the 
non-refoulement principle as international customary law. 
 
Situations of extraterritoriality do not arise despite legal fictions in national legislation. 
Australia for example created a ‘territorial excision’ of more than 3.500 of its islands. 
Although the applicability of refugee law or human rights law does not preclude States from 
installing special border procedures under national law, they have to be consistent with 
international obligations.925 
 
In certain situations it does happen that migrants at sea are not simply returned to the 
high seas, but to a certain country, sometimes based upon an agreement with that State. The 
removal of asylum-seekers to STCs for processing is considered to be lawful. The debate 
rather focuses on the specific requirements that are to be met for a State to be considered a 
STC. Effective protection is the most relevant factor to determine whether return to a third 
country is permissible. However, also necessary links between the applicant and the STC as 
well as detention conditions require attention.  
                                                 
925 GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, Thomas, Access to Asylum – International Refugee Law and the Globalisation of 
Migration Control (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 119. 
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6. Regional initiatives 
 
6.1. Migration by sea in the Mediterranean 
 
6.1.1. Migration towards Europe – The creation of Frontex 
 
Europe has to protect as much as 42,672 km of external sea borders.926 In 2010 almost 
10,000 irregular arrivals by sea were reported in Greece, Spain, Italy and Malta. In 2011, this 
number amounted to nearly 70,000, due to the uprisings in Tunisia and Libya.927 The creation 
of Frontex – the European agency for the management of operational cooperation between 
the Member States at the external borders of the European Union – was an important step 
towards promoting solidarity between the Member States in the field of effective control and 
surveillance of external borders.928  
 
Frontex was set up in 2004 by EU Council Regulation No. 2007/2004 (the Frontex 
Regulation).929 The Frontex Regulation was later amended by Regulation 863/2007, which 
established a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT)930 and 
by Regulation (EU) No. 1168/2011.931 Frontex has a mandate that includes the coordination of 
the operational cooperation between Member States, assisting Member States on the training 
of border guards, carry out risk analyses, facilitating the attainment of research and 
development, providing a rapid crisis-response capability available to all Member States and 
                                                 
926 Frontex, “Origin”, available online: <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/origin_and_tasks/origin/>. 
927 UNHCR, “Key Facts & Figures”, available online: <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a1d406060.html>. 
928 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border of the Member States of the European Union, 
OJ L 349/1 of 25 November 2004, Preamble, para. 5. 
929 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border of the Member States of the European Union, 
OJ L 349/1 of 25 November 2004. 
930 Regulation (EC) No. 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a 
mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 
2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers of guest officers, OJ L 199 of 31 July 
2007. 
931 Regulation (EU) No. 1168/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 304/1 of 22 November 
2011. 
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assisting Member States in joint return operations.932 Frontex is a community body with a 
legal personality933 as well as operational and budgetary autonomy.934 Although Frontex is a 
specialized and independent body, the responsibility for the control and surveillance of 
external borders lies with the Member States.935 Under a new mandate approved by the 
European Parliament in September 2011,936 Frontex will be able to acquire its own assets, 
such as helicopters, to monitor the borders of the European Union. Frontex will also appoint 
human rights officers to monitor whether human rights are respected at border checks. 
Further, a Consultative Forum on fundamental rights – open to the EU Fundamental Rights 
and Asylum Support agencies, the UNHCR and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – 
will be established to assist the agency's management board.937 
 
Frontex coordinates joint surveillance operations at sea between Member States with the 
aim of strengthening external sea border security. First, an operational plan is formulated on 
the basis of a risk analysis. Participating States are fully involved. The project is then 
financed, funded and managed by Frontex, though it is always led by a Member State or a 
Schengen-associated country hosting the operation. According to Frontex, its most successful 
joint operation at sea to date was Operation Hera, which targeted the passage of irregular 
migrants and the criminal organizations that transported them from West Africa to the 
Canary Islands. By stemming the flow of people through this highly dangerous route, 
                                                 
932 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border of the Member States of the European Union, 
OJ L 349/1 of 25 November 2004, Art. 2(1). 
933 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border of the Member States of the European Union, 
OJ L 349/1 of 25 November 2004, Art. 15. 
934 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border of the Member States of the European Union, 
OJ L 349/1 of 25 November 2004, Chapter IV. 
935 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border of the Member States of the European Union, 
OJ L 349/1 of 25 November 2004, Preamble, para. 4. 
936 European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 September 2011 on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 establishing a 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States 
of the European Union (Frontex), COD (2010) 0039. 
937 Regulation (EU) No. 1168/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 304/1 of 22 November 
2011, Art. 26a. 
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Frontex stated that hundreds if not thousands of lives were saved.938 Not only was this route 
perilous. The UNHCR stated that more than 1,500 people drowned or went missing trying to 
cross the Mediterranean in 2011.939 
 
However, the primary goal of Frontex is not saving the lives of migrants at sea. After 
9/11, States began to consider migrants as a possible threat to their security.940 Article 12(1) of 
the Schengen Borders Code, the Community Code on the rules governing the movement of 
persons across borders, stipulates that the main purpose of border surveillance is to prevent 
unauthorized border crossings, to counter cross-border criminality and to take measures 
against persons who have crossed the border illegally.941 Measures taken in the course of a 
surveillance operation against vessels, with regard to which there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that they carry persons intending to circumvent the checks at border crossing 
points, may include, inter alia: (1) approaching the vessel; (2) a request for information; (3) 
stopping, boarding and searching the ship; (4) seizing the ship and apprehending persons on 
board; and (5) ordering the ship to modify its course outside of or towards a destination 
other than the territorial waters or contiguous zone or escorting the vessel or steaming 
nearby until the ship is heading on such course.942 
 
6.1.2. Interception by Frontex – Conformity with the law of the sea 
 
In the course of a surveillance operation, Frontex is authorized to take interception 
measures when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a vessel carries persons 
                                                 
938 Frontex, “Tasks”, available online: <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/origin_and_tasks/tasks/>. 
939 UNHCR, “More than 1,500 drown or go missing trying to cross the Mediterranean in 2011” (31 January 
2012), available online: <http://www.unhcr.org/4f2803949.html>. 
940 See: Migration Policy Institute (MPI), “Report on The New ‘Boat People’: Ensuring Safety and Determining 
Status” (January 2006), 19-21, available online: 
<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Boat_People_Report.pdf>; ExCom, “Proposals for an Executive 
Committee Conclusion on Rescue at Sea” (10 January 2007), para. 4, 
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FICHTER, Thomas & FLEMING, Christian, “Challenges to Maritime Interception Operations in the War on Terror: 
Bridging the Gap”, 22 American University International Law Review 583 (2007), 583-672.  
941 Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing 
a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), 
OJ L 105/1 of 13 April 2006. 
942 Council Decision (EU) No. 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, OJ L 111/20 of 4 
May 2010, Annex Part I: “Rules for sea border operations coordinated by the Agency”, para. 2.4. 
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intending to circumvent the checks at border crossing points.943 EU Council Decision 
2010/252 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards the surveillance of the sea 
external borders uses the notion of ‘interception’ in a broad sense, for example, by also 
including the communication of information about the vessel.944 These measures may 
include: 
 
(a) requesting information and documentation on ownership, registration 
and elements relating to the voyage, and on the identity, nationality and other 
relevant data on persons on board;   
(b) stopping, boarding and searching the ship, its cargo and persons on 
board, and questioning persons on board; 
(c) making persons on board aware that they are not authorized to cross the 
border and that persons directing the craft may face penalties for facilitating the 
voyage; 
(d) seizing the ship and apprehending persons on board; 
(e) ordering the ship to modify its course outside of or towards a destination 
other than the territorial waters or contiguous zone or escorting the vessel or 
steaming nearby until the ship is heading on such course; 
(f) conducting the ship or persons on board to a third country or otherwise 
handing over the ship or persons on board to the authorities of a third country 
(g) conducting the ship or persons on board to the host Member State or to 
another Member State participating in the operation.945 
 
                                                 
943 Council Decision (EU) No. 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, OJ L 111/20 of 4 
May 2010, Annex Part I: “Rules for sea border operations coordinated by the Agency”, para. 2.4. 
944 Council Decision (EU) No. 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, OJ L 111/20 of 4 
May 2010, Annex Part I: “Rules for sea border operations coordinated by the Agency”, paras. 2.1-2.4. 
945 Council Decision (EU) No. 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, OJ L 111/20 of 4 
May 2010, Annex Part I: “Rules for sea border operations coordinated by the Agency”, para. 2.4. 
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Frontex’ actions on the high seas can vary from exercising a right of approach, the 
customary right of every warship or other duly authorized vessels of any State to approach a 
vessel on the high seas in order to ascertain its identity and nationality, usually by requesting 
it to show its flag, to interdiction. As already noted, approaching a vessel and requesting 
information does not constitute an interference with the exercise of rights of navigation, as 
inclusive interests are not impinged or threatened. The stopping, boarding and searching of a 
ship and seizing the ship and apprehending persons on board have to fulfil the conditions 
set out in the third part of this chapter. However, the question remains whether ordering a 
ship to modify its course or steaming nearby until the ship is heading on such course 
constitutes an interference with the right of navigation and, if this is indeed the case, whether 
the interference is justified. According to PAPASTAVRIDIS, a diversion of boats to a certain 
destination is not only the exercise of the right of approach, but it is indisputably a form of 
actual physical interference to the vessel. Therefore it must fulfil the conditions of the right of 
visit to be regarded as lawful.946 
 
Are the Frontex measures in conformity with international law? The 2009 Frontex 
General Report recognized that the contrasting interpretations of the law of the sea rules by 
Member States, especially in the definition of the operational area, was a big problem.947 As a 
result, at the end of 2009, the European Commission proposed Guidelines, supplementing 
the Schengen Borders Code, for Frontex operations at sea. 948 The aim of the proposal was to 
ensure that the international rules relevant to the maritime border surveillance operations 
carried out under the operational cooperation coordinated by Frontex are uniformly applied 
by all the Member States taking part in the operations.949 The Commission proposal was 
                                                 
946 PAPASTAVRIDIS, Efthymios, “Interception of Human Beings on the High Seas: A Contemporary Analysis 
under International Law”, 36 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 145 (2009), 155. 
947 Frontex, “General Report (2009)”, 43-44, available online: 
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948  European Commission Proposal for a Council Decision of 27 November 2007 supplementing the Schengen 
Borders Code as regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation 
coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, 
COM (2009) 658 final. 
949 European Commission Proposal for a Council Decision of 27 November 2007 supplementing the Schengen 
Borders Code as regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation 
coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, 
COM (2009) 658 final, Explanatory Memorandum, para. 2. 
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accepted by the Council of the European Union in Council Decision 2010/252 of 26 April 
2010.950 
 
The Guidelines specify the conditions under which measures can be taken in the 
different maritime areas, including the high seas. These conditions include the relevant rules 
of international law, thereby contributing to their effective and uniform implementation in 
Frontex operations. The purpose of the measures are to prevent and discourage persons from 
circumventing the checks at border crossing points and to detect unauthorized crossing of 
the external borders.951 However, the Preamble to the Guidelines mentions that all measures 
taken have to be proportionate to the objectives at any time.952  
 
On the high seas, the Guidelines make it clear that the authorization of the flag State is 
always necessary when taking any measures, whether exercising the right of visit or seizure, 
against a migrant vessel.953 Pending or in the absence of authorization of the flag State, the 
ship can be surveyed at a prudent distance. This means that no other measures are to be 
taken, unless a bilateral or multilateral agreement allows for it.954 However, pursuant to 
Guidelines, when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the ship is without 
nationality, or may be assimilated to a ship without nationality, the participating unit may 
                                                 
950 Council Decision (EU) No. 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, OJ L 111/20 of 4 
May 2010. Although the European Court of Justice (ECJ) annulled Council Decision 2010/252, and thus also the 
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accordance with ordinary legislative procedures. See: ECJ, European Parliament v. Council of the European 
Union, 17 April 2012, Opinion of Advocate General MENGOZZI, Case C-355/10 (2012) and ECJ, European 
Parliament v. Council of the European Union, 5 September 2012, Case C-355/10 (2012). 
951 Council Decision (EU) No. 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, OJ L 111/20 of 4 
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952 Council Decision (EU) No. 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, OJ L 111/20 of 4 
May 2010, Preamble, para. 3. 
953 Council Decision (EU) No. 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, OJ L 111/20 of 4 
May 2010, Annex Part I: “Rules for sea border operations coordinated by the Agency”, paras. 2.5.2.1.-2.5.2.4. 
954 Council Decision (EU) No. 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, OJ L 111/20 of 4 
May 2010, Annex Part I: “Rules for sea border operations coordinated by the Agency”, para. 2.5.2.6. 
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proceed to verify the ship’s right to fly its flag. If suspicion remains after the documents have 
been checked, a further examination on board the ship may be carried out. Other measures, 
such as seizure or apprehending persons on board, is only to be carried out when: (1) the 
ship proves to be without nationality; and (2) there are reasonable grounds for suspecting 
that the ship is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea in accordance with the 
Smuggling Protocol.955 The legal basis for this provision can be found in Article 8(7) of the 
Smuggling Protocol which says: “A State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a 
vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea and is without nationality or may be assimilated 
to a vessel without nationality may board and search the vessel. If evidence confirming the suspicion is 
found, that State Party shall take appropriate measures in accordance with relevant domestic and 
international law.” 
 
It has to be noted that the word ‘engaged’ should be understood broadly as including 
vessels involved both directly and indirectly in the smuggling of migrants.956 As it can hardly 
be contested that the smuggling of migrants is an internationally condemned crime, seizure 
and apprehending persons on board will constitute appropriate measures. MALLIA argues 
that in the context of drug smuggling, a similar provision – namely Article 17(2) of the 1988 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (Drugs Convention)957 – has been interpreted as placing a ship without 
nationality in the same category as a ship in respect of which a state exercises jurisdiction by 
virtue of the fact that it sails under its flag. As a result, a State can take the same enforcement 
measures with respect to ships without nationality as it can with respect to ships flying its 
flag.958 
 
                                                 
955 Council Decision (EU) No. 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, OJ L 111/20 of 4 
May 2010, Annex Part I: “Rules for sea border operations coordinated by the Agency”, para. 2.5.2.5. 
956 UNGA, “Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime on the work of its first to eleventh sessions, Interpretative notes for the official records 
(travaux préparatoires) of the negotiation of the Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime”, UN Doc. 
A/55/383.Add.1 (3 November 2000), 18. 
957 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (adopted 20 
December 1988, entered into force 11 November 1990), 95 UNTS 1582 [Drugs Convention]. 
958 MALLIA, Patricia, Migrant Smuggling by Sea: Combating a Current Threat to Maritime Security through the 
Creation of a Cooperative Framework (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 70. 
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According to the Guidelines, interception measures may also include: “conducting the 
ship or persons on board to a third country or otherwise handing over the ship or persons on board to 
the authorities of a third country.”959 Of course, the third country has to consent. For example, 
with regard to the Frontex Operation Hera, during which thousands of migrants were 
diverted to their points of departure at ports at the West African coast, Spain concluded 
agreements with Mauretania and Senegal that allowed the diversions.960 Senegal and 
Mauretania were involved with assets and staff.961 Also, a Mauritanian or Senegalese law 
enforcement officer is always present on board of deployed Member States’ assets and is 
always responsible for the diversion.962 
 
International law does not on its own govern the extraterritorial application of national 
law. A State clearly needs to express its intention to apply a given law extraterritorially or the 
nature of the law itself has to manifest such an intent. Does the Schengen Borders Code 
apply extraterritorially? There are circumstances in which European Community law may 
apply to activities pursued outside the territory of the Community. In the case Boukhalfa v 
Germany (1996), the European Court of Justice stated that: “The geographical application of the 
Treaty is defined in Article 227. That article does not, however, preclude Community rules from 
having effects outside the territory of the Community.”963 Moreover, according to legal doctrine, 
the extraterritorial application of the Schengen Borders is implied in the Schengen Borders 
Code due to the fact that Annex VI, para. 3 of the Code, deals with the specific rules for the 
procedures at sea borders.964 This paragraph stipulates that the Schengen Borders Code, to 
ensure that both crew and passengers fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 5 on the entry 
conditions for third-country nationals, allows for checks to be carried out on ships during 
                                                 
959 Council Decision (EU) No. 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, OJ L 111/20 of 4 
May 2010, Annex Part I: “Rules for sea border operations coordinated by the Agency”, para. 2.4(f). 
960 Frontex, “HERA 2008 and NAUTILUS 2008 Statistics”, Press Release (17 February 2009), available online: 
<http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/news_releases/art40.html>.  
961 Frontex, “Longest FRONTEX coordinated operation – HERA, the Canary Islands” (19 December 2006), 
available online: <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/news_releases/art8.html>. 
962 Frontex, “HERA 2008 and NAUTILUS 2008 Statistics”, Press Release (17 February 2009), available online: 
<http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/news_releases/art40.html>.  
963 ECJ, Boukhalfa v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 30 April 1996, Case C-214/94 (1996), ECR I-02253 (1996), 
para. 14. 
964 BALDACCINI, Anneliese, “Extraterritorial Border Controls in the EU”, in RYAN, Bernard & MITSILEGAS, 
Valsamis (Eds.), Extraterritorial Immigration Control – Legal Challenges (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2010), 245-246. 
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crossings or in the territory of third country, both “in accordance with the agreements 
reached on the matter”.965 
 
It can be concluded that the measures that can be taken by Frontex are legal according to 
the international law of the sea. Nevertheless, some remarks must be made. First, contrary to 
what the term ‘guidelines’ suggests,  the content of the Guidelines are based on obligations 
and constraints in international law. Second, due to a lack of transparency of the Frontex 
operations carried out at sea, it is difficult to know whether the Guidelines are being 
respected or not. Although Frontex identifies open communication as one of the values at the 
foundation of Frontex activities,966 it provides only selective information regarding the joint 
operations conducted at the sea borders. For example, the 2010 Frontex General Report states 
that 6,890 immigrants were apprehended during joint sea operations in 2010 – 73% fewer 
than in 2009 (25,536 migrants),967 but the Report does not mention the procedures that were 
followed to apprehend the persons.  
 
6.1.3. Interception by Frontex – Conformity with the non-refoulement principle 
 
Although the Schengen Borders Code should be applied in accordance with the non-
refoulement principle,968 the principle is not explicitly mentioned in relation to surveillance 
operations on the high seas. Some European Member States are contesting the extraterritorial 
applicability of the principle in international waters.969 However, with respect to surveillance 
operations at sea, EU Council Decision 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 introduces a prohibition on 
refoulement of those in danger of persecution or other forms of inhuman or degrading 
                                                 
965 Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing 
a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), 
OJ L 105/1 of 13 April 2006, Annex VI, Art. 3.1.1. 
966 Frontex, “General Report (2010)”, 17, available online: 
<http://www.frontex.europa.eu/gfx/frontex/files/frontex_general_report_2010.pdf>. 
967 Frontex, “General Report (2010)”, 41, available online: 
<http://www.frontex.europa.eu/gfx/frontex/files/frontex_general_report_2010.pdf>. 
968 Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing 
a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), 
OJ L 105/1 of 13 April 2006, Preamble, para. 20. 
969 European Commission Proposal for a Council Decision of 27 November 2007 supplementing the Schengen 
Borders Code as regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation 
coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, 
COM (2009) 658 final, Explanatory Memorandum, para. 2. 
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treatment.970  This prohibition applies regardless of the status of the waters the people are 
in.971 This means that, during Frontex operations, the non-refoulement principle is to be 
respected, even on the high seas. In addition, Article 19(2) of the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights also contains the non-refoulement principle: “No one may be removed, 
expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the 
death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”972 The Charter 
applies to EU Member States when implementing EU law.973 
 
According to the European Commission, an amendment of the Frontex Regulation was 
necessary in order to ensure a well-defined and correct functioning of Frontex in the coming 
years. 974 Therefore, the Frontex Regulation was adapted in the light of the evaluations 
carried out and practical experiences. The mandate of Frontex was clarified in Regulation 
(EU) No. 1168/2011.975 As already noted, Frontex will appoint a human rights officer to 
monitor whether human rights are respected at border checks and a Consultative Forum on 
fundamental rights.976 
 
                                                 
970 Council Decision (EU) No. 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, OJ L 111/20 of 4 
May 2010, Preamble, para. 10. 
971 European Commission Proposal for a Council Decision of 27 November 2007 supplementing the Schengen 
Borders Code as regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation 
coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, 
COM (2009) 658 final, Explanatory Memorandum, para. 2. 
972 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (adopted 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg 
on 12 December 2007), OJ C 364/1 of 18 December 2000.  
973 See also: European Parliament, “Study on Implementation of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Impact 
on EU Home Affairs Agencies: Frontex, Europol and the European Asylum Support Office” (2011), available 
online: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/LIBE/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=4834
9>. 
974 European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Border of the Member States of the European Union, COM (2010) 61 final. 
975 Regulation (EU) No. 1168/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 304/1 of 22 November 
2011. 
976 Regulation (EU) No. 1168/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 304/1 of 22 November 
2011, Art. 26(a). 
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The NGO’s ECRE977 and Amnesty International both welcomed the new Regulation 
which confirms that Frontex’ activities are to be carried out in accordance with relevant EU 
law, international law and obligations related to access to international protection and 
fundamental rights.978 However, these groups are concerned that, while the competence of 
Frontex is being expanded, the framework for accountability remains weak. They 
recommend that Frontex be subjected to full accountability, through an enhanced oversight 
of the Agency by the European Parliament. Independent monitoring is also seen as necessary 
to ensure that fundamental rights are respected within the context of border control 
operations.979 
 
Following the 2011 incidents with migrants at sea in the Mediterranean due to the 
situation in Tunisia and Libya, PACE adopted a Resolution on the interception and rescue at 
sea of asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants, stating that it was concerned about 
the lack of clarity regarding the respective responsibilities of European Union States as well 
as Frontex.980 The absence of adequate guarantees for the respect of fundamental rights and 
international standards in the framework of joint operations coordinated by Frontex was 
considered to be problematic. PACE would like the European Parliament to be entrusted 
with the democratic supervision of the activities of Frontex. 
 
6.1.4. Public and legal accountability of Frontex 
 
The responsibility for the control and surveillance of external borders lies with the 
Member States.981 The actions of European Member States are subject to review by the 
                                                 
977 See the website of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), <http://www.ecre.org/>. 
978 ECRE and Amnesty International, “Joint Briefing on the Commission proposal to amend the Frontex 
Regulation” (21 September 2010), 5, available online: 
<http://www.ecre.org/files/ECRE_Amnesty_Briefing_Frontex_proposal_September_2010.pdf>. 
979 ECRE and Amnesty International, “Joint Briefing on the Commission proposal to amend the Frontex 
Regulation” (21 September 2010), 4, available online: 
<http://www.ecre.org/files/ECRE_Amnesty_Briefing_Frontex_proposal_September_2010.pdf>. 
980 PACE, Resolution 1821 (2011), “The interception and rescue at sea of asylum seekers, refugees and irregular 
migrants”, para. 10, available online: 
<http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta11/ERES1821.htm#P16_137>. 
981 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border of the Member States of the European Union, 
OJ L 349/1 of 25 November 2004, Preamble, para. 4. 
 221
European Court of Justice for actions at their borders in application of Community law982 and 
they are answerable to the European Court of Human Rights for the actions of their 
authorities which engage fundamental rights protected by the European Human Rights 
Convention, as for example happened in the Hirsi Case.983 The Director is accountable to the 
Management Board, which is composed of Member State officials. Public accountability is 
limited to the adoption by the Management Board of an annual report which has to be 
submitted to the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament.984 Although the 
latter has control over the budget, the Parliament can do little in terms of ensuring that 
Frontex is held accountable for the manner in which it fulfils its mandate. Nevertheless, the 
Parliament has informal ways of supervising the work of Frontex, in particular by 
summoning the Executive Director to report and answer questions. Nevertheless, this is no 
formal legal obligation.985 For example, in 2007, the European Parliament Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE Committee) organized a public hearing on 
‘Tragedies of Migrants at Sea’. The Chairman of the LIBE Committee requested the 
participation of a representative of Frontex. However, the inability of any of the three senior 
officials of Frontex to attend that hearing caused a degree of friction.986 
 
PACE launched an inquiry into who was responsible for the more than 1,000 migrants 
thought to have perished in the Mediterranean Sea since January 2011 while trying to reach 
European soil from North Africa. The PACE rapporteur, Tineke STRIK, stated that: “There 
have been allegations that migrants and refugees are dying after their appeals for rescue have been 
ignored. Such a grave allegation must be urgently investigated.  I intend to look into the manner in 
which these boats are intercepted – or not – by the different national coastguards, the EU’s border 
agency FRONTEX, or even military vessels. I also intend to speak to witnesses directly involved in 
                                                 
982 Treaty establishing the European Community as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam (adopted 25 March 
1957, entered into force 1 January 1958), OJ C 325/33 of 24 December 2002, Art. 68. 
983  ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09 (2012). 
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985 BALDACCINI, Anneliese, “Extraterritorial Border Controls in the EU”, in RYAN, Bernard & MITSILEGAS, 
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2010), 236-237. 
986 European Union Committee of the House of Lords, “FRONTEX: the EU external borders agency”, 9th 
Report of Session 2007-08 (5 March 2008), para. 85, available online: 
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reported incidents, and put questions to national authorities, the UNHCR, FRONTEX and NATO, 
among others.”987 However, in her report of 29 March 2012, the rapporteur admitted that – 
although she had requested written information from inter alia NATO, Frontex, the European 
Union and the International Maritime Organization, not all of her requests had been 
responded to. This created a lack of information from certain quarters.988 
 
Regarding legal accountability, the Frontex regulations do not establish a process before 
the European Courts for the legal protection against unlawful actions by border control 
guards where they participate in Frontex operations. The responsibility lies with the national 
court of the host Member State.989 The lack of specific jurisdiction concerning Frontex is being 
addressed to some extent by the Lisbon Treaty, where it is provided that the European Court 
of Justice will be empowered to review the legality of acts of EU bodies, offices or agencies 
intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.990 As a result, Frontex will not be 
exculpated from claims against its acts for or in the name of the European Union.991 
Furthermore, due to the accession of the European Union to the European Human Rights 
Convention, Frontex will be directly legally accountable before the European Court of 
Human Rights for violations of fundamental rights protected under the Convention. 992 
 
6.1.5. Conclusion 
 
After analyzing the relevant rules regarding Frontex operations at sea, it can be 
concluded that at-sea operations undertaken by Frontex are not per se violating the 
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applicable law of the sea, nor the non-refoulement principle. However, the lack of 
transparency in combination with a weak framework of accountability, often leads to the 
view that Frontex is not respecting international obligations in practice. As illegal migration 
will remain a problem for Mediterranean European Member States, Europe must focus on 
the creation of efficient, legal migration channels, burden-sharing between States and 
cooperation with the countries of origin and transit. Meanwhile, Frontex provides an 
effective and workable solution for the maritime migration problem. Nevertheless, the 
mandate of Frontex should be clarified. Frontex should raise its public profile by ensuring 
that information which is or should be in the public domain is easily accessible to the public. 
Moreover, Frontex should be more formally accountable to the European Parliament. The 
Chairman of the Management Board and the Executive Director should, if so requested, 
appear before the Parliament or its Committees to discuss the activities of Frontex.993 
 
6.2. Migration by sea in the Asia-Pacific 
 
6.2.1. The Asia-Pacific and the Smuggling Protocol 
 
The UNODC created a toolkit to combat the smuggling of migrants. The toolkit – 
intended to provide guidance, to showcase promising practices and to recommend resources 
in thematic areas addressed in the separate tools – assists States to effectively implement the 
Smuggling Protocol.994 Next to this, UNODC has also developed a ‘Model Law against the 
Smuggling of Migrants’ in response to a request by the General Assembly to the Secretary-
General.995 The Model Law is designed to be adaptable to the needs of each State, irrespective 
of the legal tradition or the social, economic, cultural or geographical conditions of that 
State.996 Despite these initiatives of UNODC to help States with the implementation of the 
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Smuggling Protocol, there still remain significant challenges, for example for many States in 
the Asia-Pacific. The Asia-Pacific region includes East and Southeast Asia, Australia and the 
other countries in Oceania. Several of these countries are simultaneously sending and transit 
or transit and receiving States.997 
 
To be able to implement the Smuggling Protocol, most of the countries in the Asia-
Pacific have to amend their laws and the law enforcement systems require adjustments. In 
addition, many of the measures require substantial financial, material and human resources, 
creating particular difficulties to smaller and economically less developed nations. Many 
developing States still lack the technical expertise and resources to effectively prevent and 
suppress smuggling.998 Furthermore, given the cultural diversity in the Asia-Pacific, some 
States are reluctant to support the internationalization of criminal law. For these reasons, not 
all States in the Asia-Pacific have signed the Smuggling Protocol.999 Nonetheless, with 
growing levels of transnational crime, the countries of the region are increasingly showing 
genuine interest and willingness to participate in international law enforcement activities.1000 
Furthermore, several regional initiatives were taken in the region. These will be described in 
the following part. 
 
6.2.2. Initiatives within the framework of ASEAN 
 
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an inter-governmental 
organization which aims to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural 
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Responses”, 5 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law 696 (2001), 742-743. 
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development in the region, and to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful 
community of Southeast Asian Nations. To achieve these goals, ASEAN activities include 
political cooperation and economic and functional cooperation.1001 The ASEAN Charter 
serves as a firm foundation in achieving the ASEAN Community by providing a legal status 
and an institutional framework for ASEAN. It also codifies ASEAN norms, rules and values, 
sets clear targets for ASEAN and presents accountability and compliance.1002 The ASEAN 
Charter has become a legally binding agreement among the 10 ASEAN Member States.1003 
 
Transnational crime – including migrant smuggling – has the potential of eroding the 
central belief of strengthening the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of 
Southeast Asian Nations, thereby affecting the political, economic and social well-being of 
ASEAN. Therefore ASEAN countries have taken concerted efforts to combat such crime 
since early 1970s.1004 However, as transnational crime was expanding and becoming more 
organized, ASEAN called for a comprehensive and coordinated approach in combating crime 
at the regional level. During the First Informal Summit in November 1996, ASEAN asked the 
relevant ASEAN bodies to study the possibility of regional cooperation on transnational 
criminal matters.1005 At the Second Informal Summit in December 1997, they resolved to take 
firm and stern measures to combat transnational crimes.1006 ASEAN also adopted the ‘Vision 
2020’ which envisioned the evolution of agreed rules of behaviour and cooperative 
measures to deal with problems that can be met only on a regional scale, such as 
transnational crimes.1007 
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In 1996 the ASEAN Plan of Action in Combating Transnational Crime1008 was adopted, 
which led to the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime, concluded in Manila in 
December 1997.1009 The declaration aims to strengthen cooperation at the regional level to 
fight transnational organized crime1010 and calls for the establishment of an ASEAN Centre 
on Transnational Crime.1011 In order to achieve the general and specific objectives, ASEAN 
Member Countries are inter alia encouraged to share information, to ratify and support 
existing international treaties or agreements designed to combat transnational crime and 
to enhance cooperation and coordination in law enforcement.1012 At the ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime in November 2009, the Ministers stated that they 
noted with satisfaction the progress and achievements attained under the purview of 
responsible bodies and they recommended the synergy in executing their respective action 
plans.1013 
Although the aforementioned ASEAN initiatives are only fragmentary declarations, 
cooperation under the umbrella of ASEAN has already proved to be important. Member 
States show much stronger support for the ASEAN activities than for initiatives by 
humanitarian organizations as ASEAN is primarily driven by economic incentives and all 
countries of the region – including non-members – show a keen interest in participating in 
ASEAN forums. Consequently, it is desirable to foster legislative and law enforcement 
cooperation at the ASEAN level.1014 
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6.2.3. The Bali Process – A regional consultative mechanism 
 
Due to the large numbers of illegal boat arrivals run by smuggling operations in the 
Asia-Pacific region, a regional consultative mechanism – known as the Bali Process and co-
chaired by the Governments of Indonesia and Australia – was established in 2002.1015 It is 
primarily a process and framework for information-sharing and training of officials, in law 
enforcement and drafting legislation, in connection with the smuggling and trafficking of 
people and other crimes. More than 50 countries are involved and as the migrant flows 
consist of both victims of forced displacement and economic migrants, a primary challenge is 
to ensure that the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers are respected. Therefore the IOM 
and the UNHCR are part of the secretariat and they help to facilitate the meetings.1016 
 
At the Bali Ministerial Conferences, Ministers agreed to specific objectives for the Bali 
Process, inter alia information sharing, harmonization of legislation and enhanced law 
enforcement.1017 To achieve these goals, several workshops are organized. Australia and 
China for example developed model legislation to criminalize people smuggling which has 
subsequently been used by many regional countries in the development of their own 
legislation.1018 Participants expressed strong appreciation for the way the Bali Process has 
delivered direct practical benefits to regional operational agencies. They agreed that some of 
the objectives set by the Ministers had been achieved at least in so far as they could be taken 
forward in a multilateral process of this kind.1019 At the fourth meeting in 2011, the 
Ministerial Conference agreed that an inclusive but non-binding Regional Cooperation 
Framework (RCF) would provide a more effective way for interested parties to reduce 
irregular movement through the region. One of the core principles of this RCF is that 
                                                 
1015 <http://www.baliprocess.net/> 
1016 <http://www.baliprocess.net/>  
1017 Regional Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational 
Crime, Bali, 26-28 February 2002; Second Regional Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking 
in Persons and Related Transnational Crime, Bali, 29-30 April 2003; Third Regional Ministerial Conference on 
People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime, Bali, 14-15 April 2009; Fourth 
Regional Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime, 
Bali, 29-30 March 2011. 
1018 ASEAN, “Model Law to Criminalise People Smuggling”, available online: 
<http://www.baliprocess.net/files/Legislation/Model%20law%20-%20people%20smuggling%20-%20final.pdf>. 
1019 Bali Process, “About the Bali Process”, available online: 
<http://www.baliprocess.net/index.asp?pageID=2145831401>. 
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irregular movement facilitated by people smuggling syndicates should be eliminated and 
States should promote and support opportunity for orderly migrations.1020 
 
In recent years there has been a proliferation of regional consultative processes.1021 One 
of their advantages is that they are regionally-based and thus bring together governments 
which tend to be affected. The second advantage is that they are informal. States tend to be 
more open to dialogue and to the exchange of information. However, the main disadvantage 
is that the conclusions and recommendations still remain non-binding.1022 Although ASEAN 
sometimes makes use of the Bali Process, there is still a lack of an actual institutional 
framework.  
 
6.2.4. The protection of refugees within the Bali Process 
 
It is also important that the rights of migrants are respected in regional initiatives such 
as the Bali Process. One example is the case of the Rohingya. The Rohingya is a Muslim 
ethnic minority living in northern Rakhine State – western Myanmar – and suffers from 
multiple restrictions and human rights violations in this country. According to Amnesty 
International, the Rohingyas’ freedom of movement is severely limited. Next to this, they are 
also subjected to forced eviction and house destruction, land confiscation and various forms 
of extortion and arbitrary taxation including financial restrictions on marriage. Rohingyas 
continue to be used as forced labourers on roads and at military camps. Furthermore, the 
vast majority of Rohingyas are effectively denied Myanmar citizenship.1023 
 
                                                 
1020 SUWANIKKHA, Surat, “The Regional Cooperation Framework and the Bali Process – An Overview”, 
Presentation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Humanitarian Migration Section at the Expert 
Meeting on Refugee and Asylum Seekers in Distress at Sea (8-10 November 2011), available online: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/4ef3381e0.html>. 
1021 In the Asia-Pacific there is next to the Bali process also for example the Asia-Pacific Consultations on 
Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrants or APC Process. More information available online: 
<http://www.apcprocess.net/>. 
1022 See for example IOM, “The Role of Regional Consultative Processes in Managing International Migration”, 
IOM Migration Research Series No. 3 (2001); VON KOPPENFELS, Amanda K., “Informal but Effective: Regional 
Consultative Processes as a Tool in Managing Migration”, 39 International Migration 61 (2001); THOUEZ, 
Colleen & CHANNAC, Frederique, “Shaping International Migration Policy: The Role of Regional Consultative 
Processes”, 29 West European Politics 370 (2006). 
1023 Amnesty International, “Myanmar: The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental rights denied” (18 May 2004), 
available online: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA16/005/2004>. 
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In 2008 the number of people leaving Myanmar by boat for Southeast Asia started 
growing. They fled in search of protection, safety and/or work. By the end of that year, over 
a thousand Rohingyas had forcibly been expelled and abandoned on the high seas by the 
Thai security forces.1024 In February 2009 a Joint NGO Statement on the Requirements of a 
Regional Solution for the Rohingya was drafted in which ASEAN was asked to put this 
problem on its agenda.1025 ASEAN agreed to use the Bali Process to try to solve the problem 
of the minority Muslim Rohingyas fleeing Myanmar.1026 However, several NGO’s were 
concerned that the Bali Process, the suggested forum for the negotiation of a regional 
solution, could not adequately focus on the rights of the Rohingyas. Therefore the NGO’s 
reminded all States that any regional solution must be based upon the following principles: 
1027 
 
1. Refuge must be provided to those in need of international protection 
2. No refugee or migrant should be forcibly returned (refouled) to Burma 
3. The rights of refugees and migrants must be respected 
4. The UNHCR must be granted full, unconditional access to the Rohingya in states 
of the region 
5. The international community must be included in and provide support to any 
regional solution. 
 
At the Bali conference in April 2009, there was agreement on setting up an ad-hoc 
working group on the issue.1028 Little has been made public about these Bali Process 
discussions and to date no concrete actions have been taken. Chris LEWA, an expert on the 
Rohingya issue and director of the Bangkok-based Arakan project (a research-based 
                                                 
1024 Joint NGO’s, “Statement on the Treatment of Rohingya and Bangladeshi ‘Boat People’ in Asia” (6 February 
2009), available online: <http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/letter/statement-treatment-rohingya-and-
bangladeshi-boat-people-asia>. 
1025 Joint NGO’s, “Statement on the Treatment of Rohingya and Bangladeshi ‘Boat People’ in Asia” (6 February 
2009), available online: <http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/letter/statement-treatment-rohingya-and-
bangladeshi-boat-people-asia>. 
1026 ASEAN, “14th Annual Summit” (26 February-1 March 2009), available online: 
<http://www.aseansec.org/22210.htm>. 
1027 Joint NGO’s, “Statement on the Requirements of a Regional Solution for the Rohingya” (6 March 2009), 
available online: <http://refugeerightsasiapacific.org/2009/03/06/joint-statement-2/>. 
1028 Bali Process, “Third Regional Ministerial Conference” (14-15 April 2009), available online: 
<http://www.baliprocess.net/index.asp?PageID=2145831461>. 
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advocacy group monitoring the Rohingya situation), said that it was very likely that the 
regional leaders involved in the Bali Process would try to find a way for Myanmar to accept 
the Rohingya people back into the country instead of helping refugees.1029 
 
6.2.5. Conclusion 
 
By relying on the Bali Process to sort out the problem of the Rohingya, there is a danger that 
the issue is being treated as people smuggling rather than as a result of persecution. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that this is not simply a case of migrant smuggling since its root 
causes are far beyond the issues of the Bali Process. Myanmar must improve its treatment of 
the Rohingya because as long as these people continue to be discriminated, they will 
continue to leave the country. Next to this, the term ‘smuggling’ could be misused to board 
and search a migrant vessel or to send it back, in some cases violating the international law 
of the sea rules as well as the non-refoulement principle. In the case of the Rohingyas it would 
have been a better solution if ASEAN – which includes Myanmar – had dealt with the 
problem. ASEAN is for example able to put (economic) pressure on Myanmar to improve its 
human rights situation, one of the root causes why people leave the country in the first place. 
The Bali Process is too informal and maybe too slow when effective actions are needed as 
soon as possible. Furthermore, States should not forget – both in ASEAN as well as in the 
Bali Process – that the problem of migrant smuggling is not only a transnational issue, but 
also an interdisciplinary one. 
                                                 
1029 Mizzima, “Bali process failed to solve Rohingya boatpeople issue” (17 April 2009), available online: 
<http://www.mizzima.com/news/regional/1979-bali-process-failed-to-solve-rohingya-boatpeople-issue-ai.html>. 
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7. State responsibility and compensation 
 
7.1. State responsibility for a breach of freedom of navigation 
 
Since the freedom of navigation exclusively belongs to the flag State and not to 
individuals or private entities,1030 the flag State is the only entity able to claim a breach of the 
freedom of navigation by another State. The latter will be liable when the principles of 
general law on State responsibility are violated. Arising out of the nature of the international 
legal system and the doctrines of State sovereignty and equality of States, State responsibility 
is a fundamental principle of international law. Article 20 ILC Draft Articles says that valid 
consent by a State to particular conduct by another State, precludes the wrongfulness of that 
act in relation to the consenting State. However, the conduct has to remain within the limits 
of the consent given. Consent can be given by a State in advance, at the time the act is 
occurring or even ex post facto. The latter is a form of waiver or acquiescence, leading to loss 
of the right to invoke responsibility.1031 There are for example several drug smuggling cases – 
such as United States v. Barrio Hernandez – where the US Courts upheld State consent given 
after the boarding but prior to the ensuing trial.1032 Thus, as long as the boarding remains 
within the boundaries of the consent given, the boarding State will be exculpated or excused 
for its wrongful act, namely the infringement of the freedom of navigation enjoyed by the 
foreign-flagged vessel.  
 
                                                 
1030 ITLOS, The M/V Saiga Case (No. 2), St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea, 1 July 1999, ITLOS Reports 
(1999), para. 97. But see: ITLOS, The M/V Saiga Case (No. 2), St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea, 1 July 
1999, Separate Opinion WOLFRUM, ITLOS Reports (1999), 92 et seq. WOLFRUM states: “[D]isputes concerning 
the exercise of freedom of navigation, in general, involve rights of natural or juridical persons which may 
prevail over the rights of States. Accordingly, the concept of freedom of navigation has as its addressees States 
as well as individual or private entities.” 
1031 ILC, “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries”, 73, 
available online: <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf>. See also 
ILC Draft Articles, Art. 45. 
1032 United States v. Barrio Hernandez, 655 F. Supp. 1069 (D. P.R. 1987). 
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7.2. State responsibility and compensation under Article 110(3) LOSC 
 
7.2.1. Content and meaning of Article 110(3) LOSC 
 
Although Article 110(1) LOSC permits an interference with the freedom of navigation on 
the high seas in certain conditions, Article 110(3) LOSC provides: “If the suspicions prove to be 
unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be 
compensated for any loss or damage that may have been sustained.” Article 22(3) CHS embodies 
almost the same wordings. Already in 1826, the US Supreme Court stated in the Marianna 
Flora Case: “[T]he party seizes at his peril, and is liable to costs and damages if he fails to establish the 
forfeiture.”1033 Similar provisions can be found in Article 106 LOSC with regard to the seizure 
of a pirate ship without adequate grounds as well as in Article 11(8) in the case of a ship 
which has been unjustifiably stopped or arrested in the exercise by a State of the right of hot 
pursuit. The object and purpose of 110(3) LOSC is to prevent abusive interferences by 
increasing the degree of diligence exercised by naval officers considering a boarding.1034 In 
addition, Article 300 LOSC contains more generally a prohibition against the abuse of the 
rights recognized in the LOSC. 
 
The wording of Article 110(3) LOSC unequivocally indicates that the entity entitled to 
claim compensation is the ship. In its commentary on draft Article 46, the ILC wrote: “The 
State to which the warship belongs must compensate the merchant ship.”1035 But what exactly is 
meant by ‘the ship’? Does there exist an individual right to compensation in cases of some 
interferences? Invocation of State responsibility by a private entity is not unknown to the law 
of the sea. Next to this, unlike the ICJ, ITLOS is potentially open to private entities. Article 
20(2) of the ITLOS Statute states: “The Tribunal shall be open to entities other than States Parties 
[…] in any case submitted pursuant to any other agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal 
                                                 
1033 The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. 11 Wheaton 1 (1826). 
1034 RANDELZHOFER, Albrecht, “Probleme der Völkerrechtlichen Gefährdungshaftung”, 24 Berichte der 
Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 35 (1984), 49. 
1035 ILC, “Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its eight session”, UN Doc. A/3159 
(1956), 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 253 (1956), 284, available online: 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_104.pdf>. 
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which is accepted by all the parties to that case.”1036 Thus, the ITLOS Statute has expanded the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction to entities other than States Parties, a significant innovation which has 
not yet been fully explored. The provision has to be read together with Article 21 ITLOS 
Statute, according to which the Tribunal has jurisdiction with respect to “all matters 
specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal”. 
Therefore, entities other than States Parties, can have access to ITLOS with respect to any 
dispute submitted under an agreement, if the agreement specifically confers jurisdiction on 
the Tribunal.  
 
However, several questions may be raised. First, the term ‘entities’ is quite broad. 
Nevertheless, it may include private bodies, such as private commercial corporations or non-
governmental organizations. For example, Article 292(2) LOSC also allows private entities – 
on behalf of the flag State – to claim the release of a vessel. Although the provision does not 
allow a direct access of an individual to ITLOS, it permits the flag State to authorize an 
individual or association (e.g. the ship owner, a shipping association, a labour union) to 
make an application for release.1037 Secondly, the reference in Article 20(2) ITLOS Statute to 
‘any other agreement’ conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal differs from Article 288(2) 
LOSC. The latter states that jurisdiction may be conferred on the Tribunal by “an international 
agreement related to the purposes of the Convention”. As there is no precedent here, it will be left 
to ITLOS to decide on these open questions. 1038 Nevertheless, this issue could be of relevance 
to interferences on the high seas. For example, shipping companies could conclude 
agreements with States interested in the fight against terrorism. On the one hand, these 
agreements could oblige the shipping companies to screen their cargoes. On the other hand, 
they could refer to the limited possibilities of interferences on the high seas by the State Party 
to the agreement whether or not such conduct would be in conformity with flag State 
                                                 
1036 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Annex VI LOSC, available online: 
<http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/basic_texts/statute_e.pdf>. 
1037 OXMAN, Bernard H., “Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, 36 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 399 (1998), 423. 
1038 ITLOS, “Statement by Rüdiger Wolfrum – President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to 
the Informal Meeting of Legal Advisers of Ministries of Foreign Affairs” (24 October 2005), 10-11, available 
online: 
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jurisdiction. If the agreement would confer jurisdiction to ITLOS, the shipping company 
might directly rely on Article 110(3) LOSC to claim compensation.1039  
 
Nonetheless, the possibility of ITLOS jurisdiction remains hypothetical. The LOSC does 
not provide for the possibility that either the ship or another private entity may settle its 
dispute with the interfering State before an international forum. As a result, a claimant will 
have to pursue his claim before a domestic court. WENDEL submits that, if the domestic legal 
system does not recognize the legal personality of the ship itself, only the ship owner or the 
bareboat charterer may rely on the provision as private individuals. It might not extend to 
the owners of cargo.1040 We can conclude that, even though the LOSC does not attribute a 
right to a private entity to be exempt from interferences on the high seas by other States than 
the flag State, it provides an entitlement for a private entity to claim compensation. 
 
The basic principle in the general law on State responsibility is that a State will be 
responsible for an internationally wrongful act when conduct consisting of an action or 
omission (1) is attributable to the State under international law and (2) constitutes a breach of 
an international obligation of the State.1041 However, a successful claim for compensation 
under Article 110(3) LOSC does not per se require an unlawful interference by the 
interdicting State. Thus, while boarding might have been justified under Article 110(1)(d) 
LOSC, the interfering State might still have to pay compensation under certain conditions: its 
liability is strict. In its commentary on draft Article 46, the ILC stated that this strict liability 
is justified in order to prevent the right of visit being abused.1042 Nevertheless, except for 
compensation for an intrusion into the human rights of individuals concerned, the consent of 
the flag State to a boarding limits the individual right to claim compensation from the 
boarding State.1043 
                                                 
1039 WENDEL, Philipp, State Responsibility for Interferences with the Freedom of Navigation in Public 
International Law (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2007), 83. 
1040 WENDEL, Philipp, State Responsibility for Interferences with the Freedom of Navigation in Public 
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Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 325. 
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The ship has to be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been sustained.  
But what exactly is ‘any loss or damage‘? First of all, Article 110(3) LOSC makes a distinction 
between ‘loss’ and ‘damage’. This distinction is unknown to the general law of State 
responsibility which provides that the responsible State has to compensate for the damage 
caused by its internationally wrongful act.1044 This damage can be either moral or material. 
Moral damage includes individual pain and suffering, loss of loved ones or personal affront 
associated with an intrusion on one’s home or private life. Material damage is damage to 
property or other interests – as well as lost profits – which is financially assessable.1045 
Although the distinction between ‘loss’ and ‘damage’ seems rather strange, it can be 
explained because the original provision – namely Article 22(3) CHS – was drafted when 
there was still some confusion in the general law of State responsibility, particularly 
regarding the obligation to compensate for lost profits. Therefore, the drafters might have 
found it necessary to clarify the exact content of the obligation.1046 Secondly, the Article 
mentions the word ‘any’. This was added in order to include even losses suffered as a 
consequence of rather short delays.1047 Examples of types of damages to a ship are the delay 
of the vessel and the value of the vessel and cargo where these are destroyed or confiscated. 
However, in case of stateless migrant vessels, damages could result out of the detention and 
mistreatment of the persons on board. Also moral damages which are financially assessable – 
such as mental suffering, humiliation, degradation – can be subject of a claim of 
compensation under Article 110(3) LOSC.1048 
 
However, in case the ship boarded has committed an act justifying the suspicions, it 
does not have a right to be compensated. In the Marianna Flora Case, the United States’ 
cruiser Alligator had approached the Marianna Flora on suspicion of piracy and then been 
                                                 
1044 ILC Draft Articles, Art. 36(1). 
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fired upon by that vessel as the shipmaster feared that the Alligator was a pirate craft itself. 
As a result, the Marianna Flora was seized by the US cruiser. Although the Marianna Flora was 
not a pirate craft, liability did not follow as the ship had fired first and without provocation, 
an act justifying the suspicion.1049 Another example is the incident with the M/V So San, a 
North Korean ship that was suspected of being stateless. The boarding and searching could 
be justified as the vessel did not display a flag or identifying markings.1050 WENDEL submits 
that the searching of the cargo was not justified, as the purpose of the search was to verify 
the statelessness of the ship. Therefore, only the inspection of the vessel’s papers would have 
been allowed.1051 However, GUILFOYLE points out that Article 110(2) LOSC says: “If suspicion 
remains after the documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further examination on board the 
ship, which must be carried out with all possible consideration.” This right of further examination 
appears to be general and wide-ranging. Inspection of the cargo was thus justified as this 
may disclose information capable of revealing the vessel’s identification.1052 
 
Interferences on the high seas basically involve two States, namely the flag State and the 
boarding State. Normally, under Article 110(3) LOSC it will be the boarding State that will 
have to compensate the ship. However, in some cases also the flag State could be held liable. 
General law on State responsibility provides that the participating State may be held 
internationally responsible for the act of another State if it aids or assists these acts, directs 
and controls them or coerces the State into committing them. However, this requires that the 
State has knowledge of the act in question and that the act is considered as internationally 
wrongful.1053 As a result, flag State consent does not ipso facto imply that the flag State will be 
held liable. For example, when the wrongful act is the excessive use of force when arresting a 
suspect, the flag State would not necessarily have knowledge of those specific circumstances 
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or have permitted interdiction with a view to facilitating that abuse.1054 However, the 
compensation provision under Article 110(3) LOSC also provides for liability if the 
interference was lawful. Nevertheless, one can make an analogous application of the general 
principles of State responsibility to conclude that also in this case the flag State could be held 
liable.1055 
 
Consistent with Article 110(3) LOSC, Article 9(2) Smuggling Protocol provides that – if 
the grounds for measures taken pursuant to article 8 Smuggling Protocol prove to be 
unfounded following the boarding of the vessel – a vessel is to be compensated for any loss 
or damage that may have been sustained if the vessel did not commit any act justifying the 
measures taken. 
 
7.2.2. Agreements between States and Article 110(3) LOSC 
 
Will Article 110(3) LOSC be applicable when States have for example concluded a 
shipboarding or a shiprider agreement? As these agreements constitute treaty exceptions to 
Article 110(1) LOSC, one could argue that also the compensation provision in Article 110(3) 
LOSC is likewise not applicable. However, when wrongful conduct occurs, States may still 
be liable under general law of State responsibility. Which States will be liable – and to what 
extent – will depend on a case by case basis. Article 47 ILC Draft Articles deals with the 
situation where there is a plurality of responsible States in respect of the same wrongful act. 
The general principle in such cases is that each State is separately responsible for the conduct 
attributable to it, and that responsibility is not diminished or reduced by the fact that one or 
more other States are also responsible for the same act. 1056 As the ILC noted, terms such as 
‘joint’, ‘joint and several’ and ‘solidary’ responsibility derive from different legal 
traditions.1057 Analogies must therefore be applied with care. In the absence of agreement to 
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the contrary between the States concerned, the general principle in the case of a plurality of 
responsible States is thus that each State is separately responsible for conduct attributable to 
it.1058 During joint operations, a State thus remains independently international responsible 
for its own conduct. This implies that – where a single course of conduct is attributable to 
several States – State responsibility is not diminished or reduced by the fact that other States 
are also responsible for the same act.1059 
 
There is limited case law on joint and several liability in case of an agreement between 
States. In the Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru Case, Australia – the sole respondent – had 
administered Nauru as a trust territory under the Trusteeship Agreement on behalf of the 
three States concerned, namely Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Australia 
argued that it could not be sued alone by Nauru, but only jointly with the other two States 
concerned as these were necessary parties to the case. Therefore, Australia concluded that – 
in accordance with the principle formulated in Monetary Gold Case1060 – the claim against 
Australia alone was inadmissible and that the responsibility of the three States making up 
the Administering Authority was ‘solidary’. However, the ICJ rejected these arguments.1061 
The Court clarified: “Australia has raised the question whether the liability of the three States would 
be “joint and several” (solidaire), so that any one of the three would be liable to make full reparation 
for damage flowing from any breach of the obligations of the Administering Authority, and not merely 
a one-third or some other proportionate share. This […] is independent of the question whether 
Australia can be sued alone.”1062 It is submitted that the formal source of rights and obligations 
involved will often be the starting point for determining if joint and several responsibility 
exists. If the agreement establishes joint and several responsibility, previous or subsequent 
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facts could not make it other than joint. 1063 However, there is also a possibility of joint and 
several responsibility from a common course of conduct.1064  
 
Although shiprider agreements are often described as establishing a ‘joint’ interdiction 
program, it is more likely to be the case of the shiprider or boarding party assisting in other’s 
wrongful conduct than their acting as a joint organ. Although the shiprider and the boarding 
State officials are aboard one single vessel, they are not under any unified command or 
obligation to assist each other unconditionally in particular operations.1065 Therefore, the 
assisting State will only be responsible to the extent that its own conduct has caused or 
contributed to the internationally wrongful act. In some cases, one could argue that the 
conduct of the shiprider aboard another State’s vessel is fully attributable to the latter. Article 
6 ILC Draft Articles does recognize the possibility of attributing conduct of a State organ to 
another State in limited and precise situations. The State organ has to be placed at the 
disposal of another State and the organ has to act exclusively for the purposes of and on 
behalf of another State and its conduct is attributed to the latter State alone. The notion 
‘placed at the disposal of’ implies that the organ is acting with the consent, under the 
authority of and for the purposes of the receiving State. Next to the fact that the organ has to 
be appointed to perform functions appertaining to the State at whose disposal it is placed, it 
must also – in performing the functions entrusted to it by the beneficiary State – act in 
conjunction with the machinery of that State and under its exclusive direction and control.1066 
Given the fact that the shiprider will act within its own command structure, Article 6 ILC 
Draft Articles will not be applicable. 
 
                                                 
1063 ICJ, Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru Case, Nauru v. Australia, 26 June 1992, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Shahabuddeen, ICJ Reports 270 (1992), 274. 
1064 For an extensive discussion on joint and several responsibility, see: NOYES, John E. & SMITH, Brian D., 
“State Responsibility and the Principle of Joint and Several Liability”, 13 Yale Journal of International Law 225 
(1988), 225-267. 
1065 GUILFOYLE, Douglas, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 336-337. 
1066 ILC, “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries”, 44, 
available online: <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf>. 
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7.3. State responsibility for a breach of refugee law and human rights 
 
As mentioned, States sometimes cooperate with each other to control their borders. As 
part of the Frontex Operation Hera,1067 Spain signed a shiprider agreement with Senegal and 
Mauretania to bring on board Senegalese and Mauritanian immigration officers for 
interceptions carried out in their respective territorial waters.1068 In 1997, Italy and Albania 
signed an agreement to intercept migrants in international waters as well as Albanian 
territorial waters. Albanian officials were brought onto Italian naval vessels.1069 In 2003, the 
United States signed an agreement with the Dominican Republic to bring officials of one 
country on board vessels of the other country while carrying out patrols in their respective 
territorial waters.1070 Which State could be held responsible for conduct which violates 
refugee and other human rights? As mentioned, cooperation can have various forms. Three 
possible avenues for establishing State responsibility in joint efforts of controlling sea 
borders can be identified: (1) responsibility for the own conduct of States in situations of joint 
operations, (2) responsibility for conduct of a State organ placed at the disposal of another 
State (shiprider agreements) and (3) the concept of indirect responsibility for assisting 
another State in internationally wrongful conduct.1071 With regard to interception measures, 
ExCom stated: “The State within whose sovereign territory, or territorial waters, interception takes 
place has the primary responsibility for addressing any protection needs of intercepted persons.”1072 
However, it is suggested that this should be read as dealing with responsibility for 
                                                 
1067 Frontex does not have a mandate to operate beyond the external borders of the EU, as for example in the 
territorial waters of Senegal and Mauretania. Therefore, the existence of an agreement is requisite for this kind of 
operation. 
1068 Frontex, “Longest Frontex Coordinated Operation – Hera, The Canary Islands”, available online: 
<http://www.frontex.europa.eu/news/longest-frontex-coordinated-operation-hera-the-canary-islands-ZubSEM>. 
Frontex denies public access to the text of the co-operation agreements signed between Spain and 
Senegal/Mauratania. 
1069 Agreement between Italy and Albania to Prevent Certain Illegal Acts and Render Humanitarian Assistance to 
Those Leaving Albania (2 April 1997), Gazetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana No. 163 (15 July 1997). 
1070 Agreement between the United States of America and the Government of the Dominican Republic 
Concerning Cooperation in Maritime Migration Law Enforcement (20 May 2003), TIAS UST LEXIS 32 (2003). 
1071 DEN HEIJER, Maarten, “Europe beyond its Borders”, in RYAN, Bernard & MITSILEGAS, Valsamis (Eds.), 
Extraterritorial Immigration Control (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), 191. 
1072 ExCom, “Protection Safeguards in Interception Measures Problems Related to the Rescue of Asylum-
Seekers in Distress at Sea”, Conclusion No. 97 (LIV) (2003), para a(i), available online: < 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f93b2894.html>. 
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implementation instead of responsibility for outcome. Also, prime responsibility is not the 
same as sole responsibility.1073 
 
Shiprider agreements are being used to legally place the authority to intercept with the 
State of the officials onboard the ships. But could they also be used as a pretext to shift 
obligations under refugee and human rights law? In the Xhavara Case (2001), the ECtHR 
attributed exclusive responsibility to Italy for the acts it perpetrated in international waters 
as a result of the aforementioned agreement concluded with Albania authorizing it to patrol 
both international and Albanian waters for the purpose of migration control. The Albanian 
authorities could not be held liable for the measures taken by Italy in performance of the 
agreement. The ECtHR held that the agreement cannot – in itself – engage responsibility of 
the State under the ECHR for any action taken by Italian authorities in the implementation of 
the agreement.1074 
 
Also in the case of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom (2010) the ECtHR considered 
the impact of bilateral agreements.1075 In this case the United Kingdom argued that – as UK 
forces were operating in Iraq subject to a memorandum of understanding establishing Iraqi 
overall jurisdiction – it was under a legal obligation to transfer the applicants to the Iraqi 
authorities. The ECtHR recalled that the principles underlying the ECHR cannot be 
interpreted and applied in a vacuum. Therefore, the Convention should be interpreted as far 
as possible in harmony with other principles of international law of which it forms part. 
Moreover, the ECtHR has also long recognized the importance of international 
cooperation.1076 However, it concludes that the fact that a subsequent treaty or agreement has 
been signed shifting jurisdiction or requiring that persons are handed over to the territorial 
State, does not affect liability under the ECHR.1077 As GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN points out: 
                                                 
1073 TAYLOR, Savitri, “Offshore Barriers to Asylum Seeker Movement: The Exercise of Power without 
Responsibility?”, in MCADAM, Jane, Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2008), 125. 
1074 ECtHR, Xhavara and Others v. Italy and Albania, 11 January 2001, Appl. No. 39473/98 (2001). 
1075 ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, 2 March 2010, Appl. No. 61498/08 (2010). 
1076 ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, 2 March 2010, Appl. No. 61498/08 (2010), para. 126. 
The ECtHR referred to: ECtHR, Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, 21 November 2001, Appl. No. 35763/97 
(2001), paras. 54-55; ECtHR, Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others, 12 December 2001, Appl. No. 
52207/99 (2001), paras. 55-57; ECtHR, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, 30 
June 2005, Appl. No. 45036/98 (2005), para. 150. 
1077 ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, 2 March 2010, Appl. No. 61498/08 (2010), para. 128. 
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“While shiprider or other bilateral agreements may be taken into account in the assessment of the 
degree of control exercised by the extraterritorially acting State, they cannot serve to trade away 
human rights obligations at will.”1078 This is consistent with the ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility.1079 According to these Articles, a State may be held internationally responsible 
for the act of another State if it aids or assists these acts, directs and controls them or coerces 
the State into committing them. However, this requires that the State has knowledge of the 
act in question and that the act is considered as internationally wrongful.1080 
 
The last question that is being raised is exactly how far does the responsibility of the 
country in which the asylum application is lodged extend in case of removal to a STC? The 
country to which an asylum application has been submitted will be primarily responsible for 
considering it. Accordingly, if that country wants to transfer that responsibility to a third 
country, it must establish that such third country is ‘safe’ with respect to that particular 
asylum-seeker. The burden of proof – to establish that the third country is unsafe – does not 
lie with the asylum-seeker, but with the country which wishes to remove the asylum-seeker 
from its territory.1081 GIL-BAZO argues that the transfer of responsibility from one State to 
another – even when assuring that such State is a ‘safe third country’ – raises issues of State 
responsibility to fulfil all the obligations towards refugees under international refugee and 
human rights law that have been engaged by its exercise of jurisdiction.1082 
 
                                                 
1078 GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, Thomas, Access to Asylum – International Refugee Law and the Globalisation of 
Migration Control (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 139. 
1079 ILC, “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts” (adopted 9 August 2001), 
UN Doc. A/56/10 (24 October 2001), Supp. No. 10, available online: 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf> [ILC Draft Articles]. 
1080 ILC Draft Articles, Artt. 16-18. 
1081 UNHCR, “UNHCR’s Observations on the European Commission’s Proposal for a Council Directive on 
Minimum Standards on Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status” (July 2001), para. 36, 
available online: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,LEGAL,,COMMENTARY,,3c0e3f374,0.html>. 
1082 GIL-BAZO, Maria-Teresa, “The Practice of Mediterranean States in the Context of the European Union’s 
Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension. The Safe Third Country Concept Revisited”, 18 International 
Journal of Refugee Law 571 (2006), 599. 
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7.4. Conclusion 
 
Since the freedom of navigation exclusively belongs to the flag State and not to 
individuals or private entities,1083 the flag State is the only entity able to claim a breach of the 
freedom of navigation by another State. A valid consent of the flag State, however, precludes 
wrongfulness. Even though the LOSC does not attribute a right to a private entity to be 
exempt from interferences on the high seas by other States than the flag State, it provides an 
entitlement for a private entity to claim compensation. Article 110(3) LOSC provides: “If the 
suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded has not committed any act 
justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been sustained.” 
Consistent with Article 110(3) LOSC, Article 9(2) Smuggling Protocol provides that – if the 
grounds for measures taken pursuant to article 8 Smuggling Protocol prove to be unfounded 
following the boarding of the vessel – a vessel is to be compensated for any loss or damage 
that may have been sustained if the vessel did not commit any act justifying the measures 
taken. 
 
The wording of Article 110(3) LOSC unequivocally indicates that the entity entitled to 
claim compensation is the ship. If the domestic legal system does not recognize the legal 
personality of the ship itself, only the ship owner or the bareboat charterer may rely on the 
provision as private individuals. It might not extend to the owners of cargo.1084 Examples of 
types of damages to a ship are the delay of the vessel and the value of the vessel and cargo 
where these are destroyed or confiscated. However, in case of stateless migrant vessels, 
damages could result out of the detention and mistreatment of the persons on board. Also 
moral damages which are financially assessable – such as mental suffering, humiliation, 
degradation – can be subject of a claim of compensation under Article 110(3) LOSC.1085 
                                                 
1083 ITLOS, The M/V Saiga Case (No. 2), St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea, 1 July 1999, ITLOS Reports 
(1999), para. 97. But see: ITLOS, The M/V Saiga Case (No. 2), St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea, 1 July 
1999, Separate Opinion WOLFRUM, ITLOS Reports (1999), 92 et seq. WOLFRUM states: “[D]isputes concerning 
the exercise of freedom of navigation, in general, involve rights of natural or juridical persons which may 
prevail over the rights of States. Accordingly, the concept of freedom of navigation has as its addressees States 
as well as individual or private entities.” 
1084 WENDEL, Philipp, State Responsibility for Interferences with the Freedom of Navigation in Public 
International Law (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2007), 68 and 92-93. See also GUILFOYLE, Douglas, Shipping 
Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 325. 
1085 WENDEL, Philipp, State Responsibility for Interferences with the Freedom of Navigation in Public 
International Law (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2007), 186. 
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However, in case the ship boarded has committed an act justifying the suspicions, it does not 
have a right to be compensated.  
 
Interferences on the high seas basically involve two States, namely the flag State and the 
boarding State. Normally, under Article 110(3) LOSC it will be the boarding State that will 
have to compensate the ship. However, in some cases also the flag State could be held liable. 
However, this requires that the State has knowledge of the act in question and that the act is 
considered as internationally wrongful.1086 As shipboarding or shiprider agreements 
constitute treaty exceptions to Article 110(1) LOSC, the provision in Article 110(3) LOSC is 
likewise not applicable. However, when wrongful conduct occurs, States may still be liable 
under general law of State responsibility. Which States will be liable – and to what extent – 
will depend on a case by case basis. 
 
States can also be responsible for a breach of refugee law and human rights. While 
shiprider or other bilateral agreements may be taken into account in the assessment of the 
degree of control exercised by the extraterritorially acting State, they cannot serve to trade 
away human rights obligations.1087 This is consistent with the ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility.1088 
                                                 
1086 ILC Draft Articles, Artt. 16-18. 
1087 GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, Thomas, Access to Asylum – International Refugee Law and the Globalisation of 
Migration Control (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 139. 
1088 ILC, “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts” (adopted 9 August 2001), 
UN Doc. A/56/10 (24 October 2001), Supp. No. 10, available online: 
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Summary 
 
It is true that the LOSC has put a certain halt to the process of territorial expansion of 
coastal States sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the seas. Nevertheless, some 
provisions lend themselves for an extensive interpretation, which has quite liberally been 
made use of. Next to this, coastal States have a tendency to expand the reach of their 
regulations beyond 200 nautical miles (‘creeping jurisdiction’), as well as to functionally 
expand their jurisdiction by an ever more stringent regulation of a wider range of activities 
within their maritime zones (‘thickening jurisdiction’).1089 These trends together have been 
subsumed under the notion ‘territorial temptation’ of coastal States.1090  
 
However, when considering the waning freedom of the high seas, it must be borne in 
mind that the legal system relating to the oceans and seas based on the LOSC needs to be 
further developed in order to cope with new challenges facing the international community. 
Necessary measures – taken in for example the area of maritime security – as a result of a 
multilateral negotiating process certainly justify further limitations of the traditional 
freedoms of the seas, as this is in the interest of humankind as a whole.1091 Already in 1955, 
MCDOUGAL asserted: “[…] the international law of the sea is not a mere static body of rules but is 
rather a whole decision-making process, a public order which includes a structure of authorized 
decision-makers as well as a body of highly flexible, inherited prescriptions. It is, in other words, a 
process of continuous interaction, of continuous demand and response, in which the decision-makers 
of particular nation States unilaterally put forward claims of the most diverse and conflicting 
character to the use of the world’s seas, and in which other decision-makers, external to the demanding 
state and including both national and international officials, weigh and appraise these competing 
claims in  terms of the interest of the world community and of the rival claimants, and ultimately 
                                                 
1089 BATEMAN, Sam, ROTHWELL, Donald R. & VANDERZWAAG, David, “Navigational Rights and Freedoms in 
the New Millennium: 20th Century Controversies and 21st Century Challenges”, in BATEMAN, Sam & 
ROTHWELL, Donald R. (Eds.), Navigational Rights and Freedoms and the New Law of the Sea (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2000), 323; TUERK, Helmut, Reflections on the Contemporary Law of the Sea (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), 159. 
1090 OXMAN, Bernard H., “The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea”, 100 American Journal of 
International Law 830 (2006), 833. 
1091 TUERK, Helmut, Reflections on the Contemporary Law of the Sea (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2012), 185. See also: TUERK, Helmut,”The Waning Freedom of the Seas”, in CASADO RAIGÓN, Rafael & 
CATALDI, Giuseppe (Eds.), L'évolution et l'état actuel du droit international de la mer: Mélanges de droit de la 
mer offerts à Daniel Vignes (Brussel: Bruylant, 2009), 935-936. 
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accept or reject them. As such a process, it is a living, growing law, grounded in the practices and 
sanctioning expectations of nation-state officials, and changing as their demands and expectations are 
changed by the exigencies of new interest and technology and by other continually evolving conditions 
in the world arena.”1092  
 
This description of the law of the sea remains pertinent today, especially when 
considering maritime security issues. The ‘package deal concept’ of the LOSC should not 
stand in the way of progress. It should only mean that there is a need for caution and a 
preference of evolution over revolution. 1093 Balancing claims of jurisdiction to prescribe and 
enforce against the principle of navigational freedom is an uneasy exercise in lawmaking. 
BECKER is convinced that there is room for a more aggressive interdiction regime. However, 
its proponents have to keep in mind the needs and claims of the system as a whole. The non-
interference principle only merits respect to the extent that it remains a valuable and 
effective tool for promoting the general welfare of the international system and all its 
participants. 1094 As GAVOUNELI states on the freedom of the high seas: “[The] balance between 
freedom of action and responsibility for control, once considered sacrosanct, has been challenged 
recently as new exigencies come to force – or simply, old needs are perceived to have acquired 
increased importance.”1095 It is clear that States, in coping with the problem of illegal migration 
by sea, tend to interdict vessels on the high seas based on the fact that the migrant vessels are 
stateless. Even if a further jurisdictional nexus is necessary to seize these vessels, 
international law offers several possibilities to legally carry out seizures. 
 
The hypothesis that there is a tension between the freedom of the high seas and the 
objective of suppressing illegal migration by sea ignores the fact that the principle of the 
freedom of the high seas reflect and protects important interests, notably including security 
and law enforcement interests themselves.1096 Nevertheless, States also have to bear in mind 
                                                 
1092 MCDOUGAL, Myres S., “The Hydrogyn Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea”, 49 Am. J. Int’l L. 
356 (1955), 356-357. 
1093 KLEIN, Natalie, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 301-302. 
1094 BECKER, Michael A., “The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation and the Interdiction 
of Ships at Sea”, 46 Harvard International Law Journal 131 (2005), 230. 
1095 GAVOUNELI, Maria, Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2007), 159. 
1096 OXMAN, Bernard H., “Crimes at Sea and Trafficking of Weapons of Mass Destruction: General Report”, in 
FRANCKX, Eric & GAUTIER, Philippe (Eds.), The Exercise of Jurisdiction over Vessels: New Developments in the 
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that they do not operate within a legal vacuum when operating on the high seas. The Hirsi 
Case confirms the trend towards an extraterritorial application of the non-refoulement 
principle in case of effective control. Although this is currently not yet customary 
international law, it is hoped that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR will influence jurisdictions 
in other world regions.1097 Next to this, there is still a lacuna, namely in case of the diversion 
of vessels on the high seas. As there is probably no effective control – since the persons are 
for example not transferred onto a vessel of the diverting State – the non-refoulement principle 
will most likely not be applicable. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Fields of Pollution, Fisheries, Crimes at Sea and Trafficking of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Brussels: 
Bruylant, 2010), 137-138. 
1097 GIUFFRE, Mariagiulia, “Watered-Down Rights on the High Seas: Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy”, 61 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 728 (2012), 749. 
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Introduction 
 
In the previous two chapters we discussed the maritime safety aspects of migrants at sea 
– namely search and rescue – and the maritime security aspects, being interception at sea. 
However, both areas deal with common concerns as well as abuses. First, a common concern 
is the interaction between the law of the sea and human rights. International law is often 
broken down into specialist sub-fields, generating ‘fragmentation’ and the possibility of 
conflicting norms and regimes. We will therefore take a look at this risk in the field of 
migrants at sea. Human rights considerations in the law of the sea as well as law of the sea 
aspects within the caselaw of the ECtHR will be discussed. In this regard, especially the Hirsi 
case is interesting. Second, maritime safety and security are sometimes (deliberately) being 
confused. For example, the search and rescue framework is being (ab)used to intercept. 
States sometimes rely on the principles associated with search and rescue at sea as a means 
of interdicting vessels that could not otherwise lawfully be visited on the high seas.1098 
Furthermore, the search and rescue framework is being used by smugglers, creating a risk of 
criminalization of seafarers. In the last part, we will try to introduce a proposal to meet these 
common concerns and abuses. The proposal will focus on both an increased international 
interagency cooperation and an improved regional cooperation between States. 
                                                 
1098 KLEIN, Natalie, “International Migration by Sea and Air”, in OPESKIN, Brian, PERRUCHOUD, Richard & 
REDPATH-CROSS, Jillyanne (Eds.), Foundations of International Migration Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 270. 
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1. The law of the sea and human rights concerns: a risk of fragmentation? 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Nowadays, it seems that the age of the generalist is passing in international law. The 
teaching as well as the practice of international law is often broken down into specialist sub-
fields such as the law of the sea and international human rights law. The fact that they have 
their own sources, their own mechanisms to apply in cases of non-compliance and their own 
courts and tribunals, creates the idea that that these ‘self-contained’ regimes are separate 
from general international law.1099 As indicated by a study of the ILC, this ‘fragmentation’ of 
international law generates the possibility of conflicting norms and regimes.1100 For example, 
it is sometimes suggested that the issue of how best to regulate migration by sea bears scars 
of a fragmentary approach to law-making. It has been submitted that the substantive content 
of the law of the sea has been isolated from potentially important humanitarian 
considerations.  The law of the sea would therefore not be very susceptible to developments 
in international human rights.1101 
 
Human rights law has played a major role in the discussion on fragmentation of 
international law. Many of the most prominent conflicts over international law have pitted 
human rights law against other areas of international law.1102 For example, human rights law 
has been pitted against the international trade regime in conflicts over the availability of 
affordable medicines,1103 against international investment law in conflicts over development 
                                                 
1099 See for example: KOSKENNIEMI, Martti & LEINO, Päivi, “Fragmentation of International Law: Postmodern 
Anxieties?”, 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 553 (2002), 553-579; TREVES, Tullio, “Fragmentation of 
International Law: the Judicial Perspective”, 23 Communicazione e Studi 821 (2007), 821-876. 
1100 ILC, “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission. Finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi”, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), available online: 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/1_9.htm>. 
1101 BARNES, Richard A., “The International Law of the Sea and Migration Control”, in RYAN, Bernard & 
MITSILEGAS, Valsamis (Eds.), Extraterritorial Immigration Control (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), 
104-106. 
1102 COHEN, Harlan G., “From Fragmentation to Constitutionalism”, 25 Pacific McGeorge Global Business & 
Development Law Journal 381 (2012), 383. 
1103 OTERO GARCÍA-CASTRILLÓN, Carmen, “An Approach to the WTO Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health”, 5 Journal of International Economic Law 212 (2002), 212-213. 
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and indigenous rights1104 and against the law of armed conflict in conflicts over the legality of 
targeted killings and proper treatment of detained suspected terrorists.1105 Moreover, human 
rights law itself seems in constant danger of fragmenting, with multiple broad regional 
regimes interpreting similar treaties, State courts interpreting their obligations under both 
international law and State constitutions1106 and a variety of treaty bodies and rapporteurs 
with overlapping mandates.1107 
 
It is true that the law of the sea encounters many of the problems that arise when 
specialized sets of rules overlap, especially within the framework of the LOSC)1108 
Concerning migrants at sea, the confrontation between the law of the sea and the non-
refoulement principle proved to be problematic in both maritime safety and maritime security 
issues. Although it is unlikely that the LOSC – or the law of the sea more generally – will be 
accorded a central role in the history of the international law of human rights, it may be 
deserving of more than just a footnote.1109 The law of the sea, its instruments and institutions 
have not only a direct contribution to make to human rights law, but in some instances even 
prove to be sufficient to protect individual human rights.1110 
 
First, we will deal with the law of the sea and the human rights considerations that it 
contains, both in the LOSC and in the ITLOS judgments. Special attention will be given to the 
duty to render assistance to persons lost or in distress at sea. The second part will deal with 
how the ECtHR has applied the law of the sea in several cases. It will especially focus on the 
                                                 
1104 Amazon Defence Coalition, Ecuador Plaintiffs Appeal U.S. Court Decision on Arbitration, Bus. Wire, 18 
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judgment of the Hirsi Case. After describing how the ECtHR reached its decision, it is 
interesting to take a look at this case from a law of the sea perspective. How would a lawyer 
specializing in the law of the sea interpret the facts and how would he or she apply the 
relevant law of the sea provisions? Lastly, we will highlight some remaining questions 
concerning the Hirsi judgment. 
 
1.2. Human rights considerations in the law of the sea 
 
1.2.1. The Law of the Sea Convention 
 
The law of the sea is one of the oldest branches of international law, maintaining a 
doctrinal framework from Hugo Grotius. His essay ‘Mare Liberum’ was the first of its kind 
for international law as a whole. In 1982, after 10 years of negotiations, the LOSC was 
adopted. It must be viewed as forming part of the codification process of the law of the sea in 
the twentieth century that started with the The Hague Codification Conference of 1930 on 
territorial waters, continued with the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Conferences on the Law of the 
Sea, and reached its apogee in the monumental UNCLOS III.1111 The LOSC provides a 
framework for the regulation of ocean spaces, primarily through the allocation of 
competences to coastal States and flag States. It has been described as ‘the constitution for the 
oceans’.1112 
 
Until now, little attention has been given to the humanitarian principles within the law of 
the sea. Although the LOSC is not a human rights instrument per se, several provisions of the 
Convention articulate human rights principles which are to date still not used effectively and 
to their full potential by the human rights community.1113 Moreover, the LOSC is a global 
                                                 
1111 For a detailed history on the drafting of the LOSC see: NELSON, Dolliver M., “Reflections on the 1982 
Convention on the Law of the Sea”, in FREESTONE, David, BARNES, Richard A. and ONG, David M. (Eds.), The 
Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 28-39. 
1112 See for example: SCOTT, Shirley V., “The LOS Convention as a Constitutional Regime for the Oceans”, in 
OUDE ELFERINK, Alex G. (Ed.), Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea: the Role of the LOS Convention 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 9-38. 
1113 OXMAN, Bernard H., “Human Rights and the Law of the Sea”, in CHARNEY, Jonathan I., ANTON, Donald K. 
& O’CONNELL, Mary Ellen (Eds.), Politics, Values and Functions: International Law in the 21st Century – 
Essays in Honor of Professor Louis Henkin (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 377-404; BASTID-
BURDEAU, Geneviève, “Migrations clandestines et droit de la mer”, in COUSSIRAT COUSTÈRE, Vincent (Ed.), La 
mer et son droit: Mélanges offerts à Laurent Lucchini et Jean-Pierre Quéneudec (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 
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convention of which the scope ratione loci and ratione materiae rivals that of all but the most 
comprehensive of global human rights conventions.1114 Also, from the perspective of 
ratification, it equals the most successful global human rights conventions as 164 States and 
the EU are party to the Convention.1115 
 
As early as the Preamble, the LOSC seeks to advance the interests of humanity by 
establishing “a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international communication, 
and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their 
resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the 
marine environment” and by contributing “to the realization of a just and equitable international 
economic order which takes into account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole”.1116 Thus, 
several community rights are being promoted in the LOSC. The best known example is the 
declaration that the international seabed area and its resources are the ‘common heritage of 
mankind’.1117 Therefore, the development of the resources must be carried out for the benefit 
of mankind as a whole.1118 But also the protection of archaeological and historical objects 
found at sea,1119 the protection and preservation of the marine environment1120 and the 
obligation of transparency1121 are reflected in the Convention. 
 
Concerning the protection of individuals, the LOSC requires States to prevent and to 
punish the transport of slaves in ships flying their flag and also declares with respect to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
2003), 57-66; TAVERNIER, Paul, “La Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme et la mer”, in COUSSIRAT COUSTÈRE, 
Vincent (Ed.), La mer et son droit: Mélanges offerts à Laurent Lucchini et Jean-Pierre Quéneudec (Paris: 
Editions A. Pedone, 2003), 575-589; VUKAS, Budislav, The Law of the Sea: Selected Writings  (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), 71-79; CACCIAGUIDI-FAHY, Sophie, “The Law of the Sea and Human 
Rights”, 9 Panoptica 1 (2007), 1-21; TREVES, Tullio, “Human Rights and the Law of the Sea”, 28 Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 1 (2010), 1-14. 
1114 OXMAN, Bernard H., “Human Rights and the Law of the Sea”, in CHARNEY, Jonathan I., ANTON, Donald K. 
& O’CONNELL, Mary Ellen (Eds.), Politics, Values and Functions: International Law in the 21st Century – 
Essays in Honor of Professor Louis Henkin (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 379. 
1115 UN, “Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement relating to the 
implementation of Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of 
the Convention relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish 
stocks”, Table recapitulating the status of the Convention and of the related Agreements (23 May 2012), 
available online: <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_agreements.htm>. 
1116 LOSC, Preamble paras. 4-5. 
1117 LOSC, Art. 136. 
1118 LOSC, Art. 140 (1). 
1119 LOSC, Art. 303. 
1120 LOSC, Art. 192. 
1121 See for example: LOSC, Artt. 16, 94(7), 205, etc. 
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high seas and the EEZ that a slave taking refuge on board a ship – whatever its flag – shall 
ipso facto be free.1122  Another example is the prohibition on imprisonment or other forms of 
corporal punishment for fisheries violations and the requirement that parties who take action 
and impose penalties after arresting and detaining foreign vessels promptly notify the flag 
State of these ships.1123 However, the most important provision in the Convention is the duty 
to render assistance, also a legal obligation for States under customary international law.1124  
Nevertheless, there is no actual right to be rescued for individuals. 
 
1.2.2. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
 
ITLOS is the specialized international judicial tribunal that was created to deal with 
disputes concerning the interpretation and the application of the LOSC. The LOSC provides 
in Article 287 that a State may choose – by a written declaration – any one or more of the 
following means for the settlement of disputes: ITLOS, the ICJ, an arbitral tribunal or a 
special arbitral tribunal for disputes relating to fisheries, protection and preservation of the 
marine environment, marine scientific research or navigation, including pollution from 
vessels and from dumping. In case the parties to a dispute have accepted the same procedure 
for the settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted only to that procedure, unless the 
parties otherwise agree. If the parties to a dispute have not accepted the same procedure for 
the settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted only to arbitration. ITLOS has a residual 
compulsory jurisdiction with respect to the prompt release of vessels (Article 292 LOSC) and 
the prescription of provisional measures under Article 290(5). The majority of disputes that 
have been submitted to ITLOS fall under these two categories. 
 
In its prompt release judgments, ITLOS has underlined the importance of the LOSC for 
the protection of individuals. In the Camouco Case1125 as well as the Monte Confurco Case1126 – 
both judgments from 2000 – ITLOS gave a broad interpretation of the notion ‘detention’, as 
                                                 
1122 LOSC, Art. 99. 
1123 LOSC, Art. 73(3) and 73(4). 
1124 MSC, “Review of safety measures and procedures for the treatment of persons rescued at sea”, IMO Doc. 
MSC 76/22/8 (31 July 2002), Annex “Report-Record of Decisions on the United Nations Inter-Agency Meeting 
on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, para. 6. 
1125 ITLOS, The Camouco Case, Panama v. France, 7 February 2000, ITLOS Reports (2000). 
1126 ITLOS, The Monte Confurco Case, Seychelles v. France, 18 December 2000, ITLOS Reports (2000). 
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applied to the shipmaster and its crew. It ruled that the practice of court supervision during 
a pending case in Réunion – whereby the master had to surrender his passport and the 
authorities were obliged to verify its presence on a daily basis – amounted to ‘detention’ for 
the purpose of the prompt release proceedings under Article 292 LOSC as the master was not 
in a position to leave Réunion.  Two other judgments – the Juno Trader Case (2004)1127 and the 
Hoshinmaru Case (2007)1128 – also paid special attention to the freedom of the master and crew. 
Although in both cases the restrictions to the freedom of movement had been lifted, the 
master and crew were still present in the territory of the prosecuting State. Therefore, ITLOS 
stressed that the master and the crew were free to leave without any condition. Even though 
the persons were not in a state of detention under Article 292 LOSC, ITLOS wanted to 
eliminate all possible obstacles, bureaucratic or otherwise, to the departure of the ship. This 
shows how keen ITLOS is to protect the rights of the individuals involved in the cases 
submitted to it.1129 In the Juno Trader judgment, it was stated “[t]he obligation of prompt release 
of vessels and crews includes elementary considerations of humanity and due process of law. The 
requirement that the bond or other financial guarantee must be reasonable indicates that a concern for 
fairness is one of the purposes of this provision.”1130 ‘International standards of due process of 
law’ were also invoked in the 2007 Tomimaru Case1131 in order to assess whether the 
confiscation of a vessel had been made in such a way as to permit ITLOS to consider that the 
prompt release proceedings concerning the confiscated vessel were without object. 
 
The aforementioned human rights principles or considerations are directly stated in the 
LOSC or can be inferred from its provisions. However, such principles may become 
applicable in a case concerning the application and interpretation of the LOSC even when 
they do not appear in the latter’s provisions. ITLOS first considered the protection of human 
rights in the M/V Saiga case (1999). Although ITLOS regarded persons to be – to a certain 
                                                 
1127 ITLOS, The Juno Trader Case, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea Bissau, 18 December 2004, 
ITLOS Reports (2004). 
1128 ITLOS, The Hoshinmaru Case, Japan v. Russian Federation, 6 August 2007, ITLOS Reports (2007). 
1129 TREVES, Tullio, “Human Rights and the Law of the Sea”, 28 Berkeley Journal of International Law 1 (2010), 
4. 
1130 ITLOS, The Juno Trader Case, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea Bissau, 18 December 2004, 
ITLOS Reports (2004), para. 77. 
1131 ITLOS, The Tomimaru Case, Japan v. Russian Federation, 6 August 2007, ITLOS Reports (2007). 
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extent – ‘accessory’ to ships,1132 it ruled that considerations of humanity must apply in the 
law of the sea as they do in other areas of international law.1133 ITLOS justified integrating 
international law beyond the scope of the LOSC by making reference to Article 293 LOSC, 
which permits the application of other rules of international law not incompatible with the 
Convention. We can conclude that, although ITLOS cannot hear claims brought by 
individuals, it has been keen to introduce certain considerations of humanity into its 
jurisprudence.1134 
 
1.2.3. The SAR and SOLAS Conventions 
 
The primary objective of the SOLAS Convention is the prevention of the loss of life at sea. 
Consequently, it also deals with situations of distress at sea. The SAR Convention on the 
other hand, imputes multi-State coordination of search and rescue systems. Both treaties are 
monitored by the IMO. Following a number of incidents that highlighted concerns about the 
treatment of persons rescued at sea1135 – in particular undocumented migrants, asylum 
seekers and refugees – amendments to the SOLAS and SAR Conventions were adopted in 
May 2004. They entered into force in 2006. The purpose of these amendments is to help 
ensure that persons in distress are assisted, while minimizing the inconvenience to assisting 
ships and ensuring the continued integrity of SAR services.1136 Concerning the rescued 
persons, the amendments stipulate that the obligation of assistance applies regardless of 
                                                 
1132 ITLOS, The M/V Saiga Case (No. 2), St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea, 1 July 1999, ITLOS Reports 
(1999), para. 106. 
1133 ITLOS, The M/V Saiga Case (No. 2), St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea, 1 July 1999, ITLOS Reports 
(1999), para. 155. In the Corfu Channel Case (1949), the ICJ had already reflected the relevance of elementary 
conditions and considerations of humanity as a general principle of international law. See ICJ, Corfu Channel 
Case, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. People’s Republic of Albania, 9 April 1949, ICJ 
Reports 4 (1949). 
1134 For an extensive discussion see: PAPANICOLOPULU, Irini, “The Law of the Sea Convention: No Place for 
Persons?”, 27 International Journal of Marine & Coastal Law 867 (2012). 
1135 For example the case of the Norwegian container ship M/V Tampa (2001). The captain rescued as many as 
438 asylum seekers from drowning in international waters between Christmas Island (Australia) and Indonesia. 
It lasted for weeks until all the countries involved came to a solution for the disembarkation problem, painfully 
demonstrating the insufficiency of the international legal framework. See: DERRINGTON, Sarah & WHITE, 
Michael, “Australian Maritime Law Update 2001”, Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce 33 (2002), 275-291; 
MATHEW, Penelope, “Australian Refugee Protection in the Wake of Tampa”, American Journal of International 
Law 96 (2002), 661-676; BAILLIET, Cecilia, “The Tampa Case and its Impact on Burden Sharing at Sea”, 3 
Human Rights Quarterly 741 (2003), 741-774. 
1136 MSC, “Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, MSC Resolution 167(78) (20 May 2004), 
para. 2.3. 
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their nationality or status or the circumstances in which they are found.1137 Furthermore, 
within the capabilities and limitations of the ship, all embarked persons shall be treated with 
humanity.1138 The owner, the charterer, the company operating the ship or any other person 
shall not influence (because of financial motives for example) the shipmaster’s decision 
concerning what – in his professional judgement – is necessary for the safety of life at sea.1139 
Governments have an obligation to co-ordinate and co-operate to ensure that masters of 
ships providing assistance by embarking persons in distress at sea are released from their 
obligations with minimum further deviation from the ship’s intended voyage.1140 Lastly, 
although there is no actual duty for States to allow disembarkation onto its own territory – a 
State can refuse disembarkation or make this dependant on certain conditions1141 – 
disembarkation of the persons has to be arranged as soon as reasonably practicable.1142 The 
new amendments – drafted with the help of inter alia the UNHCR1143 – were definitely an 
improvement. 
 
The SAR and SOLAS Conventions can be used as an interpretative tool pursuant to 
Article 31(3) VCLT. Concerning the interpretation of treaties, the VCLT provides in Article 
31(3) that (a) subsequent agreements, (b) practice and (c) relevant rules of international law 
between the Parties to a treaty are relevant to its interpretation.1144 Nevertheless, the use of 
such interpretative methods has to remain faithful to the ordinary meaning and context of 
the treaty in light of its object and purpose.1145 Although the ICJ has acknowledged that 
treaties have to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system 
prevailing at the time of the interpretation, it also accepted that there is a primary necessity 
                                                 
1137 SOLAS Convention, Chapter V Regulation 33 para 1. 
1138 SOLAS Convention, Chapter V Regulation 33 para 6. 
1139 SOLAS Convention, Chapter V Regulation 34-1. 
1140 SOLAS Convention, Chapter V Regulation 33 para 1-1; SAR Convention, Chapter 3 para 3.1.9. 
1141 GOODWIN-GILL, Guy S., The Refugee in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd ed. 1996), 157. 
1142 SOLAS Convention, Chapter V Regulation 33 para 1-1; SAR Convention, Chapter 3 para 3.1.9. 
1143 In 2002, a High-Level Inter-agency Group was set up to deal with the problem of migrants at sea. The IMO, 
the UNHCR, the United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (UNDOALOS), the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) were all participating in this Inter-
agency Group. The conclusions of the Interagency Group meetings were the basis for the 2004 SOLAS and SAR 
Amendments. See for example: MSC, “Review of Safety Measures and Procedures for the Treatment of Persons 
Rescued at Sea”, IMO Doc. MSC 76/22/8 (31 July 2002). 
1144 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980), 1155 
UNTS 331. [VCLT] 
1145 VCLT, Art. 31(2). 
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of interpreting an instrument in accordance with the intentions of the parties at the time of its 
conclusion.1146 In combining both the evolutionary and the inter-temporal element, the ICJ 
reflects the opinion of the International Law Commission when commenting on the draft text 
of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT.1147 Although the 1979 SAR and 1974 SOLAS Conventions have 
respectively 101 and 161 State parties,1148 the implementation of the 2004 Amendments – 
containing several humanitarian considerations – proved to be more difficult than expected. 
States like Finland and Malta have not even signed the amendments yet. As there is no 
general acceptance of the provisions contained in the 2004 Amendments, the latter cannot be 
used to re-interpret Article 98 LOSC. States that did not sign the amendments will thus not 
be bound by them. Italy however is a party to the LOSC, the 1979 SAR and 1974 SOLAS 
Conventions and the 2004 SAR and SOLAS Amendments. 
 
To meet the practical obstacles of implementation and in order to assist States in meeting 
their existing commitments, there has been developed a wide range of soft law instruments 
concerning migrants at sea. They contain certain elements which are unlikely to find their 
way into a treaty because of the opposition of some States to binding agreements, but also 
because of their aim. For example, the 2004 IMO Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons 
Rescued at Sea were especially developed to provide guidance to Governments and to 
shipmasters with regard to humanitarian obligations and obligations under the relevant 
international law relating to treatment of persons rescued at sea. These guidelines are 
considered to be associated with the 2004 SAR and SOLAS Amendments, as they were 
adopted at the same time. The term Government that is used in these Guidelines, should be 
read to mean Contracting Government to the SOLAS or SAR Convention. 1149 
 
                                                 
1146 ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Namibia Advisory Opinion), 21 June 1971, 
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1147 ILC, “The Law of Treaties”, Commentary to draft Article 27, para. 16, in WATTS, Arthur D., The 
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1148 IMO, “Status of Conventions summary” (31 August 2012), available online: 
<http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx>. 
1149 MSC, “Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, MSC Resolution 167(78) (20 May 2004), 
para. 1.1. 
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The 2004 IMO Guidelines state that a place of safety can be defined as a location where 
rescue operations are considered to terminate, where the survivors’ safety or life is no longer 
threatened, basic human needs (such as food, shelter and medical needs) can be met and 
transportation arrangements can be made for the survivors’ next or final destination.1150 
Disembarkation of asylum-seekers recovered at sea, in territories where their lives and 
freedom would be threatened, must be avoided.1151 This requirement is applicable regardless 
where the persons were found, thus also on the high seas. 
 
Although these provisions are not binding, a soft law instrument can also contain an 
agreed interpretation of a treaty provision (Article 31(3)(a) VCLT). Subtle evolutionary 
changes in existing treaties may thus come about through the process of interpretation under 
the influence of soft law. Therefore, sometimes there is not even the need for attempting to 
turn a soft law provision into a ‘rule’ of international customary law or to enshrine it in a 
binding treaty.1152 It is submitted that States that have adopted the 2004 SAR and SOLAS 
Amendments have also agreed upon the associated 2004 IMO Guidelines as a tool of 
interpretation. Malta for example did not sign the 2004 Amendments, because they do not 
agree with the provisions in the 2004 Guidelines. On 22 December 2005, the IMO received a 
communication from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malta declaring that Malta “is not yet 
in a position to accept these amendments”.1153 According to Malta there is a safe place in terms of 
search and rescue and there is a safe place in terms of humanitarian law.1154 The 2004 
Guidelines, however, do state that a place of safety has to fulfil certain humanitarian 
requirements too. 
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1.2.4. The Smuggling Protocol 
 
Mixed migration movements make it difficult to make an assessment of the situation at 
hand, especially in case of people without proper identification documents. Nevertheless, all 
of these movements include at least some refugees or other people of concern to the 
UNHCR. As a result, it is not always easy to know which person is a smuggler and which 
person needs protection, although the saving clause in Article 19 of the Smuggling Protocol 
states that the 1951 Refugee Convention has to be respected. Migration itself is not 
considered to be a crime in the Smuggling Protocol. Thus, a migrant who possesses a 
fraudulent document to enable his or her own smuggling would not be included.1155 
Governments are even encouraged to adopt measures to protect smuggled migrants in 
dangerous and inhuman situations.1156 Moreover, when taking measures against migrant 
smuggling by sea, States must ensure the safety and humane treatment of the persons on 
board.1157 Furthermore, the Smuggling Protocol contains a ‘saving clause’ in Article 19(1), 
which makes explicit mention that nations must not use the Protocol to infringe on pre-
existing rights frameworks, including the Refugee Convention.1158 This document binds all 
State signatories of the Smuggling Protocol to follow the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 
1967 Protocol.1159 It has to be noted, however, that the travaux préparatoires indicate that a 
State – which becomes a Party to the Smuggling Protocol but is not a Party to the 1951 
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol – will not become subject to any right, obligation 
or responsibility under these instruments.1160 
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In certain circumstances a refugee or a person in need of protection and a smuggler can 
be one and the same person. BROLAN argues that this creates confusion in the public mind 
and results in politicians exploiting public fear, stereotyping refugees as a social threat.1161 
MORENO-LAX argues that if States want to implement the Smuggling Protocol in good faith, 
they have to introduce appropriate measures to properly distinguish ‘victims’ from 
smugglers, in accordance with international standards.1162 Nevertheless, during the drafting 
stage of the Smuggling Protocol it was decided that the word ‘victim’ – a term that was 
incorporated in the Trafficking Protocol – was inappropriate for smuggled migrants1163 and 
thus a fortiori also for smugglers. 
 
Moreover, the fact that States should not initiate criminal proceedings against migrants 
for the fact of being smuggled does not mean that States are not entitled to bring criminal 
prosecution against them for breaching various immigration and criminal laws during the 
course of their journey. Article 6(4) Smuggling Protocol provides: “Nothing in this Protocol 
shall prevent a State Party from taking measures against a person whose conduct constitutes an 
offence under its domestic law.” Measures can include both criminal and administrative 
sanctions.1164 For example, some of the smuggled migrants on the ship M/V Sun Sea – 
travelling from Sri Lanka to Canada – were believed to be a member of the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an organization which is often being regarded as a terrorist 
organization.1165 Nevertheless, HAMMARBERG stresses that immigration offences (not criminal 
offences) should remain administrative in nature, stating: “Criminalization is a disproportionate 
measure which exceeds a state's legitimate interest in controlling its borders. To criminalize irregular 
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migrants would, in effect, equate them with the smugglers or employers who, in many cases, have 
exploited them. Such a policy would cause further stigmatization and marginalization, even though 
the majority of migrants contribute to the development of European states and their societies.”1166 The 
NGO ‘Freedom from Torture’ has published several reports on the issue of returns of 
members of the Tamil community to Sri Lanka, detailing several cases of torture. Even in 
instances where returns were of a voluntary nature, torture has been perpetrated on Tamils. 
Reports confirm that Sri Lankan authorities often suspect complicity with LTTE activities. As 
a result, membership of the Tamil Tigers, real or perceived, thus puts people at serious risk 
of ill-treatment, abuse, detention and torture.1167 
 
Before drafting the Smuggling Protocol, the United Nations General Assembly stressed 
that – notwithstanding the need for an international convention combating migrant 
smuggling – it is also generally recognized that international efforts to prevent migrant 
smuggling should not inhibit legal migration or freedom of travel or undercut the protection 
provided by international law to refugees.1168 The saving clause in Article 19(1) Smuggling 
Protocol states that the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol have to be respected 
at all times. BROLAN suggests that the inclusion of the saving clause would further imply – 
although she admits that this is somewhat controversial – that the smuggling of persons 
found to be refugees may not be so ‘illegal’. Could it not go to the smuggler’s mitigation that 
he knew those being smuggled likely qualified as refugees, and/or were fleeing inhuman and 
degrading treatment?1169 Nevertheless, there are certainly other ways to help refugees than 
by smuggling and thus obtaining a financial or other material benefit. 
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1.3. The European Convention of Human Rights and the law of the sea 
 
1.3.1. Decisions of the ECtHR 
 
Although the ECHR1170 makes no direct reference to the law of the sea or maritime law, 
the ECtHR has already considered several cases concerning both. On the one hand, it 
involves cases related to state jurisdiction in maritime zones: how can the ECHR be applied 
in a maritime context? Thus, these cases deal with the application of Article 1 ECHR that 
says: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.”  
 
Jurisdiction in international law is generally framed territorially.1171 Nevertheless, 
extraterritoriality does not prevent human rights obligations from being engaged in 
particular circumstances.1172 The ECtHR considers the exercise of ‘effective control’ over the 
territory (for example the Loizidou Case1173) or over the persons concerned (for example Issa 
Case1174) to be the crucial element giving rise to state responsibility. For example, in the 
Medvedyev Case1175, the ECtHR noted that from the date on which the Winner was arrested 
and until it arrived in Brest, the Winner and its crew were under the control of French 
military forces. Although they were outside French territory, they were within the 
jurisdiction of France for the purposes of Article 1 ECtHR. What remained unclear – until the 
Hirsi Case that will be discussed in 2.2. – is whether situations other than those amounting to 
detention or arrest constitute an exercise of control over persons on board vessels sufficient 
to trigger human rights responsibility. 
 
                                                 
1170 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 
1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 222 [ECHR]. 
1171 ECtHR, Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others, 12 December 2001, Appl. No. 52207/99 (2001), para. 
73. 
1172 For a detailed discussion see: MORENO-LAX, Violeta, “Seeking Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a 
Fragmentary Reading of EU Member States’ Obligations Accruing at Sea”, 23 International Journal of Refugee 
Law 174 (2011), 174-220. 
1173 ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 March 1995, Appl. No. 15318/89 (1995). 
1174 ECtHR, Issa and Others v. Turkey, 16 November 2004, Appl. No. 31821/96 (2004). 
1175 ECtHR, Medvedyev and Others v. France, 10 July 2008, Appl. No. 3394/03 (2008), para. 50. 
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On the other hand, the ECtHR decisions concern cases on the protection of the 
applicant’s human rights within the context of the law of the sea. In the Medvedyev Case1176 
(2008) and the Rigopoulos Case1177 (1999) ships flying the Cambodian and the Panamanian 
flags, respectively, were apprehended on the high seas by Navy ships of France and Spain. 
Each seizure was conducted in the framework of the fight against drug trafficking and with 
the authorization of the flag State. As a result, the crew members were taken into custody on 
the Navy ship, brought to a port of the arresting State, and were later submitted to criminal 
proceedings. However, the crew members claimed that the State detaining them had 
violated Article 5(3) ECHR according to which arrested or detained persons “shall be brought 
promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power.” The time 
elapsed between the moment the crew members were taken into custody and the point at 
which they were presented to a judge (16 days in the Rigopoulos Case and 13 in the Medvedyev 
Case) was claimed to be incompatible with the requirement of “promptitude”. However, the 
Court held that there was no violation of Article 5(3) ECHR as the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ prevailed in both cases. The arrest was carried out on the high seas at a 
distance of thousands of kilometres from the French and Spanish territory. Both cases 
demonstrate the relevance of maritime situations in interpreting a human rights law 
provision. 
 
Nevertheless, in order to reach a decision, the ECtHR has sometimes taken certain steps 
in its reasoning that raise doubts from the point of view of an international lawyer 
specializing in the law of the sea. In the Medvedyev Case, the crew members pleaded a 
violation of Article 5(1) ECHR, according to which: “No one shall be deprived of his liberty save 
in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.” The applicants 
claimed that the actors making the arrest did not satisfy the requirement of a procedure 
described by law. The ECtHR decided that the legality of the arrest of the vessel depended 
on the flag State’s consent. However, the ECtHR did not seem to adopt as a starting point the 
idea that the flag State is free to authorize other States to exercise some or all of its powers on 
its ships, and that all States are free to request such authorization to the flag State.  
 
                                                 
1176 ECtHR, Medvedyev and Others v. France, 10 July 2008, Appl. No. 3394/03 (2008). 
1177 ECtHR, Rigoupoulos v. Spain, 12 January 1999, Appl. No. 37388/97 (1999). 
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On the contrary, the approach seemed to be that a request for and the granting of an 
authorization needs a legal basis, in casu Article 108 LOSC that says that “[a]ny State which has 
reasonable grounds for believing that a ship flying its flag is engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs 
or psychotropic substances may request the cooperation of other States to suppress such traffic”and 
Article 17 of the 1988 Drugs Convention stating that a Party – which has reasonable grounds 
to suspect that a vessel exercising freedom of navigation in accordance with international 
law and flying the flag or displaying marks of registry of another Party is engaged in illicit 
traffic – may request authorization from the flag State to board and search the vessel. The 
flag State may subject its authorization to conditions to be mutually agreed between it and 
the requesting Party. An international lawyer specializing in the law of the sea would have 
looked directly at the flag State authorization and would have decided on the basis whether 
this authorization covered the action taken by France. The provision in Article 108 LOSC is 
indeed aimed at encouraging cooperation between States and also Article 17 Drugs 
Convention merely wants to facilitate the cooperation based on the request and grant of an 
authorization. The obligations ensuing from Article 17 Drugs Convention are even 
conditional on the fact that a State can freely request an authorization and a State can freely 
grant or withhold an authorization.1178 
 
In the Women on Waves Case1179 the ECHR considered another aspect of the law of the sea. 
In this case, the Borndiep – a ship flying the Dutch flag – carried out a trip aimed at 
conducting activities in favour of legalizing abortion. However, as abortion was prohibited 
in Portugal at that time, the Portuguese government sent a warship to deny it access to its 
waters. The NGOs that had chartered the Borndiep, claimed that Portugal had violated their 
right of expression and freedom of peaceful meeting and of association under Articles 10 and 
11 of the ECHR. The Portuguese government argued that its interference with the right of 
innocent passage of the Borndiep was legal under Articles 19 and 25 of the LOSC as the 
passage entailed violations of Portuguese law. Furthermore, the measures corresponded to 
restrictions on passage “prescribed by law as are necessary in a democratic society. . .for the 
protection of health or morals” in conformity with Articles 10(2) and 11(2) of the ECHR. 
                                                 
1178 TREVES, Tullio, “Human Rights and the Law of the Sea”, 28 Berkeley Journal of International Law 1 (2010), 
10. 
1179 ECtHR, Women on Waves and Others v. Portugal, 3 February 2009, Appl. No. 31276/05 (2009). 
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Although the ECtHR accepted the view that the interference of the Portuguese Government 
was prescribed by law in Articles 19(2)(g) and 25 LOSC, it held that the acts of interference 
with the navigation of the Borndiep were not necessary in a democratic society. The ECHR 
noted: “the State certainly had at its disposal other means to attain the legitimate objectives of 
defending order and protecting health than to resort to a total interdiction of entry of the Borndiep in 
its territorial waters, especially by sending a warship against a merchant vessel.” TREVES doubts 
whether this argument would be valid in a case regarding interference with innocent 
passage that was submitted to a court or tribunal that had jurisdiction over cases concerning 
the interpretation and application of the LOSC. 1180 
 
The right of innocent passage is one of the cornerstones of the law of the sea. Passage 
through the territorial sea is required to be continuous and expeditious1181 and is innocent so 
long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.1182 Articles 
19(2)(g) LOSC states that the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person 
contrary to the sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State shall be considered to be 
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. In casu, passage could 
thus be considered as non-innocent. The coastal State can take the necessary steps to prevent 
passage which is not innocent.1183 When passage becomes non-innocent, there is no longer a 
right for the vessel to be present in the territorial sea. This right of removal is also being 
regarded as being part of customary international law.1184 However, the powers exercised in 
the territorial sea should be exercised proportionally with the need to prevent or punish such 
infringements.1185 In 1992, the Indonesian government turned away the Lusitania Expresso, a 
Portuguese registered ferry, from its territorial waters. The ferry – carrying human rights 
activists – was headed to East Timor to protest against human rights violations in the region. 
The human rights activists had not yet demonstrated when the Indonesian authorities turned 
the ship away. But according to Indonesia those acts would have violated Article 19(2)(d) 
                                                 
1180 TREVES, Tullio, “Human Rights and the Law of the Sea”, 28 Berkeley Journal of International Law 1 (2010), 
11. 
1181 LOSC, Art; 18(2). 
1182 LOSC, Art. 19(1). 
1183 LOSC, Art. 25. 
1184 See for example: Hoge Raad, Attican Unity Case, Staat der Nederlanden v. BV Bergings- en 
Transportbedrijf  van den Akker, Union de Remorquage et de Sauvetage and Dissotis Shipping Corporation, 7 
February 1986, 61 Schip & Schade (1986). 
1185  GOODWIN-GILL, Guy S., The Refugee in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd ed.1996), 162. 
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and thus rendered the passage non-innocent.1186 This incident illustrates a State’s willingness 
to take pre-emptive measures to prevent the occurrence of non-innocent passage. 
 
      A last case that will be discussed is the Mangouras Case1187, in which the ECtHR  had to 
determine whether a guarantee of three million Euros – fixed by the Spanish judicial 
authorities for release of Captain MANGOURAS of the vessel Prestige from detention – 
constituted a violation of Article 5(3) ECHR. Article 5(3) guarantees release of detainees prior 
to trial with allowance for reasonable bail. The ECtHR Court affirmed that, although the 
amount fixed for release of the captain was admittedly high, it did not contravene the ECHR. 
One of the reasons was the growing and legitimate concern for marine pollution, inter alia as 
expressed in the law of the sea. Thus, values emerging in the law of the sea are assessed by 
the ECtHR to determine whether they should be balanced against values set out in the 
ECHR. 
 
1.3.2. The Hirsi Case 
 
1.3.2.1. The content of the ECtHR judgment 
 
The extraterritorial applicability of the non-refoulementprinciple – which is implicitly 
present in Article 3 ECHR1188 – was decided by the ECtHR on 23 February 2012 in the case 
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy.1189 The applicants – 11 Somali and 13 Eritrean nationals – were 
part of a group of about two hundred individuals who left Libya aboard three vessels with 
the aim of reaching the Italian coast. However, after they were noticed by ships of the Italian 
Revenue Police (Guardia di finanza) and the Coastguard, the persons on board were 
                                                 
1186 See: ROTHWELL, Donald R., “Coastal State Sovereignty and Innocent Passage: The Voyage of the Lusitania 
Expresso”, 16 Marine Policy 427 (1992).  
 
1187 ECtHR, Mangouras v. Spain, 8 January 2009, Appl. No. 12050/04 (2009). 
1188 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 
1950, entered into force 3 September 1953), 213 UNTS 222 [ECHR]. 
1189 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09 (2012). See also: UNHCR, 
“UNHCR’s oral intervention at the European Court of Human Rights Hearing of the case Hirsi and Others v. 
Italy (Application No. 27765/09), Strasbourg, June 22, 2011”, available online: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4e0356d42.pdf>. 
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transferred onto Italian military ships and returned to Tripoli. This return was carried out 
based on a bilateral agreement between Italy and Libya.1190 
 
The applicants relied on Article 3 ECHR to argue that the decision of the Italian 
authorities to intercept the vessels on the high seas – and send the applicants straight back to 
Libya – exposed them to the risk of ill-treatment there, as well as to the serious threat of 
being sent back to their countries of origin (Somalia and Eritrea), where they might also face 
ill-treatment. Although the ECtHR affirmed that only in exceptional cases could acts of the 
Member States performed, or producing effects, outside their territories constitute an 
exercise of jurisdiction by them, it held that in this case there had been a violation of Article 3 
ECHR because the applicants had been exposed to (1) the risk of ill-treatment in Libya and 
(2) of repatriation to Somalia or Eritrea. The ECtHR found that the applicants had fallen 
within the jurisdiction of Italy since in the period between boarding the Italian warships on 
the high seas and being handed over to the Libyan authorities, the applicants had been 
under the continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control of the Italian authorities. The 
fact that none of the applicants were actually returned to these countries was irrelevant since 
it was the existence of the risk which mattered.1191 
 
Additionally, the ECtHR stated that the transfer of the applicants to Libya had been 
carried out without any examination of each individual situation and thus constituted a form 
of collective expulsion, in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 ECHR. Italy argued that none 
of the migrants had actually requested international protection on board the military ships. 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR considered the national authorities – faced with a situation in 
which human rights were being systematically violated – to have an obligation to find out 
about the treatment to which the applicants would be exposed after their return.1192 Thus, it 
seems that there will now be a violation of the Convention in case of enforced return to 
treatment contrary to Article 3 as long as the risk of such a treatment is ‘sufficiently real and 
                                                 
1190 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09 (2012), paras. 9-13. 
1191 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09 (2012), para. 70 et seq. 
Already before this ECtHR-decision, GUILFOYLE concluded that – based on Australian and Spanish state practice 
– the non-refoulementprinciple will be applicable on the high seas when persons are removed onto a government 
vessel. See: GUILFOYLE, Douglas, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 231. 
1192 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09 (2012), para. 133. 
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probable’,1193 whether or not the applicant has notified the deporting authorities of this risk, 
as long as these authorities should have been aware of the risk.1194 
 
1.3.2.2. A law of the sea perspective 
 
As a preliminary matter, it has to be kept in mind that the ‘rights’ in the law of the sea are 
generally not enforceable by or against individuals under the LOSC. In many circumstances 
they are articulated as duties owed by a State to other State parties. Thus, they may be 
enforced by those States pursuant to the compulsory dispute settlement provisions in the 
LOSC. As a treaty has to interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose,1195 there is no room to interpret that the individuals aboard a vessel in distress have 
a positive ‘right’ to be rescued under Article 98 LOSC. Nor do seafarers have a ‘right’ to 
expect that adequate and effective search and rescue services will be made available to them 
by coastal States in case of a distress situation.1196 Furthermore, many of the LOSC provisions 
are not self-executing. As such, these provisions must be implemented through domestic 
legislation before they give rise to legally enforceable rights and duties, at least as far as 
private persons are concerned.1197 Other States, from their side, may have little interest in 
ensuring third State compliance with international law concerning search and rescue at 
sea.1198 
 
The ECtHR decided: “Speculation as to the nature and purpose of the intervention of the Italian 
ships on the high seas would not lead the Court to any other conclusion.” However, from a law of 
the sea perspective, this would be a very important question to start with. In the Parties’ 
                                                 
1193 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09 (2012), para. 136. 
1194 DEMBOUR, Marie-Bénédicte, “Interception-at-Sea: Illegal as currently practiced – Hirsi and Others v. Italy”, 
Strasbourg Observers Blog (1 March 2012), available online: 
<http://strasbourgobservers.com/2012/03/01/interception-at-sea-illegal-as-currently-practiced-hirsi-and-others-v-
italy/>. 
1195 VCLT, Art. 31(1). 
1196 For an extensive discussion see: MOEN, Amy E., “For Those in Peril on the Sea: Search and Rescue under 
the Law of the Sea Convention”, 24 Ocean Yearbook 377 (2010), 377-410. 
1197 BARNES, Richard A., “Refugee Law at Sea”, 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 47 (2004), 
50. 
1198 BARNES, Richard A., “The International Law of the Sea and Migration Control”, in RYAN, Bernard & 
MITSILEGAS, Valsamis (Eds.), Extraterritorial Immigration Control (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), 
107. 
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submissions, the Italian Government stressed that they intercepted the vessels in the context 
of a rescue on the high seas under Article 98 LOSC. According to them, in no circumstances 
could it be described as a maritime police operation. As Italy itself submits that it was a 
rescue, it should also fulfil its obligations under international law concerning search and 
rescue. 
 
Italy signed and ratified the LOSC, as well as the 2004 SAR and SOLAS Amendments. 
Therefore, when carrying out a rescue operation, a place of safety has to be provided to the 
persons. According to the guidelines – which are associated with the 2004 SAR and SOLAS 
Amendments and thus can be used to interpret the amendments – there is a need to avoid 
disembarkation in territories where the lives and freedoms of those alleging a well-founded 
fear of persecution would be threatened, also when the persons are found on the high 
seas.1199 We can conclude that also under the law of the sea it is forbidden to disembark the 
applicants in Libya as Libya could not be regarded as a place of safety. 
 
1.3.2.3. Remaining questions 
 
The Hirsi Case was unanimously adopted by the ECtHR Grand Chamber. The latter 
accepts cases that raise a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the 
Convention or the protocols thereto, or a serious issue of general importance.1200 As the 
principle of non-refoulement as well as the prohibition of collective expulsion have attained 
the status of customary international law, the decision can be expected to have a 
jurisprudential impact beyond the reach of the European Convention.1201 Nevertheless, there 
are still some problems that remain unsolved. 
 
A first issue is whether there will be effective control in a case involving the diversion of 
a ship on the high seas. When diverting a migrant vessel, a State exercises the right of visit 
(Article 110 LOSC). The right of visit is an exception to the general principle of the exclusive 
                                                 
1199 MSC, “Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, MSC Resolution 167(78) (20 May 2004), 
para. 6.17. 
1200 ECHR, Art. 43. 
1201 HESSBRUEGG, Jan Arno, “European Court of Human Rights Protects Migrants Against “Push Back” 
Operations on the High Seas”, ASIL Insights (17 April 2012), available online: 
<http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight120417.pdf>. 
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jurisdiction of the flag State over ships flying its flag, set out in Article 92 LOSC. It entails the 
right of every warship or other duly authorized vessel to board the vessel and, more 
importantly, the right to search the vessel in circumstances of extreme suspicion.1202 As a 
diversion of boats to a certain destination is indisputably a form of actual physical 
interference with the vessel, it must fulfil the conditions of the right of visit to be regarded as 
lawful.1203 Article 110 LOSC stipulates that the right of visit is only justified – next to the 
situation where the flag State has given its consent – when there is reasonable ground for 
suspecting that the ship is engaged in piracy, in slave trade, in unauthorized broadcasting 
and when the ship is without nationality or though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show 
its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship.  The absence of 
nationality in Article 110(1)(d) LOSC seems to be the most relevant ground for the 
interdiction of vessels with migrants on board.1204 The right of visit is based upon the fact that 
the migrant boats are considered to be stateless vessels. As the result of a diversion by an 
Italian warship for example, it could happen that the migrant vessel is actually forced to 
return to Libya. However, the persons were never brought onto an Italian vessel. Is there 
effective control in this case? The law of the sea remains silent on whether the non-
refoulementprinciple is applicable when exercising the right of visit. 
 
Positively establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction has been motivated by a desire to 
avoid double standards or, as was stated by the ECtHR in the Cyprus v. Turkey Case, a 
regrettable vacuum in human rights protection.1205 According to MILANOVIC, the ECtHR 
judgments are not based on the intricacy of the concept of jurisdiction in Article 1 ECHR. The 
tensions in the policy considerations underpinning the law are the decisive factors.1206 On the 
                                                 
1202 LOSC, Art. 110. 
1203 PAPASTAVRIDIS, Efthymios, “Interception of Human Beings on the High Seas: A Contemporary Analysis 
under International Law”, 36 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 145 (2009), 155. 
1204 BARNES, Richard A., “The International Law of the Sea and Migration Control”, in RYAN, Bernard & 
MITSILEGAS, Valsamis (Eds.), Extraterritorial Immigration Control (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), 
130; GOODWIN-GILL, Guy & MCADAM, Jane, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 3rd ed. 2007), 272; PALLIS, Mark, “Obligations of States towards Asylum Seekers at Sea: Interactions and 
Conflicts Between Legal Regimes”, 18 International Journal of Refugee Law, 487, 350-353; PAPASTAVRIDIS, 
Efthymios, “Interception of Human Beings on the High Seas: A Contemporary Analysis under International 
Law”, 36 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 145 (2009), 159. The latter also discusses the 
‘slave trade’ argument as a possible legal basis for interception of human beings on the high seas. 
1205 ECtHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, 10 May 2001, Appl. No. 25781/94 (2001), paras. 78 and 91. 
1206 MILANOVIC, Marko, “Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg”, 23 European Journal of International Law 121 
(2012), 127. 
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one hand, the ECtHR does not want to open the floodgates of litigation by considering every 
individual against whom force was used as falling under the protection of the ECHR. The 
Bankovic case made clear that not any State act capable of violating a person’s human rights 
will amount to an exercise of authority and control over that individual.1207 Up until now, the 
Bankovic case has still not been overruled. On the other hand, in some cases it is manifestly 
arbitrary for persons to be unprotected by the ECHR. For example, in the case Mansur PAD 
and Others v. Turkey, the application concerned the alleged killing of seven Iranian men in 
North-West Iran by Turkish soldiers in May 1999. Turkey admitted it had bombed the area 
from a helicopter as it suspected that terrorists were there. In order to maintain good 
relations with Iran, Turkey had agreed to pay the amount of compensation claimed by the 
Iranian authorities for the killings. However, the victims’ families refused to take the money. 
The ECtHR reiterated that a State may be held accountable for ECHR violations of people 
who were in the territory of another State which was not part of the legal space of the 
Contracting States, but who were found to be under the former State’s authority and control 
through its agents operating – whether lawfully or unlawfully – in the latter State. 1208 
Nothing could have justified the killings and the persons simply had to be protected. 
 
Following this reasoning, any diversion with a probable risk of non-refoulement, will not 
be allowed. As the Mediterranean Sea is almost an enclosed sea, one could indeed sometimes 
foresee where the migrants would go to. However, in the Hirsi Case, there was an extra 
condition. In the period between boarding the ships and being handed over to the Libyan 
authorities, the applicants had been under the continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto 
control of the Italian authorities. In case of diversions, there will only be effective control at 
the time of diverting. Moreover, we must bear in mind that the diverting States will only be 
under an obligation to secure to individuals under its effective control, the rights and 
freedoms in the ECHR that are relevant to the specific situation of those individuals. This 
means that the rights in the ECHR can be ‘divided and tailored’.1209 
 
                                                 
1207 ECtHR, Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others, 12 December 2001, Appl. No. 52207/99 (2001). 
1208 ECtHR, Mansur PAD and Others v. Turkey, 28 June 2007, Appl. No. 60167/00 (2007). 
1209 ECtHR, Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, 7 July 2011, Appl. No. 55721/07 (2011), para. 137. 
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Secondly, what if interception operations on the high seas are being coordinated by 
Frontex? Frontex is the European External Border Agency that organizes joint surveillance 
operations at sea to interdict such migrant boats, helping States to cope with the problem.1210 
Although Frontex is a specialized and independent body, the responsibility for the control 
and surveillance of external borders lies with the Member States.1211 When human rights 
violations result from joint maritime operations, the independent responsibility of each 
participating EU Member State may be invoked.1212 This is how the ECtHR proceeded in the 
Xhavara Case1213, attributing exclusive responsibility to Italy for the acts it perpetrated in 
international waters as a result of the convention concluded with Albania authorizing it to 
patrol both international and Albanian waters for the purpose of migration control. 
However, as there is a lack of transparency concerning the Frontex operations, it will not 
always be easy to know which Member State had effective control. 
 
During Frontex joint operations at sea, equipment and personnel from several EU 
Member States are involved. For example, during the 2011 Operation Hermes in the central 
Mediterranean, Italy (host), Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Switzerland were all participating.1214 
Therefore, it is not always clear which State will be in control. Nevertheless, Regulation 
1168/2011 states that each operation has to be based on a well-defined operational plan, 
including an evaluation and an obligation to report incidents, agreed prior to the start of 
joint operations or pilot projects amongst Frontex and the host Member State and in 
consultation with the participating Member States.  
                                                 
1210 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border of the Member States of the European Union, 
OJ L 349/1 of 25 November 2004; Regulation (EU) No. 1168/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 October 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union, OJ L 304/1 of 22 November 2011. 
1211 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border of the Member States of the European Union, 
OJ L 349/1 of 25 November 2004, Preamble, para. 4. 
1212 See for example: MORENO-LAX, Violeta, “Seeking Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a Fragmentary 
Reading of EU Member States’ Obligations Accruing at Sea”, 23 International Journal of Refugee Law 174 
(2011), 174-220. 
1213 ECtHR, Xhavara and Others v. Italy and Albania, 11 January 2001, Appl. No. 39473/98 (2001). 
1214 Frontex, “General Report (2011)”, 41, available online: 
<http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_report/2011/General_Rep
ort_2011.pdf>. 
 274
 
The operational plan details the organizational aspects before the envisaged beginning of 
the joint operation.1215 It covers all aspects considered necessary for carrying out the joint 
operation, including a description of the tasks and special instructions for the guest officers, 
the composition of the teams of guest officers and the deployment of other relevant staff, 
command and control provisions (with the names and ranks of the host Member State’s 
border guards responsible for cooperating with the guest officers and Frontex, in particular 
those of the border guards who are in command during the period of deployment and the 
place of the guest officers in the chain of command) and the modalities of cooperation with 
third countries, other Union agencies and bodies or international organizations. Regarding 
sea operations, the operational plan has to contain specific information on the application of 
the relevant jurisdiction and legislation in the geographical area where the joint operation or 
pilot project takes place, including references to international and EU law regarding 
interception, rescue at sea and disembarkation.1216 The operational plan could thus help 
identifying the State that had the actual effective control. 
 
1.4. Conclusion 
 
Human rights concerns are intertwined with concerns of the law of the sea. These two 
fields are not separate planets rotating in different orbits, but rather meet in many situations. 
On the one hand, ITLOS takes into account certain human rights considerations. Especially 
in the field of search and rescue at sea, the SAR and SOLAS Conventions and the 
accompanying soft law provisions, are taking into account the non-refoulement principle. Next 
to this, the Smuggling Protocol contains a saving clause, referring to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. On the other hand, the ECtHR considers the law of the sea when appropriate, 
especially in cases of interception. It is important to note that the factual and legal context 
can make the mechanical application of national or regional human rights standards 
                                                 
1215 Regulation (EU) No. 1168/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 304/1 of 22 
November 2011, Art. 3(a). 
1216 Regulation (EU) No. 1168/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 304/1 of 22 
November 2011, Art. 3(a). 
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inappropriate. As a result, it may be undesirable to interpret a treaty or diplomatic note with 
the same strictness one would apply to a domestic statute.1217  
 
GUILFOYLE states: “While the Strasbourg Court is right to insist on the principle of legality 
(nullum crimen sine lege) in national implementation of law enforcement treaties, to apply a principle 
of strict legality (nullum crimen sine lege stricta et scripta) to the treaties themselves is to needlessly 
undermine the enforcement provisions of other treaty regimes. It is erroneous to presume that the 
nullum crimen or nullum poena principle applies in the same manner at the international level as at 
the national level.”1218 As some human rights are simply very difficult to provide for at sea – 
such as access to an independent lawyer – courts should be realistic in case of such 
exceptional circumstances.1219 Although a contextual interpretation of the relevant human 
rights is certainly pragmatic, we have to bear in mind that some of the problems encountered 
are reasonably foreseeable. Therefore, Governments are able to consider in advance the 
measures that could be taken to ensure compliance with ordinary and established human 
rights principles.1220 For example, the request for proposals (contract solicitation) information 
on the design process for the US Coast Guard’s newest ship – the Fast Response Cutter –  
mentions certain requirements in order to be able to deal with large groups of intercepted 
migrants being brought aboard. It says: “The main deck shall be capable of holding 150 Alien 
Migrants for 24 hours, with a minimum clear deck area of 0.5m2 (5 ft2) per person. The arrangement 
shall allow for the processing and movement of alien migrants […] [F]acilities shall include an 
awning, portable head(s), and potable water delivery […]. Deck arrangements shall be such that 
guarding personnel are provided with maximum separation from Alien Migrants while providing 
optimal opportunity for control. The main deck shall have the prescribed minimum clear deck area to 
                                                 
1217 ECtHR, Medvedyev and Others v. France, 10 July 2008, Appl. No. 3394/03 (2008), Partly dissenting 
opinion of Judges COSTA, CASADEVALL, BÎRSAN, GARLICKI, HAJIYEV, ŠIKUTA and NICOLAOUPARAS, paras. 6 
and 9-10. 
1218 GUILFOYLE, Douglas, “Human Rights Issues and Non-Flag State Boarding of Suspect Ships”, in SYMMONS, 
Clive R. (Ed.), Selected Contemporary Issues in the Law of the Sea (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 
103; GUILFOYLE, Douglas, “Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights”, 59 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 141 (2010), 160. 
1219 ECtHR, Medvedyev and Others v. France, 10 July 2008, Appl. No. 3394/03 (2008), Partly dissenting 
opinion of Judges COSTA, CASADEVALL, BÎRSAN, GARLICKI, HAJIYEV, ŠIKUTA and NICOLAOUPARAS, para. 10. 
1220 ECtHR, Medvedyev and Others v. France, 10 July 2008, Appl. No. 3394/03 (2008), Partly dissenting 
opinion of Judges TULKENS, BONELLO, ZUPANČIČ, FURA, SPIELMANN, TSOTSORIA, POWER and POALELUNGI, 
paras. 6-7. 
 276
hold alien migrants after deducting the area required for any portable heads (footprint and tiedown 
interferences included).”1221 
 
Finally, it was interesting to see – be it theoretically – how the law of the sea would have 
dealt with the Hirsi Case. Although individuals cannot directly benefit from the law of the sea 
provisions, it is surprising that these rules already provide protection, be it outside the 
ECHR and the ‘effective control’ theory. When a State – such as Italy – is party to the 2004 
SAR and SOLAS amendments, it cannot disembark rescued persons in territories where their 
lives and freedoms would be threatened, even though they were found on the high seas. In 
Italy, recent declarations at the highest political level stated that the ‘push-back’ policy will 
no longer be applied, in the light of the ECtHR Hirsi Case. Throughout the country, there 
were certainly several efforts to accommodate persons arriving from North Africa. After a 
four-day visit to Rome between 3 and 6 July 2012, Nils MUIŽNIEKS – Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights – concluded that the Italian government gave signs of a 
shift in policy.1222 However, mid-august, two large migrant boats reached Lampedusa.  One 
of the boats was carrying about 250 persons – mainly Sub-Saharan Africans – and was 
thought to have departed from Libya.  A second boat was carrying about 125 Tunisians.  As 
a result, the detention centre on Lampedusa was getting over its 350 person capacity. In 
response to the apparent increase in the numbers of persons reaching the island, former 
Italian Interior Minister Roberto MARONI called for a resumption of Italy’s push-back 
practice in order to halt new boats.1223 
                                                 
1221 Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard Fast Response Cutter B Class (22 June 2007) para. 070-
9.11, available online: <http://www.uscg.mil/Acquisition/sentinel/pdf/frcbrfp.pdf>. 
1222 Council of Europe – Commissioner for Human Rights, “For human rights protection, Italy needs a clear 
break with past practices” (9 July 2012), available online: 
<http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/News/2012/120709Italy_en.asp>. 
1223 Migrants at Sea, “400 Migrants Reach Lampedusa Over Past Weekend; Detention Centre Over Capacity; 
Former Interior Minister Maroni Calls for Resumption of Italy’s Push-Back Practice” (21 August 2012), 
available online: <http://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/2012/08/21/400-migrants-reach-lampedusa-over-past-
weekend-detention-centre-over-capacity-former-interior-minister-maroni-calls-for-resumption-of-italys-push-
back-practice/>. 
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2. When safety and security are being confused 
 
2.1. When the search and rescue framework is being used to intercept 
 
States sometimes rely on the principles associated with search and rescue at sea as a 
means of interdicting vessels that could not otherwise lawfully be visited on the high seas.1224 
Next to this, it is better for a State’s reputation to claim that they have ‘rescued’ migrants at 
sea instead of admitting that they actually interdicted a vessel.1225 In the aforementioned case 
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy1226 (2012), Italy submitted that it intercepted the migrant vessel 
in the context of a rescue on the high seas.1227 The UNCHR already stressed that States should 
avoid the categorization of interception operations as search and rescue operations, because 
this can lead to confusion with respect to disembarkation responsibilities.1228 Although States 
have indeed the duty to render assistance to persons in distress, their actual intent here is 
interdicting a vessel. As interdiction on the high seas is only possible in a limited number of 
cases, states have thus tried to ‘disguise’ these interdictions as rescues. This part will focus on 
the question whether this practice can be considered to be an abuse of right under 
international law. 
 
                                                 
1224 KLEIN, Natalie, “International Migration by Sea and Air”, in OPESKIN, Brian, PERRUCHOUD, Richard & 
REDPATH-CROSS, Jillyanne (Eds.), Foundations of International Migration Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 270. 
1225 E.g. In the Hirsi Case, Italy stated to have rescued asylum seekers that were in distress at sea and not to have 
interdicted them. See: ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09 (2012), 
para. 65. 
1226 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09 (2012). See also: UNHCR, 
“UNHCR’s oral intervention at the European Court of Human Rights Hearing of the case Hirsi and Others v. 
Italy (Application No. 27765/09), Strasbourg, June 22, 2011”, available online: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4e0356d42.pdf>. 
1227 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09 (2012), para. 65. 
1228 UNHCR, “The Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea: Conclusions and Recommendations from Recent 
Meetings and Expert Round Tables Convened by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees – Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,”, UN Doc. 
A/AC.259/17 (11 April 2008), para. 20, available online: 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/consultative_process/consultative_process.htm>. 
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2.1.1. The principle of good faith in international law1229 
 
Abuse of right is often being linked to the principle of good faith. Bin CHENG – author of 
the timely publication General Principles of Law – believed that good faith eludes a priori 
definition. According to him, the notion can be illustrated by means of international judicial 
decisions. However, the concept cannot be defined.1230 The legal concept of good faith entails 
the moral elements of honesty, fairness and reasonableness and therefore it is not easily 
reducible to precise rules. However, as a legal principle, it must be applied only where there 
is a legal obligation in question.1231 In the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ said: “One of the basic 
principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the 
principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation. … The very 
rule of pacta sunt servanda in the law of the treaties is based on good faith.”1232 
 
The VCLT codified and progressively developed the customary rules on the law of 
treaties.1233 Article 26 VCLT says: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must 
be performed by them in good faith”. In this respect, the principle of good faith has three 
functions. First of all, the principle is particularly relevant in relation to the performance of 
treaties. For example, Article 2(2) United Nations Charter mentions: “All Members, in order to 
ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the 
obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.”1234 Parties must observe 
what they have actually agreed to observe. Secondly, the principle has got a function when it 
comes to the interpretation of a treaty. Article 31(1) VCLT stipulates that a treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
                                                 
1229 On good faith, see: CHENG, Bin, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and 
Tribunals (London: Steven & Sons Limited, 1953), 105-160; D'AMATO, Anthony, “Good Faith”, in 
BERNHARDT, Rudolf (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Vol. II (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 
1995); KOLB, Robert, La bonne foi en droit international public (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2000); 
O’CONNOR, John F., Good faith in International Law (Hants: Dartmouth Publishing Company 1991), 148 p. 
1230 CHENG, Bin, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (London: Steven 
& Sons Limited, 1953), 105. 
1231 O’CONNOR, John F., Good faith in International Law (Hants: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1991), 123. 
1232 ICJ, Nuclear Tests Case, New Zealand v. France, 20 December 1974, ICJ Reports 457 (1974), para. 49. The 
association of pacta sunt servanda with ‘faith’ was already well marked in the history of ancient Rome. The 
keeping of treaties and pacts was associated by the Romans with the Goddess Fides, the personification of trust. 
See: O’CONNOR, John F., Good faith in International Law (Hants: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1991), 17. 
1233 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 
UNTS 331 [VCLT]. 
1234 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI. 
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the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. This means that the 
interpretation of a treaty is first of all based on the actual text or ‘plain meaning’. Both in the 
jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and the ICJ, the 
principle of ut res magis valeat quam pereat has been invoked.1235 This principle entails that if a 
piece of law seems unclear, one should try to understand it in a way that makes sense of it. 
However, there are certain limits to this principle. As the Court said in the Interpretation of 
Peace Treaties Advisory Opinion, the principle cannot be applied in a way that would be 
contrary to the spirit of the treaty.1236 Therefore a Court may take into account – in 
interpreting a treaty – honesty, fairness and reasonableness. Thirdly, good faith has a 
function in the process of negotiations for a treaty. International law may invoke specific 
rules derived from good faith, such as estoppel, which may be applied as appropriate to 
negotiations.1237 
 
2.1.2. The principle of abuse of right in international law 
 
In the Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international of 1960 abuse of right is defined 
as: “Exercise par un Etat d'un droit d'une manière ou dans des circonstances qui font apparaître que 
cet exercise a été pour cet Etat un moyen indirect de manquer à une obligation internationale lui 
incombant ou a été effectué dans un but ne correspondant pas à celui en vue duquel ledit droit est 
reconnu à cet Etat.”1238 The abuse of right thus refers to a State exercising a right in such a 
manner or in such circumstances either in a way that avoids an international obligation or for 
a purpose not corresponding to the purpose for which that right was recognized in favor of 
that State. This definition of the concept was footed on two judgments of the PCIJ, namely in 
the Case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia1239 and the Free Zones 
                                                 
1235 See for example: PCIJ, Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex Case, France v. Switserland, 19 
August 1929, PCIJ Ser. A No. 22 (1929), 13; ICJ, Corfu Channel Case, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland v. Albania, 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 4 (1949), 24. 
1236 ICJ, Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania Advisory Opinion, 30 March 
1950, ICJ Reports 65 (1950), 229. 
1237  O’CONNOR, John F., Good faith in International Law (Hants: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1991), 111. 
1238 BASDEVANT, Jules, “Abus de droit”, in X., Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international (Paris : 
Sirey 1960). 
1239 PCIJ, Case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Germany v. Poland, 25 August 
1925, PCIJ Ser. A No. 7 (1926), 30. The Court held: “Germany undoubtedly retained until the actual transfer of 
sovereignty the right to dispose of her property, and only a misuse of this right could endow an act of alienation 
with the character of a breach of the Treaty; such misuse cannot be presumed, and it rests with the party who 
states that there has been such misuse to prove his statement.” 
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Case1240. KISS, however, limits the definition to the relations between States. According to him, 
abuse of rights refers to a State exercising a right either in a way which impedes the 
enjoyment by other States of their own rights or for an end different from that for which the 
right was created, to the injury of another State.1241 
 
Some authors challenge the actual existence of the principle. SCHWARZENBERGER 
stipulated that the arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of a right is not illegal, but merely an 
unfriendly act. He therefore rejects the notion that there is a general rule of international 
customary law prohibiting the abuse of right.1242 The best known proponent of abuse of 
rights has been Hersch LAUTERPACHT. He stated that the determination of when the exercise 
of a right becomes abusive must depend on the specific facts of each case, rather than the 
application of an abstract legislative standard. Abuse of right would occur “when a State 
avails itself of its right in an arbitrary manner in such a way as to inflict upon another State an injury 
which cannot be justified by a legitimate consideration of its own advantage.”1243 Nevertheless, he 
acknowledged that this was a relatively ambiguous definition. Before international courts 
and tribunals, the application of the principle would therefore result in a great deal of 
discretionary power being granted to judges and arbitrators. He thus promoted some caution 
when studying this principle.1244 
 
It is difficult to establish what is supposed to amount to an abuse, as distinct from a harsh 
but justified use, of a right under international law.1245 However, largely due to its 
widespread existence in national legal systems, many authors have considered abuse of 
rights to be part of international law, whether as a general principle of law or as part of 
                                                 
1240 PCIJ, Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex Case, France v. Switzerland, 19 August 1929, 
PCIJ Ser. A/B No. 46 (1932), 167. The Court suggested that if a State attempted to avoid its contractual 
obligations by resorting to measures having the same effect as the specifically prohibited acts, an abuse of rights 
would result. 
1241 KISS, Alexandre, “Abuse of Rights”, in BERNHARDT, Rudolf (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International 
Law (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1992-2003), Vol. I. 
1242 SCHWARZENBERGER, Georg & BROWN, Edward D., A Manual of International Law (Abingdon: Professional 
Books, 6th ed. 1976), 119. 
1243 OPPENHEIM, Lassa, International Law: A Treatise (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 8th ed. 1955 by 
LAUTERPACHT, Hersch), 345. 
1244 LAUTERPACHT, Hersch, The Development of International Law by the International Court (London: Stevens 
& Sons, 1958), 164; see also LAUTERPACHT, Hersch, “Droit de la paix”, 62 Recueil des Cours 95 (1937), 342. 
1245 SCHWARZENBERGER, Georg & BROWN, Edward D., A Manual of International Law (Abingdon:  Professional 
Books, 6th ed.1976), 84. 
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customary international law.1246 Abuse of rights first found support in international law 
when the Advisory Committee of Jurists was drafting Article 38 of the Statute of the PCIJ1247, 
which identifies sources of international law and which later became Article 38 of the Statute 
of the ICJ.1248 One of the members of the Committee, referred to the principle “which forbids 
the abuse of rights” as one of the “general principles of law”.1249 According to him, disputes 
concerning the right of a coastal state to fix the breadth of its territorial sea are an example of 
this principle. At that time, there was no international rule defining the outer limit of the 
territorial sea. Therefore he suggested that the Court be permitted to admit the rules of each 
State in this respect as “equally legitimate in so far as they do not encroach on other principles, such 
for instance, as that of the freedom of the seas.”1250 
 
The principle also appears in case law of the PCIJ and the ICJ. When dealing with the 
right to draw straight baselines in a territorial sea delimitation in the Fisheries Case, the ICJ 
said: “The base-line has been challenged on the ground that it does not respect the general direction of 
the coast. It should be observed that, however justified the rule in question may be, it is devoid of any 
mathematical precision. In order properly to apply the rule, regard must be had for the relation 
between the deviation complained of and what, according to the terms of the rule, must be regarded as 
the general direction of the coast. Therefore, one cannot confine oneself to examining one sector of the 
coast alone, except in a case of manifest abuse; nor can one rely on the impression that may be gathered 
from a large scale chart of this sector alone.”1251 Some additional support for the principle may be 
found in separate and dissenting opinions as well as in international arbitral decisions. Also, 
                                                 
1246 See generally BYERS, Michael, “Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, A New Age”, 47 McGill Law Journal 
389 (2002) 389-431; WHITEMAN, Marjorie M., Digest of International Law (Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1965), Vol. V, 224-30; KISS, Alexandre, “Abuse of Rights”, in BERNHARDT, Rudolf (Ed.), 
Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1992-2003), Vol. I. 
1247 Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (adopted 16 December 1920, entered into force 5 
September 1921) 6 LNTS 279. 
1248 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 16 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 33 
UNTS 993 [ICJ Statute], Art. 38(1)(c) which reads: “The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: ... (c) the general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations”; See generally: CHENG, Bin, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts 
and Tribunals (London: Stevens & Sons, 1953), 490 p. 
1249 X., Procès-verbaux des séances du comité (The Hague : Van Langenhuysen Brothers, 1920), 314-315 and 
335. 
1250 X., Procès-verbaux des séances du comité (The Hague, Van Langenhuysen Brothers 1920), 315. 
1251 ICJ, Fisheries Case, United Kingdom v. Norway, 18 December 1951, ICJ Reports 116 (1951), 141-142. 
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a number of States have argued for the applicability of abuse of rights in State-to-State 
litigation and arbitration.1252 
 
2.1.3. The link between good faith and abuse of right 
 
It is possible to argue that abuse of right is redundant because it is itself only a more 
specific expression of a broader principle, namely that of good faith. For example, BIRNIE & 
BOYLE argue that abuse of right is merely a method of interpreting rules concerning matters 
such as the duty to negotiate and consult in good faith, or another way of formulating a 
doctrine of reasonableness or a balancing of interests. Therefore they conclude that the 
principle does not add anything useful.1253 CHENG similarly writes that the theory of abuse of 
right is merely an application of good faith to the exercise of rights.1254 Nonetheless, the 
principle of abuse of right is not redundant since it is – in a small yet important respect – 
supplemental to the principle of good faith since it provides the threshold at which a lack of 
good faith gives rise to a violation of international law, with all the attendant 
consequences.1255 
 
2.1.4. Good faith and abuse of right in the law of the sea 
 
Article 300 LOSC stipulates: “States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed 
under this Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this 
Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right”. The inclusion of this 
provision provides circumstantial evidence of the acceptability of the doctrine in 
international law.1256 In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, Australia and New Zealand alleged 
before ITLOS that Japan was “in breach of its obligations under international law, specifically 
Articles 64 and 116-119 LOSC, and in relation thereto Article 300 and the precautionary principle 
                                                 
1252 For an extensive overview of the case law see: BYERS, Michael, “Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, A New 
Age”, 47 McGill Law Journal 389 (2002), 389-431. 
1253 BIRNIE, Patricia & BOYLE, Alan E., International Law and the Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1992), 126. 
1254 CHENG, Bin, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (London: Stevens 
& Sons, 1953), 21. 
1255 BYERS, Michael, “Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, A New Age”, 47 McGill Law Journal 389 (2002), 
411. 
1256 ILUYOMADE, Babatunde O., “The Scope and Content of a Complaint of Abuse of Right in International 
Law”, 16 Harvard International Law Journal 47 (1975), 71. 
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which, under international law, must direct any party in the application of those articles.”1257 
Although they cited the provision as a useful guide in interpreting Japan’s duties, they did 
not invoke the principle as the basis of an independent cause of action.1258 When ITLOS 
issued its decision, the order did not refer to Article 300 LOSC or relied on allegations of 
abuse of right.1259 
 
When the controversy moved to the Arbitral Tribunal, Australia and New Zealand again 
cited Article 300 LOSC.1260 These allegations – based on a treaty that specifically refers to the 
abuse of right – would seem to provide an ideal situation for the parties to invoke that 
principle as a separate legal basis for their claims.1261 However, in reality both Australia and 
New Zealand specifically stated that they were not accusing Japan of an independent breach 
of an obligation to act in good faith.1262 This reluctance of States to allege an independent 
breach of the article reflects an awareness of the diplomatic cost a State may pay in making 
such allegations against another State. It will be difficult to prove that a State is guilty of a 
substantive breach of the abuse of right principle.1263 The Arbitral Tribunal put forward that 
the burden of proof on a State making such allegations is very high. It does not exclude, 
however, that a court or a tribunal might find that the obligations of Article 300 LOSC 
provide a basis for jurisdiction.1264 We can conclude that, although it is very rare for a 
provision of this kind to be included in an international treaty1265 and despite the explicit 
language of the provision, the experience to date suggests that Article 300 LOSC is unlikely 
                                                 
1257 ITLOS, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Australia and New Zealand v. Japan, 30 July 1999, Australia’s 
Request for Provisional Measures, ITLOS Reports (1999), 25. 
1258 HOFF, Paul S. & GOULDING, Michael I., “Japan's Whale Research Program and International Law”, 32 
California Western International Law Journal 151 (2002), 197. 
1259 ITLOS, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Australia and New Zealand v. Japan, 27 August 1999, ITLOS Reports 
(1999). 
1260 Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Australia and New Zealand v. Japan, 15 July 1999, Australia’s Statement of 
Claim and Grounds on Which It Is Based in the Dispute Concerning Bluefin Tuna, paras. 37 and 45. 
1261 HOFF, Paul S. & GOULDING, Michael I., “Japan’s Whale Research Program and International Law”, 32 
California Western International Law Journal 151 (2002), 198. 
1262 Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Australia and New Zealand v. Japan, 31 March 2000, Reply on Jurisdiction of 
Australia and New Zealand, para. 182. 
1263 HOFF, Paul S. & GOULDING, Michael I., “Japan’s Whale Research Program and International Law”, 32 
California Western International Law Journal 151 (2002), 198. 
1264 Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Australia and New Zealand v. Japan, 4 August 2000, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, para. 64. 
1265 NORDQUIST, Myron H. (Ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary 
(Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1985-2003), Vol. V, para. 300.6. 
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to have much practical meaning or effect. In fact, no international tribunal has yet expressly 
founded liability on such an abuse of right doctrine. However, this cannot be completely 
excluded in the future. 
 
2.1.5. Abuse of right and interdictions in disguise 
 
As already stated, interception on the high seas is subject to a number of conditions 
which – if not met – can lead to illegal actions. Therefore, States tend to categorize 
interdictions on the high seas as rescues. Could these actions constitute an abuse of right 
under international law, and more specifically Article 300 LOSC? In its commentary on the 
LOSC, NORDQUIST stipulates that it would appear that the parameters of the notion of abuse 
of rights as enunciated in Article 300 LOSC are limited to relations between States Parties as 
defined in Article 1(2) LOSC. He therefore refers to the definition put forward by KISS.1266 
Thus, to amount to an abuse of right, these rescues on the high seas have to be carried out in 
a way which impedes the enjoyment by other States of their own rights or for an end 
different from that for which the right was created, to the injury of another State.1267 The 
purpose of these rescues is definitely not consistent with the purpose of the duty to render 
assistance.  
 
Therefore, we can conclude that this constitutes an end different from that for which the 
duty was created. The most difficult element is however that this must lead to the injury of 
another State. As in casu we deal with migrant vessels with potential asylum-seekers on 
board, it is highly unlikely that any State considers the interdictions in disguise as injurious. 
Nevertheless, we can conclude that the duty to render assistance was not created for the end 
it is being used sometimes. 
 
                                                 
1266 NORDQUIST, Myron H. (Ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary 
(Dordrecht: Nijhoff 1985-2003), Vol. V, para. 300.5. 
1267 KISS, Alexandre, “Abuse of Rights”, in BERNHARDT, Rudolf (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International 
Law (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1992-2003), Vol. I. See also: GOODWIN-GILL, Guy S., “State Responsibility 
and the ‘Good Faith’ Obligation in International Law”, in FITZMAURICE, Malgosia & SAROOSHI, Dan (Eds.), 
Issues of State Responsibility before International Judicial Institutions (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), 75-104. 
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2.2. When the search and rescue framework is being used to smuggle 
 
Due to increased interception measures at sea, smugglers are often sending migrants to 
navigate the sea on their own, rather than risk being caught with the passengers. Also, 
because of the likelihood that the vessels will not return, smugglers are utilizing less 
expensive materials to build the boats. With no need to transport fuel for a return trip, 
migrants are making use of this extra space by loading their boats with more people, 
resulting in more drownings.1268 MSC points out that illegal migrants are often transported 
on ships that are not properly manned, equipped or licensed for carrying passengers on 
international voyages and that States should take steps to eliminate these unsafe practices.1269 
For example, every year tens of thousands of Somalis and Ethiopians – often fleeing violence, 
human rights abuses and poverty in the Horn of Africa – pay smugglers to ferry them across 
the Gulf of Aden to Yemen. Many never make it, as the boats capsize or smugglers beat some 
of the passengers to death, force them overboard, or disembark people too far from 
shores.1270 
 
Smugglers are generally well informed about States’ protection obligations in case of 
distress situations and thus they act to exploit them. They are able to instruct migrants what 
to do upon interception to increase their chances of gaining entry into and remaining in 
countries of destination. For instance, States have been faced with situations of people 
sabotaging their own vessels to force authorities to carry out rescues.1271 As the concept of 
distress is not qualified, it also includes ‘self-induced’ distress as a type of distress in need of 
rescue.1272 PUGH argues that a group of determined people who have set out on a risky 
                                                 
1268 CARLING, Jorgen, “Migration Control and Migrant Fatalities at the Spanish-African Borders”, 41 
International Migration Review 316 (2007), 327. See also: NESSEL, Lori A., “Externalized Borders and the 
Invisible Refugee”, 40 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 625 (2009). 
1269 MSC, “Interim Measures for Combating Unsafe Practices Associated with the Trafficking or Transport of 
Illegal Migrants by Sea”, IMO Doc. MSC.1/Circ. 896/Rev. I (12 June 2001), para. 4. 
1270 Early 2012, a migrant vessel – crewed by three smugglers and carrying 58 passengers – set sail for Yemen. 
However, the boat’s engine broke down and smugglers forced 22 passengers overboard. After five days, the boat 
capsized in rough seas and bad weather. At least 11 people drowned following this boat incident. See: UNHCR, 
“Somalis Perish in New Boat Disaster in Gulf of Aden”, Briefing Note (10 February 2012), available online: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/4f35146d9.html>. 
1271 UNODC, “Smuggling of Migrants by Sea”, Issue Paper (2011), 7, available online: 
<http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Migrant-Smuggling/Issue-Papers/Issue_Paper_-
_Smuggling_of_Migrants_by_Sea.pdf>. 
1272 MALLIA, Patricia, Migrant Smuggling by Sea: Combating a Current Threat to Maritime Security through the 
Creation of a Cooperative Framework (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 98. 
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voyage in a substandard vessel may not be easily recognized as being in a condition of 
distress. Therefore, this argument cannot be supported.  
 
Moreover, so-called ‘rescuers’ are in fact smugglers. On 9 September 2012, Italian 
authorities questioned survivor reports that the boat on which they were sailing from 
Tunisia actually sank or capsized near Lampedusa on 7 September. Italian authorities raised 
the possibility that the survivors were intentionally landed on the small island of Lampione – 
approximately 20 km west of Lampedusa – by a smuggler’s ‘mother ship’ and that the 
smugglers then returned to Tunisia.  Some of the 56 survivors who were rescued from 
Lampione reported that their boat sank and they were forced to swim to the island. 
However, Italian authorities did not find sufficient debris, bodies, or other evidence that 
would indicate that their boat sank.  Although two bodies were recovered, the locations of 
the recovered bodies are not consistent with the location where the migrant boat is reported 
to have sunk.1273 These kind of practices can result in criminalization of seafarers, as almost 
happened in the aforementioned case of the Cap Anamur. The fear of criminalization by those 
who go to the rescue of boats carrying migrants is one of the reasons why commercial vessels 
fail to go to the rescue of persons in distress at sea.1274  
 
2.3. Conclusion 
 
Concerning migrants at sea, maritime safety and security are sometimes deliberately 
being abused. First, the search and rescue framework is being abused to intercept persons. 
States sometimes rely on the principles associated with search and rescue at sea as a means 
of interdicting vessels that could not otherwise lawfully be visited on the high seas.1275 This 
should be avoided, as it creates confusion on the rights and duties of all the parties involved. 
                                                 
1273 Migrants at Sea, “Question Raised Whether Migrant Boat Sank Off Lampedusa Last Week” (9 September 
2012), available online: <http://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/2012/09/09/question-raised-whether-migrant-boat-
sank-off-lampedusa-last-week/>. 
1274 PACE launched an inquiry in 2011 to investigate why over 1.000 migrants had died or perished in the 
Mediterranean Sea while trying to reach European soil from North Africa. See PACE, “Lives Lost in the 
Mediterranean Sea: Who is Responsible?”, Report of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced 
Persons (29 March 2012), para. 13.4, available online: 
<http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2012/20120329_mig_RPT.EN.pdf>. 
1275 KLEIN, Natalie, “International Migration by Sea and Air”, in OPESKIN, Brian, PERRUCHOUD, Richard & 
REDPATH-CROSS, Jillyanne (Eds.), Foundations of International Migration Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 270. 
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Second, the search and rescue framework is being used by smugglers. However, this might 
lead to criminalization of seafarers. As a result, shipmasters fail to go to the rescue of persons 
in distress at sea. 
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3. The future? 
 
Adapting the LOSC in order to meet new challenges such as migration by sea is not an 
option. As the LOSC embodies a carefully negotiated balance of interests, it contains several 
provisions specifically designed to preserve its integrity.1276 Not only are reservations or 
exceptions only allowed when expressly permitted by the Convention,1277 inter se agreements 
between State Parties must be compatible and notice must be given to other State Parties.1278 
Moreover, amendment procedures are very strict and it is unlikely that they will ever be 
used.1279 The approach that is suggested is two-folded: (1) high-level interagency cooperation 
to tackle both law of the sea and human rights/humanitarian matters with regard to safety as 
well as security issues; and (2) strengthened regional cooperation between States in order to 
share the burden. 
 
Interdisciplinary problems therefore ask for interdisciplinary solutions. The 
abovementioned problems are indeed interdisciplinary in nature, including inter alia law of 
the sea, human rights and refugee law. Therefore, steps to improve the legal framework 
cannot be taken by only one agency, for example the IMO or UNHCR. Instead, it is 
submitted that a group of agencies should work together to tackle the interdisciplinary 
issues. To specifically combat trafficking in persons, there does already exist a high-level 
interagency group, namely the Interagency Coordination Group against Trafficking in 
Persons (ICAT). ICAT was established by General Assembly Resolution and aims to improve 
coordination and cooperation between UN agencies and other international organizations to 
facilitate a holistic approach to prevent and combat trafficking in persons, including 
protection of and support for victims of trafficking.1280 The participating organizations 
include the IOM, the ILO, OHCHR, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and 
                                                 
1276 BOYLE, Alan, “Further Development of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea”, in FREESTONE, David, 
BARNES, Richard & ONG, David M. (Eds.), The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 43. 
1277 LOSC, Art. 309. 
1278 LOSC, Art. 311. 
1279 LOSC, Artt. 313-314. 
1280 UNGA, “Improving the Coordination of Efforts against Trafficking in Persons”, UN Doc. A/RES/61/180 (8 
March 2007). 
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UNODC.1281 Concerning smuggling of persons however, there does not exist a similar 
initiative. 
 
Also, as was mentioned in the first chapter of this dissertation, in the aftermath of the 
M/V Tampa Case in 2001, a high-level interagency group on the treatment of persons rescued 
at sea was set up. This group consists of UNDOALOS, UNHCR, UNODC, OHCHR, IOM 
and IMO.1282 IMO’s area of competence is search and rescue at sea as well as the delivery of 
rescued persons to a place of safety, as regulated by the SOLAS and SAR Conventions. The 
area of competence of UNDOALOS – as far as the LOSC is concerned – is also restricted to 
sea operations and related aspects, including issues of sovereignty, territorial waters, etc., 
with issues of international co-ordination and co-operation in ocean affairs and the law of the 
sea within the ambit of the United Nations General Assembly. On the other hand, the areas 
of competence of UNHCR, UNODC, OHCHR and IOM are considered to be multi-
disciplinary as they respectively relate to issues concerning asylum, transnational organized 
crime including the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, human rights 
and migrants in general, on a global scale.1283 The responsibilities, that each should assume 
for follow-up action in emergency cases, naturally relates to the areas of competence and co-
competence. Collaborative and co-operative efforts should strive to complement the work of 
the different organizations and agencies. The development of a common legal position in 
complex situations is very important. 1284 
 
However, until now, this interagency cooperation has thus far only been focusing on 
rescue at sea and disembarkation problems. Although the conclusions of the interagency 
                                                 
1281 UNODC, “International Organizations United against Trafficking in Persons” (13 December 2010), available 
online: < http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/2010/inter-agency-coordination-group-against-
trafficking-in-persons-icat.html>. 
1282 MSC, “Review of Safety Measures and Procedures for the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, IMO Doc. 
MSC 76/22/8 (31 July 2002), Annex: “Report-Record of Decisions on the United Nations Inter-Agency Meeting 
on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, para. 3. 
1283 MSC, “Review of Safety Measures and Procedures for the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, IMO Doc. 
MSC 76/22/8 (31 July 2002), Annex: “Report-Record of Decisions on the United Nations Inter-Agency Meeting 
on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, para. 32. 
1284 MSC, “Review of Safety Measures and Procedures for the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, IMO Doc. 
MSC 76/22/8 (31 July 2002), Annex: “Report-Record of Decisions on the United Nations Inter-Agency Meeting 
on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, para. 33. 
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group meetings were the basis for the 2004 SOLAS and SAR Amendments,1285 the IMO 
Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea,1286 the IMO/UNHCR Practical guide 
on rescue at sea1287 and the 2009 FAL guidelines on disembarkation,1288 specific problems 
relating to security issues were not addressed. For example, IMO/UNHCR Practical guide on 
rescue at sea does not mention what to do in case of smuggling suspicion. Also, outside the 
interagency group, several international and regional initiatives for cooperation were 
introduced, such as the UNHCR Draft Model framework for cooperation following rescue at 
sea operations  (burden and responsibility-sharing among States during and after rescue),1289 
the Regional MoU for the Mediterranean on concerted procedures relating to the 
disembarkation of persons rescued at sea (purely maritime matters)1290 and the Regional 
cooperation framework within the Bali Process.1291 However, until now, these initiatives were 
not harmonized. Although the UNHCR Draft Model framework for cooperation mentions 
that it could be implemented into the Regional MoU for the Mediterranean, this is not yet the 
case. Furthermore, neither instruments mention the interception or the smuggling of 
migrants. 
 
Therefore, the high-level interagency cooperation should in the future focus on elements 
not yet taken into account. Some issues raised by domestic law and international legal 
                                                 
1285 MSC, “Adoption of Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as 
Amended”, MSC Resolution 153(78) (20 May 2004); MSC, “Adoption of Amendments to the International 
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979, as Amended”, MSC Resolution 155(78) (20 May 2004). The 
amendments entered into force on 1 January 2006. 
1286 MSC, “Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, MSC Resolution 167(78) Annex 34 (20 
May 2004). 
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(2006), available online: 
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1288 FAL, “Principles Relating to Administrative Procedures for Disembarking Persons Rescued at Sea”, IMO 
Doc. FAL 3/Circ.194 (22 January 2009). 
1289 UNHCR, “Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Distress at Sea – How Best to 
Respond?”, Background paper (8-10 November 2011), available online: 
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UNHCR’s 10 Point Plan of Action on Refugee Protection and International Migration. See: UNHCR, “Refugees 
and Asylum-Seekers in Distress at Sea – How Best to Respond?”, Summary Conclusions (8-10 November 
2011), available online: <http://www.unhcr.org/4ede2ae99.html>, para. 13. 
1290 HESSE, Hartmut, “Persons rescued at Sea”, Presentation by the Senior Deputy Director, IMO Maritime safety 
Division at the Expert Meeting on Refugee and Asylum Seekers in Distress at Sea (8-10 November 2011), 
available online: <http://www.unhcr.org/4ef3061c9.html>. 
1291 SUWANIKKHA, Surat, “The Regional Cooperation Framework and the Bali Process – An Overview”, 
Presentation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Humanitarian Migration Section at the Expert 
Meeting on Refugee and Asylum Seekers in Distress at Sea (8-10 November 2011), available online: 
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instruments relating to transnational organized crime have not yet been taken into account 
and the law enforcement perspective to combat smuggling and trafficking had not yet been 
extensively discussed. For example, where crimes may have been committed, those involved 
– including seafarers and humanitarian workers – should bear in mind the possibility of 
investigative measures, their legal obligations not to obstruct investigations, and possible 
legal obligations imposed by the criminal law of flag or investigating States.1292 Next to this, 
the interagency group could play a role in harmonizing the new (regional) initiatives. 
 
The most essential ingredient for an effective and a comprehensive response to the 
problem of migration by sea – together with the adoption and the implementation of the 
relevant international instruments – is strengthened cooperation between States.1293 States are 
sometimes reluctant to cooperate on issues concerning migrants. The reason for this is that 
they fear to create a pull factor. For example, in 2012, Frontex reported that there was a 
significant increase in the number of Somalis reaching Malta. Frontex stated: “Taking into 
account the professional planning of the trips, it is assumed that the modus operandi has changed and 
that Malta is now targeted on purpose, thereby replacing Italy as the preferred destination country for 
this nationality. The reason for this change has not yet been confirmed; however, in the past Malta 
resettled some Somali migrants in the United States and in some EU Member States, which might be 
acting as a pull factor.”1294 Nevertheless, regional arrangements should focus on burden-
sharing, as some States are disproportionately affected. 
                                                 
1292 MSC, “Review of Safety Measures and Procedures for the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea”, IMO Doc. 
MSC 76/22/8 (31 July 2002), Annex: “Report-Record of Decisions on the United Nations Inter-Agency Meeting 
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1293 UNODC, “Smuggling of Migrants by Sea”, Issue Paper (2011), 8, available online: 
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Summary 
 
First, we took a look at the interaction between the law of the sea and human rights. 
Human rights concerns are intertwined with concerns of the law of the sea. These two fields 
are not separate planets rotating in different orbits, but rather meet in many situations. 
Especially in the field of search and rescue at sea, the SAR and SOLAS Conventions and the 
accompanying soft law provisions, are taking into account the non-refoulement principle. On 
the other hand, the ECtHR considers the law of the sea when appropriate, especially in cases 
of interception. It is important to note that the factual and legal context can make the 
mechanical application of national or regional human rights standards inappropriate. As 
some human rights are simply very difficult to provide for at sea – such as access to an 
independent lawyer – courts should be realistic in case of such exceptional circumstances.1295 
Although a contextual interpretation of the relevant human rights is certainly pragmatic, we 
have to bear in mind that some of the problems encountered are reasonably foreseeable. 
Therefore, Governments are able to consider in advance the measures that could be taken to 
ensure compliance with ordinary and established human rights principles.1296 Second, the 
confusion between maritime safety and security was discussed. The search and rescue 
framework is sometimes being (ab)used to intercept. Next to this, although the definition of 
migrant smuggling seems quite clear, it was pointed out that States sometimes confuse – 
willingly or unwillingly – rescuers with smugglers.  
 
These problems have one common element: different areas of international law cross, 
creating confusion on how to deal with a certain situation. The high-level interagency group 
on the treatment of persons at sea is able to address these interdisciplinary issues as each 
agency can rely on the diverse competences they have. The high-level interagency 
cooperation has already proved that it is efficient in improving the legal framework 
concerning search and rescue at sea by tackling some of the main practical problems. 
Unfortunately, until now interagency cooperation has almost exclusively been focusing on 
                                                 
1295 ECtHR, Medvedyev and Others v. France, 10 July 2008, Appl. No. 3394/03 (2008), Partly dissenting 
opinion of Judges COSTA, CASADEVALL, BÎRSAN, GARLICKI, HAJIYEV, ŠIKUTA and NICOLAOUPARAS, para. 10. 
1296 ECtHR, Medvedyev and Others v. France, 10 July 2008, Appl. No. 3394/03 (2008), Partly dissenting 
opinion of Judges TULKENS, BONELLO, ZUPANČIČ, FURA, SPIELMANN, TSOTSORIA, POWER and POALELUNGI, 
paras. 6-7. 
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safety issues, such as rescue. By creating a new dialogue on the security concerns, the 
problem of migrant smuggling could be handled more efficiently. Next to this, the most 
essential ingredient for an effective and a comprehensive response to the problem of 
migration by sea – together with the adoption and the implementation of the relevant 
international instruments – is strengthened cooperation between States.1297 
 
                                                 
1297 UNODC, “Smuggling of Migrants by Sea”, Issue Paper (2011), 8, available online: 
<http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Migrant-Smuggling/Issue-Papers/Issue_Paper_-
_Smuggling_of_Migrants_by_Sea.pdf>. 
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1. Concluding remarks 
 
The central research question of this study is whether the law of the sea provides enough 
tools to deal with migrants at sea both as a safety and as a security problem and if not, how 
we can improve the law in order to meet the current needs.  
 
First, concerning migrants at sea as a safety problem, we can state that practice does not 
meet legal obligations. The reason for this is the lack of a disembarkation duty. Although it is 
a legal obligation for shipmasters and States to render assistance to persons in danger of 
being lost and to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, there is 
no comparable duty for States to disembark these persons. Therefore, shipmasters are 
reluctant to rescue migrants at sea because they now that States will often refuse 
disembarkation. Although recent international and European soft law initiatives do focus on 
such a duty, they also put too much burden on the coastal States. The 2009 IMO Guidelines 
on Principles Relating to Administrative Procedures for Disembarking Persons Rescued at 
Sea mention that if disembarkation from the rescuing ship cannot be arranged swiftly 
elsewhere, the Government responsible for the SRR should accept the disembarkation.1298 
Similarly, Council Decision 2010/2521299 states in its Guidelines that regarding 
disembarkation, priority should be given to the third country from where the ship carrying 
the persons departed or through the territorial waters or SRR of which that ship transited. If 
this is not possible, priority should be given to disembarkation in the Member State hosting 
the surveillance operation at sea.1300 Due to the increased loss of life in the Mediterranean in 
2011, the negotiations on the Draft Regional Agreement on concerted procedures relating to 
the disembarkation of persons rescued at sea in the Mediterranean Basin were speeded up. 
Malta has an important role in this agreement due to its enormous SRR. One of the problems 
that should be tackled is the coordination between the several SRR in the Mediterranean. 
                                                 
1298 FAL, “Principles Relating to Administrative Procedures for Disembarking Persons Rescued at Sea”, IMO 
Doc. FAL 35/Circ.194 (22 January 2009), para. 2.3. 
1299 Council Decision (EU) No. 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, OJ L 111/20 of 4 
May 2010. 
1300 Council Decision (EU) No. 2010/252 of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, OJ L 111/20 of 4 
May 2010, Annex Part II para. 2.1. 
 296
Also, a system of burden-sharing has to be part of the agreement. When the Regional 
Agreement could meet part of the concerns Malta has, it could even go further than purely 
maritime matters and thus include provisions on human rights and humanitarian law. The 
key solution is burden-sharing between States: without any prior agreements, the life of 
many migrants is being jeopardized. It is estimated that for every 100 people safely landing 
after a dangerous journey in the Mediterranean, 5 people drown without leaving any 
trace.1301 
 
Secondly, concerning migrants at sea as a security problem, we can conclude that States 
have the tendency to expand the policing rights they have (especially on the high seas), but 
meanwhile try to avoid extraterritorial human rights obligations. As some provisions in the 
LOSC lend themselves for an extensive interpretation, States have quite liberally made use of 
this possibility. However, this is not necessarily illegitimate. It must be borne in mind that 
the legal system relating to the oceans and seas based on the LOSC needs to be further 
developed in order to cope with new challenges facing the international community. 
Necessary measures – taken in for example the area of maritime security – as a result of a 
multilateral negotiating process certainly justify further limitations of the traditional 
freedoms of the seas, as this is in the interest of humankind as a whole.1302 The ‘package deal 
concept’ of the LOSC should not stand in the way of progress. It should only mean that there 
is a need for caution and a preference of evolution over revolution. 1303 It is clear that States, in 
coping with the problem of irregular migration by sea, tend to interdict vessels on the high 
seas based on the fact that the migrant vessels are stateless. Even if a further jurisdictional 
nexus is necessary to seize these vessels, international law offers several possibilities to 
legally carry out seizures. The hypothesis that there is a tension between the freedom of the 
high seas and the objective of suppressing irregular migration by sea ignores the fact that the 
principle of the freedom of the high seas reflect and protects important interests, notably 
                                                 
1301 LEG, “Report of the Legal Committee on the work of its ninety-eight session”, IMO Doc. LEG 98/14 (18 
April 2011), Annex 9. 
1302 TUERK, Helmut, Reflections on the Contemporary Law of the Sea (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
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including security and law enforcement interests themselves.1304 Nevertheless, States also 
have to bear in mind that they do not operate within a legal vacuum when operating on the 
high seas. The Hirsi Case confirms the trend towards an extraterritorial application of the 
non-refoulement principle in case of effective control. Although this is currently not yet 
customary international law, it is hoped that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR will influence 
jurisdictions in other world regions.1305 Next to this, there is still a lacuna, namely in case of 
the diversion of vessels on the high seas. As there is probably no effective control – since the 
persons are for example not transferred onto a vessel of the diverting State – the non-
refoulement principle will most likely not be applicable. 
 
Lastly, when confronting safety and security with human rights, we saw that these 
different fields of law meet in many situations. Especially in the field of search and rescue at 
sea, the SAR and SOLAS Conventions and the accompanying soft law provisions, are taking 
into account the non-refoulement principle. On the other hand, the ECtHR considers the law of 
the sea when appropriate, especially in cases of interception. It is important to note that the 
factual and legal context can make the mechanical application of national or regional human 
rights standards inappropriate. As some human rights are simply very difficult to provide 
for at sea – such as access to an independent lawyer – courts should be realistic in case of 
such exceptional circumstances.1306 Although a contextual interpretation of the relevant 
human rights is certainly pragmatic, we have to bear in mind that some of the problems 
encountered are reasonably foreseeable. Therefore, Governments are able to consider in 
advance the measures that could be taken to ensure compliance with ordinary and 
established human rights principles.1307 Also, the confusion between maritime safety and 
security was discussed. The search and rescue framework is sometimes being (ab)used to 
intercept. Next to this, although the definition of migrant smuggling seems quite clear, it was 
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pointed out that States sometimes confuse – willingly or unwillingly – rescuers with 
smugglers. These problems have one common element: different areas of international law 
cross, creating confusion on how to deal with a certain situation. The high-level interagency 
group on the treatment of persons at sea is able to address these interdisciplinary issues as 
each agency can rely on the diverse competences they have. The high-level interagency 
cooperation has already proved that it is efficient in improving the legal framework 
concerning search and rescue at sea by tackling some of the main practical problems. 
Unfortunately, until now interagency cooperation has almost exclusively been focusing on 
safety issues, such as rescue. By creating a new dialogue on the security concerns, the 
problem of migrant smuggling could be handled more efficiently. However, the most 
essential ingredient for an effective and a comprehensive response to the problem of 
migration by sea – together with the adoption and the implementation of the relevant 
international instruments – is strengthened cooperation between States.1308  
 
Nevertheless, even though States can take initiatives to tackle the root causes of 
migration – there will always be a certain level of migration. Moreover, as soon as a maritime 
migration route is identified and closed down, smugglers and/or migrants will adjust either 
the route or their modus operandi to stay ahead of detection. Therefore, even though States 
may cooperate and come to a workable solution, the job is never finished. 
 
2. Suggestions 
 
2.1. Suggestions with regard to safety concerns 
 
- Sign, ratify and implement the relevant international legislation to ensure that migrants are 
rescued in accordance with the search and rescue regime and harmonize domestic 
legislation.  
- Agree on the respective SRRs and avoid overlaps. 
                                                 
1308 UNODC, “Smuggling of Migrants by Sea”, Issue Paper (2011), 8, available online: 
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- Develop (regional) arrangements for disembarkation of persons rescued at sea and their 
delivery to a place of safety and link these arrangements to burden-sharing. 
- Encourage shipmasters to use the IMO/UNHCR practical guide on rescue at sea and to 
inform IMO, UNHCR and other relevant actors when disembarkation proves problematic.  
- Develop SOPs for seafarers and RCC personnel. 
- Relieve shipmasters of responsibility to care for rescued persons as soon as possible.  
- Put in place compensation mechanisms for ships that suffer financial losses.  
- Impose sanctions against masters who ignore distress calls and do not rescue persons in 
distress at sea. 
- Hold States, which ignore distress calls and do not rescue persons in distress at sea, 
responsible. 
- Examine allegations of failure to rescue persons at sea. 
- Consider new technologies to detect persons in distress. 
- Consider new technologies to detect vessels that ignore distress calls. 
- Consider means by which information on the migrants can be shared without 
compromising other sensitive information. 
 
2.2. Suggestions with regard to security concerns 
 
- Avoid embarkation of migrants, thereby respecting the right to leave. 
- Carry out joint operations at sea and conclude cooperation or shiprider agreements. 
- Clarify the role and responsibilities of all parties involved in joint operations at sea and/or 
cooperation or shiprider agreements. 
- Investigate the smuggling of migrants at sea and identify the actual smugglers. 
- Not criminalize shipmasters for migrant smuggling when they have rescued persons at sea. 
- Not criminalize smuggled migrants and assess their protection needs. 
- Reduce the profit incentives of migrant smugglers. 
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- Implement international standards into domestic legislation to reflect international and 
regional refugee law and human rights law. 
- Equip vessels involved in interception to assess special (protection) needs of migrants at 
sea.  
- In case of diversion to a third country, ensure the safety of the migrants and their effective 
protection. 
 
2.3. Suggestions with regard to common concerns 
 
- Recognize that the law of the sea and humanitarian/human rights law are not separate 
fields of law. 
- Clarify whether – and in which circumstances – diversions of migrants at sea can be 
categorized as exercising effective control. 
- Do not categorize interception operations as search and rescue operations and/or use rescue 
as a pretext to undertake interception without grounds. 
- Develop strengthened high-level interagency cooperation which also deals with 
interception at sea and migrant smuggling. 
- Stimulate (regional) cooperation between States by drafting burden-sharing agreements. 
- Carry out research on push and pull factors of migration by sea. 
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